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1Introduction
The opposite of a correct statement is a false state-
ment. But the opposite of a profound truth may
well be another profound truth.
Niels Bohr to Werner Heisenberg
In Tom Stoppard’s play Arcadia (1993) Bernard the literary
scholar and Valentine the mathematician have an on-going feud
over the value of their respective fields of interest. Their verbal
duels are a fine example of the age-old argument over whether
science and literature can be meaningful. Bernard berates science
for only providing meaningless factual details: he ‘can’t think of
anything more trivial than the speed of light’ (A 61), and he feels
that cosmology is pointless compared to the beauty and insight in
Byron’s poetry. Valentine, on the other hand, voices the excite-
ment generated by new scientific knowledge, and has the satisfac-
tion of seeing Bernard’s pet theory destroyed by one of those triv-
ial factual details (A 88). In the play the two opinions find a bal-
ance, and both poetry and the non-human physical world engage
the human imagination. If Bernard argues that all relevant knowl-
edge is self-knowledge (A 61), the elements of chaos theory in the
play show that scientific knowledge can be vital to gaining an un-
derstanding of our own place in the physical scheme of things,
which makes it a natural part of attaining true self-knowledge.
Like Stoppard, many literary critics and theorists have com-
mented on the discoveries of chaos theory, but unlike the play-
wright, many of them have taken those discoveries to mean that
we live in a universe where shape, coherence and knowledge are
illusions. Even many critics writing on Arcadia seem to assume
that since it thematises chaos theory, it must be a play about frac-
tured time, lost meanings and the absurdity of the human condi-
tion. But Stoppard has, in fact, created a play in which chaos the-
ory symbolises precisely the ways in which human beings can gain
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knowledge of the world and make that knowledge meaningful in
their particularly human context.
This study arose from the need to explain a group of literary
works that have clearly been influenced by chaos theory, but
which equally clearly fall outside the categories and descriptions
suggested by previous theoretical approaches to literature and
chaos theory. Although these previous publications have made
important contributions to understanding the complex ways in
which order and disorder have been conceptualised in postmod-
ern culture, their emphasis on the disordered end of the spectrum
makes them unable to accommodate works that, while obviously
referring to the methods of chaos theory and the systems it stud-
ies, also engage the order found in the seemingly complex, the
possibility of coherent meaning despite the noise in the message,
and the physical reality that lurks behind human sign systems.
These three conceptual clusters are the foci for this study and
form the backbone of the discussion in chapters 2 through 4.
Most of the literary discussions on chaos theory focus on the
relationship between the individual mind and what surrounds it –
whether other texts or other beings, fictional or real. From the
mid-1900s onwards the way Western culture has understood that
relationship has been influenced by the idea of physical existence
as information. After the Second World War the epistemological
implications of the theory of relativity, quantum mechanics and
Claude Shannon’s work on information and entropy created a
paradigm of uncertainty. This paradigm displaced the overly op-
timistic views of the reliability of information and, once human
beings were demoted from their special status as the pinnacle of
creation, it was seen to explain not only the essential functions of
the physical universe, but also that of human language and con-
sciousness. All this formed what Patricia Waugh (2005: 243) has
called  the  ‘scriptoral  metaphor’:  a  view of  existence  as  a  flow of
information that moves inevitably towards its own extinction.
Many authors have seen chaos theory in the light of this para-
digm. I would argue, however, that there is another dimension in-
volved, one that, instead of concentrating on a universally appli-
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cable model of information, emphasises the various intercon-
nected physicalities which exist on the level of human experience.
Where the paradigm of information has continued to influence
the neo-Darwinist descriptions of human beings as ruled by their
genetic programming, and the poststructuralist theories of all-
encompassing textuality (Waugh 2005: 242-244), what I call the
humanist perspective describes embodied human minds and their
interaction with a universe which is physical, though to a large ex-
tent culturally mediated. Analyzing the reception of chaos theory
in literary studies offers us a way of bringing these two paradigms
into clearer focus.
The title of my study reflects this difference in emphasis be-
tween previous approaches and the one presented here. Not only
does this work aim to give an overall description of those per-
spectives to chaos theory that have been adopted within the hu-
manities in general and literary studies in particular, but it also
aims to point out the specifically humanist themes that authors
have found in chaos theory, but which the literary critical and
theoretical discussion has to a large extent ignored. Thus, in this
context ‘humanist’ refers firstly to the area of scholarship that ex-
amines human beings and human meanings instead of purely
physical phenomena. Chaos theory may be a set of ideas devel-
oped in mathematics and physics to explain physical systems, but
it also creates resonances in certain concepts dealt with in the
humanities. Secondly, the term ‘humanist’ refers to specific ap-
proaches in the humanities, approaches that have their starting-
points in what some would see as old-fashioned conceptualisa-
tions of artistic form, identity and reality.1 While aware of the
fraught history of the term and the criticism it has received, I sug-
gest that it can still serve to describe the perspective discussed
1 In this context ‘humanism’ does not refer, for example, to the discussion
about the relative positions of Christian religion and secular humanism (ei-
ther in the form of Enlightenment rationality or the current theories of bio-
logical determinism), nor to the more specifically North American debate
between Humanism and what has been called the Moral Majority (see La-
mont 1949/1982).
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here. What I see as particularly humanist elements in that perspec-
tive  are  an  interest  in  durable  forms,  in  human  identity,  and  in
building ideas of representation on some version of epistemologi-
cal realism. In addition, within the context of the accumulation of
knowledge the term carries ideological implications by focusing
on communal effort and a respect for other voices.2 All of these
aspects of humanism have received criticism, starting from the
anti-classical theories of artistic form, and running all the way
through to the deconstruction of the subject and of linguistic ref-
erence.3 Without wishing to return to the control-centred, essen-
tialist and backward-looking positions that humanism has occu-
pied in the past (in particular through European imperialism), my
aim in  adopting  the  term in  spite  of  its  ideological  baggage  is  to
show that chaos theory is being used specifically as a way of open-
ing up new approaches to issues bracketed by anti-humanist cri-
tique. The authors and scholars discussed here try to go beyond
the structuralist and poststructuralist theories by combining stabil-
ity with dynamics in order to try and conceptualise a humanism
that could accommodate the critique. Thus this study employs
‘humanism’ to denote a particular attitude towards structure, iden-
tity and reality, without implying that it is either a synchronically
or a diachronically consistent philosophical position.4
2 Humanism has been connected to an interest in coherent form particu-
larly in the context of Renaissance humanism and its attention to classical
proportions. For humanism associated with a view of identity as a unitary
phenomenon and a source of agency see e.g. Said (2004: 41-43), and with
epistemological realism see e.g. von Wright (1977).
3 For overviews of anti-humanist critique see Soper (1986) and Davies
(1997: 35-71, 127-135).
4 Even though I am keen to emphasise that the thinking associated here
with humanism has undergone changes and is still continually developing, I
do not want to be drawn into dubbing the approach a ‘new humanism’,
since that term has itself already been associated with various interpreta-
tions, including the ‘problematization of man’ that took place during the
Enlightenment (von Wright 1977: 15), the 1920s argument for a return to
the classics in the American universities (Said 2004: 17-18) and what Georg
Lukács (1983: 28) has described as the view of ‘man as a product of himself
and his own activity in history’. On ‘posthumanity’ see section 3.1.
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The phrase ‘texture of reality’ in my title comes from a chap-
ter title in Ian Stewart’s popular science book Does God Play Dice?
(1989/1997), where it refers to the fractal forms discovered in na-
ture by chaos theory. In this study the phrase refers not only to
those forms of reality, but also to their textual representations.
The authors considered here do not see reality as textuality but as
a physical realm which is accessible to the human mind. This ac-
cess is achieved not only through the physical sciences, but also
through individual human experience, at least in so far as the
mind is able to develop a feel for the texture of reality – to intui-
tively form a sense of the dynamics that are expressed in physical
things. Moreover, the texts discussed in this thesis attempt to re-
enact in language the forms discovered by chaos theory: the self-
similarity of fractals and the infinite but constrained loops of
strange attractors. These are the textures that my readings attempt
to make felt to the reader.
As the opening epigraph of this introduction suggests, al-
though this thesis has its roots in my own sense that the dominant
interpretation of chaos theory in literary studies is incomplete, I
do not mean to imply that it is completely misguided. The ques-
tion is whether to emphasise complexity or simplicity; whether au-
thors and scholars are more interested in the varieties of intricate
works and interpretations, or in the larger patterns of shared ele-
ments appearing in literature and in human minds. Chaos theory
can provide metaphors for both approaches, and in the hands of
some authors it preserves the balance between the two. Thus I set
out to delineate the humanist perspective to chaos theory not in
order to eclipse the previous interpretations, but with the aim of
shedding light on that end of the chaotic spectrum which has
within literary studies (though not in literary works) received less
attention. Further, I aim to clarify the theoretical positions that
form the background to the whole discussion and are perhaps the
reason why the humanist aspects of chaos theory have remained
so much out of sight.
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Enter Chaos Theory
During the 1960s and 1970s scientists in various fields were work-
ing on both natural phenomena and mathematical abstractions
which, though relatively simple systems, did not behave as pre-
dicted by the calculations. They eventually developed new math-
ematical formulae to deal with these discrepancies, and collec-
tively these methods became known as chaos theory. Examples of
chaotic behaviour have now been found in weather patterns,
stock-market price fluctuations, dripping taps, the motion of as-
teroids and the erratic eye-movements of schizophrenics. In such
systems discrepancies do not just appear briefly before settling
down into an equilibrium, but instead one minute change sparks
another, and another, until the overall behaviour of the system
bears no resemblance to the original predictions. But it is impor-
tant to note that even while embracing the unpredictability of
natural phenomena, chaos theory by no means denies determin-
ism.
Thus scientific chaos does not, despite the common sense of
the word, mean randomness, but nonlinearity; it does lack pre-
dictability, but it has discernible form. Furthermore, while disor-
der does increase in the universe as a whole (as thermodynamics
showed by discovering entropy in the nineteenth century) chaos
theory demonstrates that simple formulae, expressed as iterated
algorithms, may also create pockets of negentropy: they give rise
to infinitely complex and unpredictable structures. The point is
that the universe may still be winding down, but it is not simply
breaking down the structures we already recognise. Instead, it is
also constantly creating new, dynamic structures. In this way
chaos theorists set aside the most pessimistic reactions to entropy
and emphasise the presence of emergent complexity: ‘Somehow, after
all, as the universe ebbs toward its final equilibrium in the feature-
less heat bath of maximum entropy, it manages to create interest-
ing structures’ (Gleick 1987/1988: 308).
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Fig. 1.  A detail from the boundary of Mandelbrot Set, the most famous of
fractals.5
The central concepts in chaos theory have to do either with
such complex dynamics of change or, in particular, with the geo-
metrical presentations of those dynamics. Fractals are geometric
shapes whose dimension is neither 1 (line), 2 (plane) nor 3 (solid),
but, for example, 1.26 (snowflake) (Stewart 1989/1997: 205). The
most frequently mentioned characteristics of fractals are their in-
finite depth (successive zooming to smaller and smaller details
only reveals ever more details) and their self-similarity,  the way the
shapes revealed by the zooming strongly resemble one another
from level to level.
  Another geometrical way of envisioning the dynamics of
chaos are strange attractors.  An  attractor  is  defined  as  whatever
shape a system’s activity settles down to (Stewart 1989/1997: 99).
The reason why chaotic systems have attractors deemed strange is
5 ‘Mandel zoom 03 seehorse’. Created by Wolfgang Beyer with the pro-
gramme Ultra Fractal 3. Wikimedia Commons. <http://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Mandel_zoom_03_seehorse.jpg>. Accessed
25.9.2008.
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that their activity does not settle into either a single state (a point
on a graph) or a limit cycle (a loop), but instead creates a trajec-
tory that is, in fact, a fractal. The lines of a strange attractor split
into an infinite number of further lines, indicating a behaviour
that is in some sense settled (it does not leave the area defined by
the attractor) but is, at the same time, infinitely variable within
those settled parameters.
Fig. 2. The strange attractor by Edward Lorenz, known as the butterfly attractor.6
6 ‘Attracteur étrange de Lorenz (1963)’. Created by user Zweistein. Wikime-
dia Commons. <http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Lorenz.jpg>.
Accessed 30.10.2008.
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These four concepts: emergent complexity, fractals, self-
similarity and strange attractors will recur in several contexts in this
study and form the core of the view of chaos theory presented
here. One further note of clarification on terminology should be
made: chaos theory here refers to the collection of mathematical
methods and physical theories that aim to explain chaotic behav-
iour, and chaos to the behaviour of the systems thus studied.
The boom in the study of chaos took place during the 1980s
and 1990s, as is shown by Weingart and Maasen’s (1997: 467-471)
analysis of the number of occurrences within the Science Citation
Index (SCI) between the years 1974 and 1996. During the twenty-
two-year period the number of documents with ‘chaos’ or ‘cha-
otic’ in their titles rose from 23 to 1,008. Scientific popularisations
began to appear fairly quickly after the formulation of the theory
in professional articles (Paul 2004: 37-42), culminating in two par-
ticularly influential books: science journalist James Gleick’s best-
selling Chaos: Making a New Science (1987/1998), which remains the
most often cited source for authors, poets and playwrights, and
Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers’s Order Out of Chaos: Man’s
New Dialogue with Nature (1984), a more philosophically oriented
work by a Nobel-prize-winning chemist and a philosopher of sci-
ence, which has greatly influenced many literary scholars.
On the basis of these and other works, chaos became a popu-
lar new concept during the 1990s and it appeared both in dozens
of works of literature and in literary criticism and theory.7 Clearly,
chaos theory is not the first scientific idea to leave its mark in the
literary field. The effects of, for example, the theory of evolution,
thermodynamics and quantum mechanics have been extensively
studied (see e.g. Wilson and Bowen 2001, Beer 1983/2000 and
7 The MLA database lists ‘chaos theory’ as a subject term for the first time
in 1988 for N. Katherine Hayles’s SubStance article on Michel Serres. Subse-
quently the number of books or articles per year averages around ten, the
strongest years being between 1994 and 2002. An early peak is formed by
Hayles’s collection Chaos and Order in 1991 (16 occurrences), as its chapters
are listed separately in the database.
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Strehle 1992). Like these earlier notions, chaos theory found reso-
nances in the cultural atmosphere of its time. As N. Katherine
Hayles (1990) has argued, the themes of unpredictability, fractal
diffusion and reflexivity were well in place in postmodern works
of literature by the time chaos theory was articulated in the sci-
ences, thus making the theory an attractive analogy for literary
scholars. The popularity of chaos theory in literary studies, how-
ever, is also closely connected with the nature of the disciplines of
literature and chaos theory themselves. The appearance of chaos
theory in literary studies has had as much to do with the way both
of those disciplines were taken as representatives of their respec-
tive fields in discussions over interdisciplinary epistemology, as
with the vision chaos theory gives of the dynamics of the uni-
verse. From C. P. Snow’s lecture8 onwards, literature has been
presented as the paradigmatic arts subject, a position due both to
the nature of the original debate over the status of English litera-
ture in the British educational system in the early twentieth cen-
tury (Cordle 1999: 13-14), and to the authority of literary theory
within more recent, postmodern approaches in the humanities.
Chaos theory, on the other hand, with its interest in nonlinearity,
unpredictability and margins has often been represented both in
popular science and within the humanities as a herald of a para-
digm shift towards a new, postmodern science (though chaos sci-
entists themselves have played down such a revolutionary status;
see e.g. Gleick 1987/1998: 306-307 and Hayles 1990: 22-23). In
other words, many scholars have seized upon chaos theory and
literature as a field of study which is assumed to be particularly re-
vealing about the arts and the sciences in general.
The timing of the chaos boom in literary studies can thus be
related on the one hand to the postmodern Zeitgeist and,  on  the
other hand, to a specific set of popularised books which made
8 C.P. Snow’s Rede Lecture of May 1959, in which he famously stated that
the arts and the sciences are ‘two cultures’ which no longer understand one
another. The ensuing debate, originally between Snow and F. R. Leavis,
continued ferociously in the 1990s in form of the ‘Science Wars’. See also
pp. 19-20.
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chaos theory available to non-specialists. Further, the ever-
increasing prestige of the natural sciences over the human sci-
ences, and the institutional rewards offered to interdisciplinary
projects during the latter half of the twentieth century have also
induced many literary scholars to legitimise their work by referring
to mathematics and physics. Others have been drawn to chaos
theory simply because of their wish to explicate particular literary
works in which chaos appears as a thematic and/or structural
element. This latter group of texts consists of traditional contex-
tual analysis in which chaos theory simply appears as part of the
ideational context of the text, and as such are not representative
of interdisciplinarity as it is usually defined. Others use the termi-
nology of chaos theory metaphorically in order to suggest new
avenues for literary analysis, or to clarify methods already in place.
Some critics and theorists even argue that literary works actually
are chaotic systems and that the methods of analysis developed by
chaos theory should thus be combined with those currently used
by literary scholars. Despite such arguments, however, examples
of literary analysis actually using the methods, not just the under-
lying ideas, of chaos theory have not appeared. This is due to the
simple fact that in order to subject a literary text to the methods
of chaos theory, its constitutive elements should first be rendered
in numerical form – a task which is unsurprisingly difficult.
The single most influential monograph that has been pub-
lished in the field of chaos and literature is N. Katherine Hayles’s
Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in Contemporary Literature and Science
from 1990. It is the work to which most others refer, and it estab-
lished that the relationship between chaos theory and literature is
not only worth studying but also diagnostic of much wider issues
in postmodern cultural theory. In this particular field Hayles is a
figure that cannot be bypassed, not only because of her seminal
monograph and the collection of articles she edited the following
year, but also because so many of the central issues affecting the
field appear in her later work as well, even though not specifically
in the context of chaos theory. Chaos Bound presents the cultural
implications of chaos split in two between the philosophical ‘or-
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der-arising-out-of-chaos’ paradigm, associated with French intel-
lectual circles and Ilya Prigogine, and the ‘order-within-the-chaos’
paradigm, associated with chaos scientists, the concept of the
strange attractor and explanations about the behaviour of real sys-
tems. This study traces a similar division, but where Hayles takes
literary theory to represent the former view and science the latter,
I argue that it is possible to see a contingent of authors and schol-
ars within the field of literature who adhere to what Hayles pre-
sents as the natural scientists’ conceptualisation of chaos and its
implications.
Another book I would like to draw attention to in this intro-
duction is Gordon Slethaug’s Beautiful Chaos: Chaos Theory and
Metachaotics in Recent American Fiction (2000). Slethaug makes a
valuable contribution by pointing out that authors have incorpo-
rated chaos theory to their texts in several different ways. Many
works, he suggests, rely on metaphorical structures based on the
ideas of order and randomness. In others the specific concepts of
chaos theory are woven into the content of the work, either by
creating chaotic structural patterns or through explicit plot refer-
ences to chaos theory. More rarely the literary works also reflect
on their own use of the patterns of chaos and thematise the im-
plications of those patterns for literature and for life. While
Slethaug’s point that this reflective or ‘metachaotic’ use of chaos
result  in  the  most  nuanced  use  of  chaos  theory  is  well  made,  I
would like to qualify his further suggestion that ‘[o]f the three, the
use of metaphor is arguably the least complex or grounded in the
specifics of scientific theory, for metaphors are applicable to gen-
eral expressions of order and disorder rather than to specific
manifestations of new theories and practices’ (Slethaug 2000:
164). Considering the fact that one of the authors Slethaug fo-
cuses on in the volume is John Barth, whose use of metaphors
based on chaos theory is both explicit and effective, this state-
ment requires the further clarification that there is a marked dif-
ference between metaphors that refer to chaos and order as gen-
eral concepts and metaphors drawn specifically from the science
of dynamical systems. Whereas the former are found in literature
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throughout history, the latter are applicable to the ‘specific mani-
festations of new theories and practices’ Slethaug calls for, and
thus their interpretation calls for a different conceptual context.
The blurring of the traditional metaphorical meanings of
chaos and order with the concepts presented in chaos theory is a
common problem in literary criticism. A symptomatic example is
Philip Kuberski’s Chaosmos: Literature, Science, and Theory (1994),
where the conceptualisation of chaos is split between the theory
and the textual analyses. Where the first chapter discusses interest-
ing issues of chaos theory, self-organisation and materiality, the
others refer almost exclusively to the older chaos/cosmos dichot-
omy, even as Kuberski presents various solutions by authors
(James Joyce, T.S. Eliot, E.M. Forster, Norman Mailer, James
Merrill and Doris Lessing) that go beyond that dichotomy.9 In
contrast, this study concentrates exclusively on the metaphors that
arise, not from the traditional opposition between chaos and or-
der, but from the scientific theory which aims to explain chaos in
the new sense of dynamical systems and emergent complexity.10
My central argument is based on the following two points.
Firstly, the theoretical arguments created by literary scholars about
the meaning of chaos theory for literature do not accommodate
all the literary works which use chaos theory as a conceptual
background. Secondly, I believe that the blind spots revealed in
these scholars’ interpretations of chaos theory match certain ques-
tions in current literary theory that have been left unattended, and
that the literary works which engage the humanist end of the
spectrum of metaphorical possibilities offered by chaos theory
point towards new answers to those questions.
9 In chapter IV Kuberski (1994: 182, 184) explicitly equates chaos with en-
tropy rather than dynamical systems.
10 One scholar with an explicit aim of constructing a similar review is Brian
Ward, whose PhD thesis from 1998 examines the ‘appropriation’ of chaos
theory in literary studies and discusses issues such as politics, environment
and psychology. Ward’s sources, however, naturally focus on the fairly early
writings on chaos theory and literature and he does not identify the human-
ist tendencies that are in focus here.
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Primary Material
A central issue when choosing primary material for a study of sci-
entific ideas in literary texts is whether the idea should be treated
as primary and its appearance in literature as secondary. For many
literary critics studying chaos theory and literature has meant
showing how the unpredictability and nonlinearity of chaotic sys-
tems are reflected both in the plot and the textual elements of in-
dividual works. Occasionally these literary works themselves do
contain particular interpretations of chaos theory, but most critics
seem more interested in either coaxing from them chaos-like
characteristics or simply applying methods based on chaos theory
to works that have been chosen according to some other criteria.
For example Hawkins (1995) and Nemesvari (1997) have fol-
lowed Hayles (1990: 22-23) in arguing that old texts can be fruit-
fully analysed using new paradigms, and that comparisons with
chaos theory reveal aspects of older works which otherwise would
not  have  been  noticed.  More  recently,  Hayles  (2000:  2)  has  also
pointed out that a chaotic analysis of a work which does not ex-
plicitly discuss chaos theory in its modern form could also be use-
ful in clarifying the philosophical and aesthetic implications of
chaos theory – i.e. that the combination of contemporary theory
and past literature might discover something new about chaos as a
methodological tool rather than just about the literary work which
is being examined. This is exactly what the best work on chaos
theory and literature has managed to do: to bring together two
seemingly very different ideational constructs and produce new
information on both.
In this work I aim to reveal something new both about
chaos-inspired literature and about the nature of contemporary
literary scholarship by analysing literary works and critical texts
side  by  side.  As  the  focus  is  on  tracing  the  different  emphases
given to chaos theory in different aspects of literary culture, the
literary works I have chosen can clearly be shown to be taking
part in the discussion surrounding chaos theory, whereas others
which could be linked to the themes of order, disorder, identity or
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epistemology, but which make no direct reference to chaos theory
or complexity as such are excluded. The works discussed here also
incorporate chaos as a thematic element, rather than an incidental
cultural detail or plot device. I focus on three authors in particu-
lar: British playwright Tom Stoppard (born 1937), American nov-
elist John Barth (born 1930) and American poet Jorie Graham
(born 1950). Stoppard’s chaos-inspired play Arcadia opened in
London on 13 April 1993 and immediately became a huge critical
and popular success, becoming one of the fastest-selling play
scripts  in  the  history  of  British  theatre  (Nadel  2002:  447).  It  is
possible, however, that the audience’s keenness to buy the text
had less to do with their admiration of it than with the necessity
of reading the play either before or after seeing it in order to un-
derstand exactly what is going on. Stoppard has for years been ac-
cused of packing his plays too full of obscure references to aes-
thetics, philosophy and physics, and although Arcadia is more suc-
cessful in incorporating them into a story than most of his previ-
ous works, there is still a lot in the play for the audience to absorb
in one sitting. Over the years, Arcadia has received considerable
critical attention and many critics have also analysed its use of
chaos theory. What still remains to be done, however, is to see
how Stoppard’s interpretation of chaos connects to the larger de-
bate concerning chaos theory and literature – in particular the
epistemological and ontological questions discussed in this study.
John Barth has also explicitly incorporated chaos theory into
his novels and short stories at least since 1994. Barth has generally
been seen, along with authors such as Donald Barthelme, Robert
Coover and Thomas Pynchon, as one of the foremost representa-
tives of American postmodern fabulism (Scholes 1967), but his
work can also be seen to represent strong humanist tendencies. In
his writing chaos theory appears as a metaphor for the intercon-
nectedness of the individual and culture, of present and past
voices, as well as for the balance between innovation and recog-
nisable constraints in literary structure. Barth, in particular, can
also be seen as an author who uses chaos theory to speak simulta-
neously about reality and about the ways in which we interpret re-
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ality: chaos appears in his works both as a physical phenomenon
that links human beings to the universe through self-similar dy-
namics, and as a metafictional metaphor for the process of mean-
ing-making and story-telling.11 Barth and Stoppard receive their
special place in this dissertation for three reasons: both have pub-
lished at least one major work that centrally thematises chaos the-
ory;  their  works are of  a  quality  and complexity  that  rewards ex-
tended  analysis;  and  the  issues  their  works  deal  with  through
chaos theory are similar to those that appear in the works of many
of the literary theorists, and thereby make the dialogue I hope to
set up between literary works and theory possible.
Jorie Graham has been regarded as a poet who, like Barth, is
reacting to her own language as she is writing it, and exploring
what happens in the gap between her language and the ineffable
(Gardner 1999: 1-4). After five collections of poems that appeared
between 1980 and 1993, Graham’s selected poems, The Dream of a
Unified Field (1995) won the Pulitzer prize in 1996. Since then she
has published five more collections, the latest of which is Sea
Change from 2008. In her poetry chaos theory appears as one
among many other scientific and philosophical theories concern-
ing existence and perception, in particular the theory of relativity,
cognitive science and phenomenology. The role Graham gives to
chaos theory is closely connected to Barth’s and Stoppard’s con-
ceptualisations, as her poems represent simultaneously the seeth-
ing complexity of the physical universe and the difficulty of that
act of representation.
In addition to the works by Stoppard, Barth and Graham I
refer to a number of other authors as examples of the humanist
interpretation of chaos theory. While many works – popular nov-
els especially – suffer from their authors’ enthusiasm to educate
11 In contrast, even Robert Rebein (2001: 3-7), who argues for a definition
of realism that would include the techniques of metafiction, does not in-
clude John Barth in the camp of American new realists, but rather counts
him, mainly on the basis of Barth’s 1967 essay ‘The Literature of Exhaus-
tion’ as representing the kind of postmodernism that too narrowly concen-
trates on formal play.
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their audience about chaos theory, others present their readers
with more intricate experiments on what the implications of chaos
theory might be for different areas of human experience. The
works discussed here are representatives of a wide variety of gen-
res and traditions, from poetry to metafiction and from short sto-
ries to drama, and I believe this variety to support the notion of a
general humanist perspective which transcends generic conven-
tions. On the other hand, I hope to have respected the heteroge-
neity of the material by adopting different techniques of reading
for different genres, without, however, losing sight of the main
purpose of this dissertation. The texts have been analysed with an
eye to their original context, but all in order to reveal how chaos
fits into their overall theme and structure.12
What is more, it must be kept in mind that not all fiction,
drama and poetry which is presented within literary studies as be-
ing ‘about science’ is actually about science as a method of human
inquiry at all, but instead about the kinds of natural phenomena
that have been revealed or explained by that inquiry. This differ-
ence becomes crucial in chapter 4, which discusses literary epis-
temology and the question of realism. The fact that literary works
include scientist characters who proceed to tell their companions
(and readers) about the latest break-throughs in dynamical sys-
tems theory does not necessarily mean that that work thematises
science as such. Often the case is that the scientific ideas are tools
by which the book speaks about the reality that the science has
revealed. In this way many of the works considered in this disser-
tation use chaos theory to discuss things other than the differ-
ences and commonalities between art and science. These include
the complex and unpredictable, yet structured reality that human-
ity interacts with, the ebb and flow of popular culture, the organi-
sation of societies, or even the search for God. What all the texts
share is an ambiguity about the roles of order and randomness. In
12 It may also be noted that the only dramatist discussed here is Stoppard,
whose works are much more text-centered and under closer authorial con-
trol than most contemporary drama (see e.g. Corballis 1984: 10).
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chaos theory the authors have found a way of approaching that
ambiguity through a scientific model – a metaphor for the com-
plexity of human experience that is simultaneously true about the
physical world.
Some of these texts, Stoppard’s Arcadia in particular, have al-
ready received considerable attention, but I hope to show that
analysing them together and in the context of the interpretations
of chaos theory within literary scholarship will reveal new facets in
individual works and clarify an important contemporary intellec-
tual tendency. Lamarque and Olsen (1994: 391), in looking for
ways to define which aspects of epistemological theorising can be
useful for literary studies, separate two approaches: the reading of
‘philosophy in literature’ (i.e. ‘philosophy is subordinated to the
purpose and function of literature’) and the reading of ‘philoso-
phy through literature’ (i.e. fictive situation throwing light on e.g. a
moral problem within a philosophical discourse). My purpose in
this study is not to read the fictions purely for information about
the implications of chaos theory (chaos theory through literature),
nor to simply chronicle the ways in which fictions have made use
of chaos theory (chaos theory in literature). Instead I draw on the
literary works to point to certain recurring interpretations of
chaos theory in order to clarify theoretical issues, but also use the
theoretical issues connected to chaos to form new and hopefully
rewarding readings of the works themselves.
The secondary sources I rely on include several popular sci-
ence books on chaos theory and related sciences. Although I de-
rive from them a basic understanding of the concepts and meth-
ods of dynamical systems theory, I do not claim to have formed
an expert opinion on chaos theory, nor do I attempt to evaluate
the relative merits of the different popular presentations. In
choosing what to focus on I take Daniel Cordle (1999: 62-63) as
my guide and emphasise that the role of a literary critic engaging
science need not (and mostly should not) be an arbiter on the cor-
rectness of the various uses of scientific theories:
science may be distorted as it is popularised or otherwise dis-
seminated, and the writer may in any case misunderstand the sci-
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ence. It is unlikely to be the task of the literature-science critic to
sort out any such misapprehension, because a list of ticks and
crosses against the writer’s scientific references is unlikely to be
of much interest, and a critic with a literary background may in
any case be unqualified for such a task. Certainly, though, the
form in which the science is  presented is  of  interest,  and a  par-
ticular ‘take’ on a scientific idea may well be significant.
Thus  I  will  not  be  judging  whether  an  author  or  a  literary  critic
has understood or misunderstood chaos theory, but consider in-
stead the reasons why different interpretations exist.
Interestingly, not only is chaos seen in differing ways in litera-
ture, but the popular science presentations of chaos theory also
show various ‘takes’ on the subject, and there are marked differ-
ences as to which end of the chaotic spectrum is emphasised. For
example, the opposition between Gleick’s and Prigogine’s books
has been much commented on (e.g. Porush 1993). Jack Cohen
and Ian Stewart’s The  Collapse  of  Chaos:  Discovering  Simplicity  in  a
Complex World (1994/2000), and John Gribbin’s Deep Simplicity
(2004/2005), are both books whose very titles echo the way they
stress the simple, underlying rules of the dynamics that appear to
us as  chaos.  My own understanding of the implications of  chaos
theory draws more heavily on these works than on, for example,
Prigogine, for the simple reason that the view of chaos theory I
wish to examine in literary works does the same. Thus this study
focuses more on discernible shapes than on fragmentation, more
on self-similar repetitions and strange attractors than on the end-
lessly variable depths of fractals.
Background: Theorising Interdisciplinarity
Whenever a theory of physics and theories of literature are
brought together, it is important to make clear the project’s inter-
disciplinary position. The research field of literature and science
has featured two major discussions in the last century: the Snow
versus Leavis or ‘Two Cultures’ debate in the 1950s and 60s, and
the ‘Science Wars’ or ‘Sokal affair’ in the 1990s. The first of these
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was initiated by scientist and novelist C.P. Snow (1959/1998) with
his lecture on ‘The Two Cultures’, in which he castigated human-
ists for being so ignorant of basic scientific principles as to make
real communication between them and the scientists practically
impossible. The resulting discussion over what kind of knowledge
science and literature produce was famously continued by Tho-
mas Kuhn’s (1962/1970) theory of paradigm shifts and by the so-
ciology of science as practiced, for example, by Bruno Latour
(1987). Most recently the debate gained high visibility when physi-
cist Alan Sokal offered to the journal Social Text an article entitled
‘Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Her-
meneutics of Quantum Gravity’ (Sokal 1996a), which immediately
after its publication Sokal revealed to be a parody of postmodern
abuse of scientific concepts (Sokal 1996b). In the discussion that
followed the scientists argued that poststructuralist conceptual an-
alysis rudely misconstrued the true meaning of their ideas,
whereas literary and cultural theorists were baffled by the scien-
tists’ inability to understand metaphor, irony and the value of the
new meanings generated by the recontextualisation of scientific
concepts (see e.g. Sokal and Bricmont 1998, Cordle 1999, Labin-
ger and Collins 2001, Ashman and Baringer 2001).13
What, then, can be done to avoid the problems caused by
such interdisciplinary incomprehension? Much depends on how
interdisciplinarity itself is defined, whether it is seen as openness
and innovation or as power struggle and appropriation. So far,
perhaps the best-known analysis of interdisciplinary scholarship is
Julie Thompson Klein’s Interdisciplinarity: History, Theory and Practice
(1990), in which the definitions of multidisciplinarity, interdisciplinarity
and transdisciplinarity depend on the levels of the interaction taking
place between disciplines. In this scheme (Klein 1990: 55-73),
multidisciplinary approaches consist in the coming together of
scholars from various fields to provide multiple points of view to
a particular object or problem. Multidisciplinary approaches leave
the methodologies of the individual disciplines more or less intact,
13 For an overview of these debates and the philosophical issues involved
see Norris (2007: 107-133).
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whereas truly interdisciplinary work, as Klein proposes, would in-
volve some kind of methodological synthesis between the partici-
pating fields of research. Beyond these two co-operative modes
Klein sets transdisciplinarity, with its aim for an overarching syn-
thesis, or a larger vision covering several disciplines. Thus true in-
terdisciplinarity, as Klein sees it, is defined not so much through
the object of study – for example, a literary analysis of scientific
texts – but through an adoption of methods from one discipline
into another.
As Gillian Beer (1996) and Joe Moran (2002) have both
pointed out, an interdisciplinary synthesis also implies a transgres-
sion of the accepted disciplinary boundaries and a questioning of
the status of the various disciplines and the knowledge they pro-
duce. In Open Fields: Science in Cultural Encounter (1996: 173-195)
Beer examines the way ideas transform when they move from one
field to another, concentrating particularly on the adoption of sci-
entific concepts into works of literature. Such a process, she ar-
gues, can never be limited to a direct translation of ideas from one
realm to another, but always involves transformations and desta-
bilisations. Similarly, Moran (2002: 15) describes literary interdis-
ciplinarity as being fuelled by a postmodern questioning of the
epistemological foundations of disciplinary boundaries. Disci-
plines, Moran (2002: 83-84) suggests, are a ‘form of common
sense, allowing us to keep doing what we do without continually
speculating about its purpose, limits and ultimate worth’. What
transgressive interdisciplinarity does is to question that common
sense,  and  thus  it  should  be  viewed  as  ‘a  way  of  living  with  the
disciplines more critically and self-consciously, recognizing that
their most basic assumptions can always be challenged or rein-
vigorated by new ways of thinking from elsewhere’ (Moran 2002:
187).
The transgression that can be seen as the defining element of
interdisciplinarity in literary theory can turn in on itself and be-
come transdisciplinarity: an imperialistic attempt at creating a
Grand Unified Theory of human thought. The ferociousness of
the recent Science Wars, for example, can be seen to have arisen
Introduction
22
not so much from disciplines arguing over the suitability of par-
ticular uses of terminology (even though this is the format some
of the most famous volleys, particularly by Sokal and Bricmont in
1998, have taken). Rather, the aggression arises from one disci-
pline attempting to present itself as an overarching transdiscipline
to another field or method of research, subsuming it either as an
object of study (for example, when literary theory treats science as
a cultural/textual phenomenon) or as a particular sub-category of
itself (as when the natural sciences argue that literary study should
be just another form of empirical research). Works such as Jean-
François Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition (1984) and Gross and
Levitt’s Higher Superstition (1994) have exerted enormous influence
in cementing the prejudices each field of research has harboured
towards the other, the former by presenting scientific knowledge
as a form of discourse and analysing it as such, the latter by viru-
lently criticising sociological and cultural theories for not adhering
to what the authors see as the rules of proper scientific research.
Judging from the theoretical discussion, it would seem that
two prime motivations for interdisciplinary research in literature
are transgression and epistemological questioning on the one
hand, and attempts to achieve an overarching transdisciplinary
status on the other. In their provocatively titled book Academic
Tribes and Territories Tony Becher and Paul  R.  Trowler  (2001:  59)
explicitly describe many of the arguments arising in disciplinary
margins  as  territorial  disputes,  and  even  a  cursory  look  at  the
rhetoric of the Science Wars shows that in interdisciplinary dis-
cussion the implicit combination of the metaphors of ARGUMENT
IS WAR and KNOWLEDGE IS TERRITORY has become a cliché. But
often it is not quite clear whether the troops of one discipline are
transgressing and aim to destabilise borders in a particular region,
or whether they form the spearhead of an imperialistic invasion of
transdisciplinarians.
This study does not aim to be interdisciplinary in the sense of
applying chaos theory to literary works or to their interpretation.
What it does, instead, is trace a cluster of concepts in literary
works and in literary theory in order to find out how and why
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those concepts are being used. In this it may drift from the tradi-
tional path of literary analysis and lean towards conceptual analy-
sis or the history of ideas, but it certainly cannot be said to repre-
sent an in-depth methodological interchange between literature
and mathematics or physics. However, I do engage the results of
the sciences and, in particular, the way those results and their im-
plications to human existence have been interpreted. Therefore I
mean for Bohr’s comment in the epigraph to this introduction to
also be interpreted as an expression of the notion that science and
literature reach profound truths each in its  own way,  without in-
validating the other’s discoveries. Elinor S. Shaffer (1998: 12) ar-
gues that ‘[t]he approach of the humanities to the sciences is in
our time not just a curiosity or a diversion, or a parasitic coloniza-
tion, or a rearguard sniping operation – though at times it has
shown features of all of these – but a central feature of intellectual
life’. Similarly, I believe that the reason for the relevance of the
humanities to the sciences lies in the necessity of evaluating the
results  of  scientific  advances in terms of not only their  ability  to
generate more science or better commodities, but also in terms of
their consequences for our ideas about who, how, and where we
are as embodied, conscious and imaginative beings. Chaos theory
has been presented to the general public and to non-specialist
academics  as  a  paradigm that  changes,  for  example,  our  view of
the basic rules of interaction in the universe. In this study I ana-
lyse  the  ways  in  which  literary  authors  and  scholars  have  taken
that message on board, and the questions they feel the new para-
digm might be able to answer. These include the nature of the lit-
erary work as a structured object and how it can be described, the
formation of an identity in the relationship between self and
other, and, finally, the questions of mimesis, realism and episte-
mology. All of the underlying motivations for such interpretations
reflect different conceptions as to what a theory of physics has to
do with literary analysis.
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Metaphorical and Non-Metaphorical Uses of Chaos Theory
The ways in which chaos theory has been adopted within literary
studies vary considerably depending on the kind of contact they
posit to exist between the science, the scholarship and the literary
works under analysis.
At one extreme are the literary scholars who take as their
starting-point the idea of historical and cultural contextualisation.
Chaos theory has certainly inspired many authors of fiction,
drama and poetry, and the most straightforward argument would
be that a familiarity with the relevant scientific ideas is useful
background knowledge for any scholar working with such texts.
Slethaug’s Beautiful Chaos (2000) lacks both the extensive claims
and the revolutionary tone adopted by critics whose aim is to
equate literature with chaotic systems. Slethaug’s underlying as-
sumption is that literary works reflect the understanding of reality
current within their culture of origin, and since new scientific
theories change that understanding, being aware of the science
can help us in the analysis of individual works of literature.
‘American literature within the twentieth century’, he argues, ‘had
begun to change radically as conceptions of reality changed on the
basis of technology and science’ (Slethaug 2000: 5). Thus his own
methods of literary analysis are not affected by the methodology
of  chaos  as  such,  and  the  actual  analysis  of  literary  works  is  still
conducted on the basis of contextualised close reading for
themes, tropes and structures. Slethaug simply relates the concep-
tual make-up of the text, reconstructed on the basis of the textual
elements, to the one presented by chaos theory. The only ques-
tion mark raised by such scholarship in this context would be that
it is not really interdisciplinary in the sense defined by Klein
(1990).
However, there are also literary scholars who have explicitly
stated that the application of chaos theory in literary studies is
based on a true correspondence between the systems being stud-
ied. One example of such thinking can be found in Peter Stoi-
cheff’s essay ‘The Chaos of Metafiction’ (1991). Metafiction, Stoi-
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cheff argues, is a dynamical system which happens to exist not in
physical reality, but in language and culture.
It seems, at first, curious that metafictional texts possess charac-
teristics of chaotic systems in the phenomenal world, but they do.
[...] As much as possible, I want to avoid using chaotic structures
merely as a convenient metaphor or allegory for the structures
contained within metafiction. [...] The crucial purpose in exposing
the chaos and complexity of metafiction is not to provide another
vocabulary through which to speak of a text; nor is it to suggest
that the dynamics of metafiction are like those of chaos or of
complex systems. Instead, it is to show that metafiction displays
the properties located in what science calls chaos, and that a
metafiction text is a complex system. (1991: 85)
The snowballing rhetoric displayed by this passage leads the
reader through a series of steps towards the idea that literary texts
can be equated with a physical system. Stoicheff begins with an
equivocal suggestion of similarities and, as if gathering courage
while writing the paragraph, ends with an unequivocal statement
that ‘a metafiction text is a complex system’.14 After making his
radical claim, however, Stoicheff does not apply the mathematical
methods of chaos theory to the analysis of metafictional texts, but
merely points – through expressions such as the ‘Lorenz-like infi-
nite tracings of interpretation’, ‘the chaos of indeterminate mean-
ing’ and ‘the metafictional “narrative of chaos”’ (Stoicheff 1991:
90, 92, 95) – at similarities between the assumptions concerning
reality displayed in metafictional texts and in Prigogine’s explica-
tion of chaos theory in Order out of Chaos. Considering the com-
plexity of the literary text as an object of research, it is difficult to
envisage the actual application of the detailed mathematical meth-
ods of chaos theory to literary works to be anything but a practical
impossibility,15 and many literary scholars  would find such an at-
14 Another example of non-metaphorical presentation is Thomas Jackson
Rice (1994: 46), for whom literature is ‘a precise analog’ of complexity in
nature.
15 Empirical studies of larger trends in literary history do, however exist.
Martindale (1991), for example, presents equations to describe the appear-
ance of word types in English poetry and suggests that the dynamics of
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tempt to be nothing but yet another encroachment of the natural
sciences into fields to which they are not suited.
The middle ground between these two positions is occupied
by those literary scholars who use the concepts and terminology
of chaos theory metaphorically. In some cases this is done in or-
der to clarify or provide support for established practices of liter-
ary analysis, as is the case with Joseph M. Conte’s Design and Debris
(2002). Conte’s aim is to make the interplay of order and disorder
in postmodern American fiction more transparent by adopting the
vocabulary of chaos theory in his formal analysis of literary works.
Yet other scholars use the metaphorical connections between lit-
erature and chaos as the means of directing literary analysis to-
wards new avenues for research. On the one hand, Michael Pat-
rick Gillespie suggests in The Aesthetics of Chaos (2003) that literary
scholars should learn from chaos theory to better accommodate
ambiguity and inconsistency in their readings. On the other hand,
William Paulson’s (1991, 2001a) solution is to develop a chaos-
inspired way of approaching literary texts that would respect their
otherness, yet make analysis possible.
The objections to the adoption of chaos theory within literary
studies also vary according to which of these correspondence lev-
els are referred to. One common protest is that chaos theory
serves no other purpose than that of providing scholars with im-
pressive-sounding new terminology to bandy about (e.g. Mathe-
son and Kirchoff 1997). Considering the field as a whole, a lot of
the work being done in chaos theory and literature is certainly
guilty of trying to offer old wine in new bottles. The motivation
for such research is perhaps caused by the continuous pressure to
find new and exciting approaches to literature, as well as by an in-
grained feeling that the hard sciences can lend an air of respect-
ability to research in the humanities. Patricia Waugh (1999: 43)
has pointed out how even Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition uses
‘the borrowed authority of science’ to legitimise aesthetic know-
those appearances is chaotic. For a discussion of quantitative and qualita-
tive analyses in relation to chaos and literature see Bruce (1994: 152-157).
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edge, even while he exposes the ways in which scientific knowl-
edge justifies itself through relying on narrative means. Similar
forms of argument can be found in many works on chaos theory
and literature that refer to the natural sciences in order to gain
support for a particular theory of literature; or as Joseph Flanagan
(2003) has put it, eschew interdisciplinary ‘collaboration’ for ‘cor-
roboration’.16
If excessive deference towards the hard sciences is one
source of criticism concerning chaos theory and literature, a con-
verse problem arises when the interdisciplinary other receives too
little respect. This occurs when connotations created within liter-
ary and cultural studies are reattached to the scientific context, as
is the case, for example, with what chaos theory should, in fact, be
studying. Having adopted the foci of chaos theory, some literary
scholars have gone so far as to connect the technical meaning of
the term ‘chaos’ to its older cultural meanings and then imply that
the conceptual structure thus formed is (or should be) the object
of study in both cultural and scientific research (e.g. Demastes
1998: 8-9). The difficulty in keeping such implications of transdis-
ciplinarity out of cultural studies of science while still producing
interesting conceptual analysis is, I believe, one of the major hur-
dles on the road to fruitful interdisciplinary research. Sometimes
critics also allow the technical and cultural meanings to slide un-
controllably within their texts. For example, in Jude V. Nixon’s
discussion of the roles of energy and entropy in Gerard Manley
Hopkins’s poetry, the meaning of ‘chaos’ varies from being a
synonym for entropy (Nixon, 2002: 139), to the existential horror
which is the opposite of life and God (141), and to the naturally
ordered beauty portrayed in Gleick’s popularisation (139). Occa-
sionally, such fluctuations can engender new meanings, but most
often the result is merely confusion.
A further problem affecting many critics is that they imply a
deep connection between scientific discoveries and literary phe-
nomena without actually stating what that connection would be
(or even making a speculation). In an article published in 2003
16 Knoespel (1991: 101-102) levels similar criticism towards Hayles.
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Slethaug, who in his 2000 volume refrains from making interdis-
ciplinary assumptions, implies that the connection between liter-
ary works and chaos theory has been established and needs no
further argumentation. He compares the plot structures and sym-
bols of Sherman Alexie’s stories to chaos theory with the single
explicit justification that both involve weather: ‘A way of account-
ing for the relationship of order and disorder, chaos theory is of-
ten best seen at work in weather phenomena, and both the short
story collection and film begin with an emphasis on weather’
(Slethaug 2003: 132). In such cases I would agree with Stephen H.
Kellert (1996: 215-216), who points out that ‘the search for a bold
new synthesis’ between the sciences and the humanities does not
require that we let pass ‘causally flexible use of language or sug-
gestive but tenuous leaps of reasoning’.
Considering the epistemological destabilisations associated
with interdisciplinarity, it is perhaps not surprising that there is
also  a  tendency  among  scholars  to  conflate  literature  as  an  art
form with the study of literature as an academic discipline. Many
(e.g. Beer 1996 and Porush 1991) call their own project interdisci-
plinary, but then explicitly confine their comments to the inter-
faces between literary works and the methodology of the natural
sciences (how the ways that science and literature portray the
world resemble or differ from one another); others (e.g. Paulson
1991) consciously use the term ‘literature’ to mean the artistic
phenomenon and its study interchangeably. Such a blurring of the
borderline  between  a  field  of  study  and  its  object  is,  of  course,
widely accepted within poststructuralist approaches in the hu-
manities, but in the case of literature and science it tends to create
problems when done unconsciously. It is also rare for scholars to
make a difference between literary studies as a critical methodol-
ogy and as theoretical study concerning the ontology of literary
works – another issue where clear demarcations are notoriously
difficult to draw, but which it is nevertheless important to be
aware of when making interdisciplinary crossings.17 In research
17 Cordle (1999: 31) has also noted that in the Two Cultures model literary
criticism is either absent or conflated with literature.
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into literature and chaos theory literature is often seen as a single
system of discourse in which ontologies, methodologies, subjects
and objects are constantly in flux but which is, despite this com-
plexity, unproblematically compared with both the methodology
of chaos theory and the dynamical systems it studies.
A useful list of further common accusations levelled against
literary criticism engaging chaos theory has been complied by
Cordle (1999: 67):
the reliance on journalistic and popular accounts instead of actual
scientific texts; a misapprehension of the importance of chaos
theory to contemporary science and a consequent tendency to see
it as a revolutionary development that has transformed science as
a whole; and the use of terms with a specific technical meaning
(‘chaos’, ‘nonlinear’, and so on) as though they are equivalent to
their popular meanings.
Cordle himself points out that these objections do not, as such,
apply to research which is conducted within the confines of the
humanities and which aims only at tracing the movement of cer-
tain ideas through culture. Thus for most literary scholars, utilis-
ing chaos theory does not mean applying it to literature, but rather
attempting to see how that thought complex fits (or doesn’t fit)
into the theoretical issues discussed in literary studies. Kellert
(1996), for example, analyses theoretical texts that compare chaos
theory with deconstruction and comes to the conclusion that the
use of the quantitative techniques of chaos theory in literary stud-
ies is not possible. However, he does see a possible avenue which
he calls ‘metaphorical extension’: ‘[T]he use of nonlinear dynamics
as a new conceptual resource for other disciplines’ (Kellert 1996:
216). Chaos theory might thus offer a world-view that, instead of
being a scientific justification for something we already know
about literature and culture, actually shows human beings, their
art, their thinking and their relation to the universe in a new light.
While I also would like to underline the fact that the appear-
ance of chaos theory in culture makes it available as an object of
study for the humanities, it is also important to be honest about
what I can and cannot say about it. I will not be attempting to
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draw inferences back from literary meanings of chaos theory to
what the science might be or should be about, and I will try to be
very careful about being clear when the terminology is used in its
technical sense and when with further cultural meanings attached.
These and other issues of interdisciplinary terminology will be
discussed more fully in chapter 1.
A final point to be made also concerns the limitations of this
study. The multiplicity of uses to which chaos theory has been put
makes it practically impossible to engage very closely with all of
the relevant theoretical questions. A single dissertation attempting
to discuss themes such as the ontology and structure of literary
works, the formation of human identity and the relationship be-
tween literature and reality may already be overextending itself. As
a result, many of the theoretical issues to which scholars refer re-
ceive only cursory but hopefully clarifying analysis.
Structure of the Study
My argument is structured around four theoretical questions that
the literary interpretations of chaos theory can be seen to focus
on:  What  is  literary  scholarship  and  how does  it  differ  from the
natural sciences? What is the nature of the literary work and how
can it be analysed? What is the relationship between self and
other, both in terms of human identity and the different agencies
involved in the reading of a literary work? How does the human
mind connect to the material universe and how can that universe
be represented in literature?
Before engaging the literary texts themselves, it is necessary
to clarify certain issues concerning interdisciplinarity and the
movement of concepts and vocabularies between different disci-
plines. Thus chapter 2 discusses the ways in which the boundaries
between the arts and the sciences have (or have not) been crossed
by literary scholars’ interpretations of chaos theory, and the ways
in which chaos theory functions as a useful lens through which we
can see the sometimes contradictory effects of research aims and
the rhetoric used to present those aims. The critics and theorists
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are seen to occupy a multitude of positions depending on whether
they  understand  ‘science’  as  an  activity,  as  text,  or  as  a  body  of
knowledge.
Chapter 2 discusses the ways in which the concept of the
strange attractor can be used in the discussion concerning the on-
tology of the literary work. While many theorists discussing chaos
theory have taken fractal dimensions to be a way of pointing out
the gaps in the seeming unity of a literary work, others emphasise
the way concepts deriving from chaos theory can also describe the
literary work as a definable shape, even though the exact relation-
ships between its details could never be pinned down. Some crit-
ics and authors have also used the strange attractor as a metaphor
for visualising narrative in terms of spatial rather than temporal
structures. Tom Stoppard’s Arcadia, for example, is consciously
constructed on the seemingly contradictory ideas of fractal diffu-
sion and the discernible shape of the strange attractor. On the one
hand, the scenes of the play switch back and forth between the
past and the present at an increasing rate, simulating the rhythm
of period doublings with which the phases of a chaotic system bi-
furcate. However, the play ends with a scene where the two time
periods come together in the form of two couples from different
centuries waltzing to the same music, emphasising the harmony of
the overall shape over the discordance of the details. John Barth’s
works also reflect a similar emphasis on structure over random
details. In On With the Story Barth uses chaotic iteration as a struc-
tural tool which, instead of fracturing the narrative, enables the
author to formulate both a narrative practice that allows for infi-
nite variations within a finite narrative frame and the theoretical
position of ‘chaotic-arabesque postmodernism’, also expressed in
his essays.
Chapter 3 discusses the mind in communication with itself
and with others, and the power relationships involved in such
processes. The concept of individual identity is viewed in the con-
text  of  emergent  complexity,  which  helps  to  envision  it  as  a  dy-
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namic but nevertheless recognisably unitary phenomenon.18 Of
the literary authors, John Barth, in particular, constructs an au-
thorial persona through multiple iterations of themes, tropes and
characters, and finally consciously utilises the symbolic structure
he detects in chaos theory to describe the process. Other authors
have found in chaos a metaphor through which to define the rela-
tionship between individual and community, nature and humanity,
or even humanity and the divine. Mostly chaos theory is seen as a
metaphor that helps the authors balance the needs and freedom
of an individual with the larger pattern of universal laws.
Many authors present chaos theory as something which can
connect human thought to the world by revealing the similarities
in the structure and function of various systems, whether material
or cognitive. In the works of Tom Stoppard and Jorie Graham
chaos theory points towards an intuitive connection between
mind and world, and between past events and present ideas.
Chapter 4 takes part in the discussion concerning the representa-
tion  of  reality  and  suggests  that  even  though  these  authors  use
many techniques associated with postmodern literature in general
and  metafiction  in  particular,  their  texts  nevertheless  reveal  an
evident mimetic intent. A central distinction made in this chapter
is that departure from the conventions of literary realism does not
necessarily imply a loss of interest in reality. As Susan Strehle
(1992: x) has noted in her study of the literary adaptations of
quantum mechanics, ‘[w]hile many living writers share a well-read
fascination with the possibilities inherent in literary form, and
while they make allied formal choices to replace realism, they do
so in order to think more clearly about what we now understand
as real’. Graham and Stoppard write the desire for both truth and
art back into postmodern literature. They do not return to a naive
form of realism but seek a dynamic interplay in which the possi-
18 A final note on vocabulary: I prefer not to use the technical term ‘dy-
namical’ in connection with the non-technical extensions discussed in this
dissertation. Thus, while it has not yet been established that identity is a dy-
namical system in the sense meant by chaos theory, it can legitimately be
described as ‘dynamic’ as opposed to static.
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bility  of  truth is  always present,  even though it  is  also frequently
questioned. Strehle (1992: 1-5) calls such works ‘actualist’, a term
closely related to the ‘externalist realism’ I adopt in this study.
However, Strehle’s focus on quantum mechanics and poststruc-
turalist theory gives her term a more epistemologically pessimistic
tilt.
My conclusions present the humanist perspective in compari-
son and contrast with nineteenth-century romanticism and make
some tentative suggestions as to the directions of future research.
Those suggestions include the claim that, as the concepts of non-
linear dynamics seep more permanently into contemporary cul-
ture, the presence of chaos theory in literary studies is diffusing in
such a way that the explicit reference to the concepts and vocabu-
lary is supplanted by discussion which may well have benefited
from those concepts, but which continues to employ the termi-
nology of literary studies. By this I do not mean to say that the in-
terdisciplinary field between literature and science is being aban-
doned by either party, only that activity may be shifting elsewhere
along the border, perhaps even changing from forms of open
conflict to mutual respect and diplomacy. One of the points about
the approach delineated here is that rather than viewing the sci-
ences and the humanities as either opposing or enclosing forces it
attempts to combine a respect for the knowledge produced by the
natural sciences with an equal respect for the expertise of the hu-
manities in evaluating the cultural value and consequences of that
knowledge. These are the interdisciplinary relations to which I will
turn in my first chapter.
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1.  The Proliferation of Scientific Metaphors
Few things have played a more fatal part in the his-
tory of human thought and action than great imagi-
native analogies from one sphere, in which a par-
ticular principle is applicable and valid, to other
provinces, where its effect may be exciting and
transforming, but where its consequences may be
fallacious in theory and ruinous in practice.
Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity19
Interdisciplinary work crosses over between fields:
it transgresses. It thus brings into question the
methods and materials of differing intellectual prac-
tices and may uncover problems disguised by the
scope of established disciplines. Forms of knowl-
edge do not readily merge; they may lie askance or
cross-grained. But that does not imply failure. Dis-
analogy can prove to be a powerful heuristic tool
[...].
Gillian Beer, Open Fields: Science in Cultural Encounter
A good analogy is like a diagonal frog.
Kai Krause, www.edge.org
As is suggested by the above quotations, there are wide diver-
gences in opinion as to the validity and usefulness of taking a set
of concepts and/or methods from one discipline and applying
them to another. The authors disagree on whether such projects,
in their transgression of disciplinary borders, reveal perspectives
and problems to which previous methodologies have been blind,
or whether they are exciting but finally meaningless speculations.
Where Isaiah Berlin warns us against assuming that what is rea-
sonable in one field of life and thought is also reasonable in an-
19 This quotation was first used in connection with chaos theory and litera-
ture by Willie van Peer (1998: 48).
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other, Gillian Beer sees those same analogies as a ‘powerful heu-
ristic tool’ which helps us overthrow ingrained patterns of think-
ing and thus promotes innovation. Kai Krause, on the other hand,
manages to create a beautifully enigmatic analogy: a stylistically
evocative statement (diagonal frog is almost an anagram of good
analogy) which at the same time states that such evocativeness has
no real meaning.
Before moving on to discuss the specifically humanist uses to
which  chaos  theory  has  been  put  in  works  of  literature,  it  is  im-
portant to take a step back and have a look at the phenomenon of
literature and science more generally. In the Introduction I briefly
discussed the movement of ideas between science and literature
and the ways in which that interaction has been conceptualised.
This chapter will examine the more specific question of chaos
theory and literary interdisciplinarity. The central issue turns out
to be metaphor: what is the function and value of metaphorical
connections between literature and the science of chaos?
In the following pages I try to answer this question by focus-
ing on three different conceptualisations of ‘science’: as an activity,
as text produced by that activity, and as knowledge produced by that
activity  and  disseminated  by  texts.  When  viewed  in  the  light  of
these three categories, the contributions to the study of literature
and chaos theory can be seen to be responding to several different
questions, rather than forming a unified research project. When
science is understood as a human activity that exists within a par-
ticular cultural context, the literary appropriations of chaos theory
concentrate on viewing chaos theory, too, as a cultural product,
and treat both the mathematics and its artistic interpretations as
equal  expressions  of  a  wider  cultural  field.  From  this  point  of
view, a central question is who has the right to confine or meta-
phorically extend the meanings of the terms associated with chaos
theory. If, on the other hand, the focus of research is on science
writing, chaos theory is seen more as a source text, as part of the
historical and ideational context of a particular literary work.
From this perspective metaphor appears mostly as an evocative
way to transmit the concepts of chaos theory to a lay audience,
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and to form artistic expressions of its central concepts. Quite an-
other aspect of taking chaos theory as text is full-scale textuality,
which dissolves the role of acting agents and focuses on the rela-
tion of literature to science through the concepts of postmodern
intertextuality. Finally, if literary scholars take science to mean the
knowledge produced by scientific activity and transmitted by sci-
entific texts, they tend to engage with chaos theory in order to
change the way knowledge is defined and perceived, both within
literary studies and beyond. This approach involves the most
complex aspects of metaphor and consequently raises the most
interesting questions. Does a metaphor say something no other
means of communication can? Is a cross-disciplinary metaphor
more than a clarifying image or a pleasing figure? Can a metaphor
actually produce knowledge?
In recent research in science and technology, metaphor has
received increasing attention. ‘If scientists see mathematics and
method as the two Ms that form the basis of scientific assaying’,
suggests Ken Baake (2003: 208), ‘language scholars can rightfully
add a third M – metaphor’. In his own analysis of the uses of
metaphor in the scientific activity of the Santa Fe Institute in New
Mexico, Baake (2003: 6) finds that metaphor is used widely and
for a variety of purposes. These include both theory-constitutive
and expressive uses: metaphor helps both in the early, conceptual
phase when new theories are being generated (especially in an in-
terdisciplinary context) and in the write-up phase when a particu-
lar project is presented to an audience as ‘exciting, cutting edge
and worthy of publication and funding’. However, in situations
where the scientists ‘want to appear rigorous and far removed
from the social fray that discursive language inspires’ they become
wary of metaphor and try to limit themselves to technical lan-
guage (Baake 2003: 6). This ambivalence is a reasonable response
to a situation in which the different aspects of science as activity,
text and knowledge interact. The value of heuristic metaphors for
the creation of new concepts and that of evocative metaphors for
the communication of those concepts to a non-expert audience is
undeniable. But the point at which a scientist would want to step
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back from metaphor is when he or she no longer feels that its
connotations are either controllable or suitable to the constella-
tion of scientific knowledge.
That suitability is defined through the general ‘fit’ of the
knowledge imparted by the metaphor to all the other aspects of
what is known. Baake (2003: 9) presents an analogy from music
theory and suggests that the new meanings generated by a scien-
tific metaphor must harmonise with the context in which it ap-
pears. Metaphors, he suggests, ‘tend to be accepted if they sound
sonorous amid the overall paradigm in which those scientists op-
erate. So a metaphor and all of its meanings must fit into the the-
ory in the same way a note and all of its harmonics must fit into a
melodic phrase’. It is clear that many aspects of chaos theory have
resonated strongly with literary studies. However, problems have
arisen when literary scholars and cultural theorists have added to
the metaphorical complex of chaos theory resonances which clash
with other aspects of the physical sciences, as has been the case
with some aspects of the poststructuralist interpretations of
chaos.
Matheson and Kirchoff (1997), who have studied chaos the-
ory metaphors in works of literary criticism, take the position that
to employ the vocabulary of chaos theory as a metaphor in literary
studies is inherently unprofitable. None of the texts creating
metaphorical connections between literature and chaos, they ar-
gue, produces a truly novel reading of a particular piece of litera-
ture, and those claiming to produce connections that are more
than metaphorical are only able to point to vague likenesses. In
these interpretations, ‘crucial terms such as “anticipates”, “re-
calls”, and “remarkably similar” are difficult to take seriously,
since the words are presumably intended to connote more than
slight and coincidental similarities between vague and general
concepts – and as always, even these minimal similarities seem
nonessential to the analysis that finally emerges’, Matheson and
Kirchoff (1997: 41) propose. They also offer a taxonomy of four
ways of constructing analogies between objects, and argue that
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none of them is of value as a methodology for chaos and litera-
ture studies.
(i)  B [chaos] allows us to learn about A [literature] in ways that
could not be accomplished without modeling A as B. [...]
(ii) Those unacquainted with A but knowledgeable about B can
best learn about A by pursuing A’s analogy with B. [...]
(iii) Those who are somewhat acquainted with A can learn more
about A by coming to learn about B.
(iv) B is structurally similar to A, and this is inherently interesting.
(Matheson and Kirchoff 1997: 41)
The first option is out, Matheson and Kirchoff (1997: 42) argue,
because the interpretations built with the help of chaos theory
could have been arrived at without it; the second does not apply,
since the interpretations are written for other literary scholars and
not for scientists; and the third is a problem, since the use of
chaos theory does not, in their opinion, open up the text to read-
ers  not already familiar  with chaos theory (at  least  not without a
cumbersome explanation of the terminology used). What is left is
the fourth option, which Matheson and Kirchoff argue not to be
true in the case of chaos and literature, but which many others do
find a valid point (see chapter 2).
This chapter will discuss the process of metaphorically trans-
ferring (both metaphorical and non-metaphorical) concepts and
vocabulary from one discipline to another. What does it mean for
a literary critic to say they are treating chaos as a metaphor for lit-
erature? Is Leo Steinberg (1986: 1) correct when he claims that
being able to imagine ‘ways in which some art, or some function
of art, can be said, metaphorically, to be like some science’ is in-
herently pointless, or, as Steinberg ironically suggests, about as in-
teresting and relevant as comparing art and mountaineering? By
way of an answer, I will examine the writings of a handful of liter-
ary scholars engaging chaos theory in order to show that the
comparison between the two phenomena of chaos theory and lit-
erature brings to focus important issues of literary ontology and
epistemology.
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Hayles (1991b: 30) has suggested that there are several as-
sumptions affecting critics responses to the question of whether
chaos terminology should be brought into literary studies as
metaphors or because of a direct correlation between the systems.
A scholar wishing to answer that question, Hayles argues, would
have to make clear what she believes the route of influence be-
tween science and literature to be, whether she thinks that lan-
guage constitutes ideas or conveys them, and whether scientific
inquiry is free from social and cultural influence. Although most
scholars do not fulfil Hayles’s request to discuss these issues ex-
plicitly, it is possible to bring out these unstated assumptions by
analysing what exactly they mean by ‘science’, and, in turn, exam-
ine those assumptions in order to get to grips with the dynamics
of interdisciplinary knowledge.
1.1  Heuristic Metaphor: Science as Activity
[O]ur interviewees have tended to agree that much
of the power of descriptive words, including meta-
phoric words, lies in their flexibility to change con-
notations according to situation. These chameleon-
like terms allow scientists to see new associations
among seemingly disparate ideas [...]. Struggling to
find rigorous definitions, however frustrating that
process  may  be,  is  as  much  a  part  of  science  as  is
laboratory field work.
Ken Baake, Metaphor and Knowledge
The history of scientific developments is littered with dramatic
stories of moments of discovery. Some of them, like the famous
anecdote of August Kekulé realising the structure of the benzene
ring in a  vision of a  snake eating its  own tail,  describe the role  a
heuristic metaphor can play in the scientist’s mind in guiding it
towards the discovery. Once such metaphors have entered into
scientific discussion, they engage the scientists in the work of sort-
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ing out the various connotations produced and in finding out
which ones have explanatory force. Sometimes these metaphors
remain in the scientific parlance and spread into the minds of the
general audience, where they may mutate enough to cause a back-
lash from the side of the scientists, as has happened in the case of
chaos theory. Occasionally their presence even raises the question
as to whether science is actually about discovery or about inven-
tion. Since so many problems have arisen from the prolific con-
notations of a word such as ‘chaos’, it is relevant to ask why scien-
tists would choose such an evocative term in the first place. This
reason, naturally, has much to do with the way metaphors play a
part in scientific conceptualisation. It is also a question that leads
me to those literary appropriations of chaos theory which see sci-
ence mainly as a human activity, whether discovery or construc-
tion.
Philosopher Rom Harré (1986: 8) sees science primarily as an
enterprise rather than as a collection of facts and theories. Sci-
ence, he argues,
is not a logically coherent body of knowledge [...], but a cluster of
material and cognitive practices.  [...]  Science  is  an  activity:  it  is
something people do. Some, but not all of that doing is thinking,
and a yet more minor part of it is producing discourses in which
the results of making those material manipulations and doing that
thinking are recorded.
Thus cultural study of science in this sense takes the form of so-
ciological research into what scientists actually do. In literary stud-
ies the influence of sociological science studies, combined with
poststructuralist theory, has created a conceptualisation of ‘sci-
ence’ as one human activity among others, and, in particular, an
activity which is enclosed within the system of culture.20
20 For a useful condensation of the discussion of representation in socio-
logical studies of science see Knuuttila (2005: 21-36).
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Sociology of Science
If  poststructuralism  caused  many  theorists  to  view  literature  as
enclosed within a self-referential bubble, Kuhn’s The  Structure  of
Scientific Revolutions (1962/1970), was interpreted as proving that
the settlement of scientific disputes does not proceed on the basis
of how things actually are in nature, but depends, instead, on dis-
ciplinary paradigms that make it possible to think in a certain way
and in no other. Even though Kuhn (as quoted in Harris 1996:
81) later tried to point out that paradigms do change, and as far as
he is concerned, change to match reality better and better, the ef-
fect of culture and society on the questions that the scientific
community chooses to ask has remained the most influential idea
in the book. That view was taken up most notably by David
Bloor’s Knowledge and Social Imagery (1976) and the strong pro-
gramme in the sociology of scientific knowledge. In literary stud-
ies, particularly in feminist and postcolonial studies, some scholars
(e.g. Keller 1985, Haraway 1991 and Harding 2006) have conse-
quently presented science as struggle for power that is based at
least as much on cultural construction as on objective observa-
tion.
One consequence of the sociological study of science has
been that it has emphasised the view, initially present in the popu-
lar books (e.g. Gleick’s Chaos), that the ‘new science’ of chaos is
an epistemologically revolutionary movement in science. The im-
plication is that the initially marginalised institutional position of
the chaos scientists would also mean that chaos theory itself was a
marginalised and anti-establishment form of scientific inquiry.
Demastes (1998: 8), for example, suggests that chaos theory is a
instantiation within scientific practice of themes that affect culture
more generally: ‘The point is simple: our contemporary culture
has become obsessed with issues of unpredictability and uncer-
tainty at numerous levels – economic, social, political, spiritual’.
Similarly,  Slethaug  (2000:  xi)  notes  that  the  role  of  chaos  as
counter-culture is dependent on its interest in the turbulent mar-
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gins of known and ordered behaviour, which aligns it with other,
postmodern cultural theories:
It is perhaps this insistence on marginalization that gives chaos
theory  at  least  some  of  its  appeal  for  the  modern  writer  and
reader of recent American literature. [...] Although it further con-
firmed the importance of science in all our lives, this alternative
mode suggested that dominant views of science – if not science
itself – could be contradicted, that it was not, as some thought,
monolithic, orthodox, single-minded, or at one with itself, and
that, therefore, it was available to the sceptical humanist.
Slethaug and Demastes represent fairly moderate views of
how chaos theory and postmodern uncertainty interact in a larger
cultural framework. There are, however, other literary scholars for
whom chaos represents a revolution within the epistemology of
the natural sciences. Many of these views depend on arguments
where the metaphor chosen by scientists for the behaviour of dy-
namical systems is extended to include meanings which are inter-
esting and relevant within the context of cultural studies, but do
not resonate with the scientific context. For example, Brian Ward
(1998) notes that in The Transparency of Evil (1990) Jean Baudrillard
uses chaos theory not as knowledge that science has gained about
the  function  of  the  universe,  but  as  part  of  a  social  and  cultural
constellation of values that directs the actions of scientists and
cultural theorists alike. ‘The concepts of chaos theory are upheld
by theorists like Baudrillard as powerful tools which are able to
validate cultural impressions of social systems as chaotically de-
termined systems’, Ward (1998: 243) suggests. He further argues
that  the  basis  for  such  uses  of  chaos  is  also  accepted  in  the  sci-
ences.  The  purposes  to  which  it  is  put  in  cultural  studies,  Ward
(1998: 243) claims, matches the focus on instability and breakage
in the natural science approaches: ‘It is essential to recognise that
this impression of the principles of chaos theory is not fundamen-
tally inconsistent with the perception of their value within sci-
ence’. Scientists have, however, expressly denied that chaos the-
ory’s principles would mean a revolution in the epistemology of
the scientific process. I will return to this point in the following
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section, but suffice it to say here that Ward seems to accept the
sociological view of science as a cultural and social activity, which
in turn validates the implication that the cultural meanings at-
tached to the scientific metaphor are so strong that they should be
taken into account within the scientific context as well.
It is clear that the strongest criticism towards using chaos
theory in literary and cultural studies has come from scholars who
are reacting against just such appropriations. Gross and Levitt
(1994: 92), for example, take the chaos theory discussion to be a
part of a larger attack by constructivist epistemology. Because of
the emphasis chaos theory gives to margins and unpredictability,
they suggest, it ‘has been a proving ground for postmodernist crit-
ics eager to try their apparatus in the venue of modern scientific
thought, and eager to justify their philosophic maxims by appeal
to ostensible “paradigm shifts” in science’. However, interpreta-
tions based on the strongly constructivist position are actually
quite rare, even though many literary scholars have allowed similar
implications to slip into their rhetoric. For this reason some of the
attacks against literature and chaos, Gross and Levitt’s in particu-
lar, can come across as overkill and result only in obscuring the
underlying reasons why literary scholars choose to engage chaos
theory in their writings.
Similar questions arise when we consider ideology within sci-
ence and literature studies. It is clear that sometimes literary
scholars allow themselves to be swayed to promote a scientific
theory – or a particular interpretation of the consequences of a
theory – because they see it as matching a particular ideology. For
example,  Kellert  (1996)  criticises  Gross  and  Levitt  for  turning  a
blind eye to Alexander J. Argyros’s (1991) scientific mistakes and
castigating Hayles for hers, despite the fact that Argyros makes
use of far less tenable arguments than those employed by Hayles.
The reason for the imbalance, Kellert believes, is that Gross and
Levitt agree with Argyros’s political aims. ‘After all’ Kellert (1996:
229) suggests,
Hayles has claimed that a rough similarity between chaos theory
and deconstruction shows that they both developed in response
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to some common cultural constraints. Argyros, on the other
hand, claims that chaos theory shows Derrida to be wrong, and
that nonlinear dynamics provides an objective ground for en-
lightenment values, traditional narrative, and liberal democracy.
From Kellert’s (1996: 230-231) perspective, ‘no one group of
people has a preemptive right to decide what chaos theory does or
does not mean’, but, rather, all the interpretations, including scien-
tific ones, invest in the term their own cultural context. Advised
by the arguments concerning the politics of chaos theory I suggest
that exposing bias in scientific theory can, as Ann E. Cudd (2001:
96) argues, actually increase the objectivity of science as a process.
Accepting the fallibility of individual researchers does not, how-
ever, need to invalidate the epistemological goals of the entire
project of science. The point I hope to make here is that interdis-
ciplinary research which takes as its starting point the view of sci-
ence as an activity directed by cultural prejudices will lead to very
different conclusions about the cultural meanings of chaos theory
than if the starting point is a view of science as an activity which
itself can direct culture towards new conceptions of reality.
Among the literary scholars who present science as an activ-
ity, the role of chaos theory tends to be to emphasise some form
of constructivism. Stoicheff, for example, whose view of metafic-
tion as a chaotic system was discussed in the Introduction, rests
his argument on the assumption that the construction of meaning
in metafiction is similar to the way chaos theorists construct
knowledge. Thus the emphasis in his epistemology is on the in-
terpretation, rather than observation, of the world: ‘Metafiction
and scientific chaos are embraced by a larger revolution in con-
temporary thought that examines the similar roles of narrative,
and of investigative procedure, in our “reading” or knowledge of
the world’ (Stoicheff 1991: 85). The new transdisciplinary para-
digm  which  results  from  that  revolution  will  for  Stoicheff  be  a
methodology which questions the objectivity of our world-view
and is mainly interested in the ways in which meaning is con-
structed.
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A more nuanced text is Hayles’s Chaos Bound (1990), in which
she maps the relationship between chaos theory and postmodern
literature and culture, centrally discussing works by Henry Adams,
Stanislaw Lem and Doris Lessing. In her 1984 volume The Cosmic
Web, Hayles had already outlined a model of cultural practice
based on the idea of an interconnected field in which the strict
separation of different disciplines is impossible, and in which sci-
ence is one among many cultural activities. In Chaos Bound Hayles
openly positions herself as a transdisciplinary commentator on lit-
erature and science as cultural phenomena which reflect a shared,
underlying network of ideas and influences, a network which also
happens to exhibit characteristics of chaos.
Different disciplines are drawn to similar problems because the
concerns underlying them are highly charged within a prevailing
cultural context. Moreover, different disciplines base the theories
they construct on similar presuppositions because these are the
assumptions that guide the constitution of knowledge in a given
episteme. This position implies, of course, that scientific theories
and models are culturally conditioned, partaking of and rooted in
assumptions that can be found at multiple sites throughout the
culture. (Hayles 1990: xi) 21
Despite applying the tools of literary and cultural studies to the
natural sciences, Hayles does not, at least explicitly, attempt to
claim that science as a methodology is ruled solely, or even mainly
by cultural forces. It should also be noted that Hayles is not saying
that chaos mathematics can  be  used  to  understand  literary  works,
but that its development in the intellectual sphere sheds light on
other similar developments in the field of literary theory. Against
this background, her literary analyses concentrate on showing the
presence of the paradigm of chaos in her chosen works, and rely
on traditional methods of close reading and historical and cultural
contextualisation. Hayles is, however, more aware of the ambigui-
ties of her situation than many other scholars, and reminds the
reader that if her field model of cultural influences is correct, her
21 Many scholars, for example Hawkins (1995) have explicitly adopted
Hayles’s scheme of the chaotic cultural field.
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own position is embedded in the matrix she is analysing, and thus
she cannot claim to present an objective ‘view from nowhere’. ‘At
best,’ she admits, ‘I have reenacted the cultural dominant in such a
way as to make its dynamics clearer than they may have been be-
fore’ (Hayles 1990: 293-294). Thus Hayles weaves together a
transdisciplinary view of a cultural dominant that affects all scien-
tific activity, and a transgressive questioning of all the knowledge
produced by disciplines under the influence of that cultural domi-
nant. This questioning includes her own work, even though the
implication remains that literary or cultural analysis is the
‘metamethod’ through which the dynamics of the cultural domi-
nant are clarified.
Even Hayles, though, is not immune to the difficulties and
confusions involving interdisciplinary chaos studies. One rare
lapse into vague argumentation over the relationship between sci-
entific and literary objects and discourses occurs in her preface to
Braun and McCarthy’s Disrupted Patterns. Here Hayles (2000: 2)
suggests that ‘metaphoric parallels between the science of chaos
and literary texts allow critics to treat these texts as if they were
chaotic systems’. The first problem in this seemingly simple sen-
tence is the conflation of the ‘science of chaos’ with the ‘literary
texts’; of a methodology of one discipline with the object of an-
other. In the second half of the sentence Hayles equates the texts
with chaotic systems themselves, revealing an underlying (and
perhaps intended) uncertainty as to what is actually being com-
pared (however metaphorically) with what.
The Context of Discovery
By discussing science as an activity these critics and theorists con-
centrate on the context of scientific discovery. It is clear that sci-
entists do use ideologically charged metaphors and that often their
research activity and eventual discoveries are directed by the
metaphors chosen to describe particular phenomena. As Baake’s
study (2003) shows, the contextual reasons as to why one meta-
phor is chosen instead of another can be cultural, and thus a le-
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gitimate topic of research for a cultural scholar. However,
whether this cultural influence on scientific metaphors justifies ex-
tending the field of reference of those metaphors once they move
away from a purely scientific context is a more complex issue. In
Open Fields Gillian Beer (1996) notes how often a new conceptu-
alisation in the natural sciences is initially given an evocative name
in order to help colleagues to fill out the blanks in the theory, as
well  as  in  order  to  signal  to  them that  the  theory  is  still  without
proper definition (Beer 1996: 184). Dependence on such heuris-
tics, Beer (1996: 157-158) argues, has led to the practice of
impressionistic or whimsical naming which is fashionable in high
theory today: words such as ‘charm’, ‘quark’, or ‘black hole’ delib-
erately evade severe equivalence in order to allow space for cor-
rection and enhancement without the need constantly to replace
and to move on from terms. [...] Language is a heuristic tool but
it may best function at the frontiers of scientific knowledge by
adopting a mode which sounds strangely belletristic.
It is clear that the open-endedness of scientific metaphors is a
vital part of their heuristic function.22 But how can such open-
endedness be reconciled with the theories of reference and the
precision required of a scientific theory? I will return to this ques-
tion in the following sections, but perhaps it will suffice to point
out here that, as Beer suggests, what makes the restricted and
changing meanings of a scientific metaphor communicable are the
resonances provided by the scientific context. Therefore, scien-
tists reading each other’s non-mathematical explanations concern-
ing new concepts agree to restrict the possible meanings of the
heuristic metaphor to the context of the particular scientific the-
ory being discussed: ‘Not what is said, but the agreement as to
constraints on its reception, will stabilize scientific discourse’
(Beer 1996: 159). Such agreements concerning the constraint of
constructed meaning are often viewed in a negative light in cul-
tural science studies, which considers them as exclusionary and
22 See also Ricoeur (1978: 20-22), Harries (1978-79: 87), Quine (1978-79:
161), Boyd (1980) and more recently Haack (2003: 225).
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distorting. They are, however, a necessary part of the communi-
cability of heuristic metaphors.
Similar phenomena can also be found in interdisciplinary lit-
erary studies, where the technical language of science (especially in
its  belletristic  forms) is  adopted as  a  way to approach new ideas.
When new interdisciplinary conceptualisations are introduced, the
argumentation may often overreach itself and produce work that
seems to present untenable and unrealistic comparisons between
disciplines. As Weingart and Maasen (1997: 496) have suggested,
many early chaos-and-literature scholars seem to be merely adopt-
ing exciting vocabulary to describe mundane interpretations. Thus
the use of cross-disciplinary metaphors, they suggest, does not
necessarily indicate interdisciplinary activity, rather the opposite.
‘[E]ven those who are most engaged in this process [of combining
chaos and literature]’,  they argue,  ‘discuss its  pros and cons with
their disciplinary colleagues rather than with chaos scholars from
other disciplines’. The concepts of chaos theory are included, as it
were, within the discourse of literature, and not treated as part of
another field with which to engage in dialogue. This strategy,
Weingart and Maasen argue, actually precludes the possibility for
the ‘major epistemic shifts’ that interdisciplinary studies are so
famous for (Weingart and Maasen 1997: 496). However, the strat-
egy can also be seen in terms of literary scholars trying to restrict
the resonances of the imprecise vocabulary they have adopted, in
the same way as scientists have wished to corral terms like ‘chaos’.
The real contradiction happens if a literary scholar simultaneously
attempts to restrict their use of terminology to the literary context
and at the same time claim an extensive interdisciplinary status for
their work.
If Weingart and Maasen argue that literary scholars do not
take science seriously as an interdisciplinary partner, others have
suggested that the use of scientific terminology in literary analysis
arises from respecting it too much. Earlier in this chapter I noted
how Matheson and Kirchoff strongly criticised literary scholars
for equating chaos theory with literature. They also suggest that
Hayles, among many others, is guilty of displaying a ‘gee-whiz atti-
Scientific Metaphors
50
tude’ which arises from a keenness to tell other literary scholars
about the scientific discoveries, rather than engaging in a truly in-
terdisciplinary dialogue with those sciences (Matheson and Kir-
choff 1997: 31). However, Matheson and Kirchoff’s stern posi-
tion has itself been criticised as ‘occasionally arrogant, sometimes
categorical, and perhaps all too dismissive’ (Braun and McCarthy
2000b: vi-vii). The fact that many of the attempts to assimilate the
scientific analysis of chaotic behaviour to the study of literature
are superficial and even severely flawed in their ontological start-
ing points does not necessarily mean that the entire endeavour is
without basis. It may merely mean that the rhetoric should be un-
derstood in the context of incipient interdisciplinarity where the
visions of the project often extend beyond the authors’ ability to
formulate those visions in argumentative language.
How, then, should the cultural study of science be justified as
an academic endeavour? One solution is offered by Cordle (1999:
51) who separates two specific aspects of science and labels them
‘professional science’ and ‘cultural science’. The former refers to
‘the  set  of  practices  and  expertise  that  make  up  the  life  of  the
working scientist, and in order to participate in which he or she
must be trained’. The latter, ‘anything that contributes to the gen-
eral perception – the cultural “value” – of science’, is the valid ter-
ritory of cultural studies in general, and when it comes to texts, of
literary studies in particular. Such research, Cordle (1999: 61-72)
argues, could consist of, for example, 1) tracing the influence of
science in particular works of literature, 2) examining the repre-
sentations of science and scientists, 3) rhetorical analysis of scien-
tific, particularly popular science texts, 4) tracing the appearance
of shared metaphors in the two discourses, or 5) the larger disci-
plinary questions of the ‘Two Cultures Debate’ as well as the simi-
larities and differences between literary theory and the method-
ologies of the natural sciences. While the last question is reserved
for the final section of this chapter, the following pages will exam-
ine the first four.
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1.2 Rhetorical Metaphor: Science as Text
In adapting natural languages to the construction of
experimental science, the creators of scientific dis-
course developed powerful new forms of wording;
and these have construed a reality of a particular
kind – one that is fixed and determinate, in which
objects predominate and processes serve merely to
define and classify them. But the direction of phys-
ics in the twentieth century has been exactly the
opposite: from absolute to relative, from object to
process, from determinate to probabilistic, from
stability to flow. [...] The language [the scientists]
learned  at  their  mothers’  knees  is  much  more  in
harmony with their deepest theoretical perceptions.
M.A.K. Halliday and J.R. Martin,
Writing Science: Literary and Discursive Power
Scientists are not just individual human beings engaging in an ac-
tivity, they are also users of natural language. When notions of
theoretical physics that in some sense properly exist only in the
language of mathematics are translated into natural language they
undergo a transformation into a context that is much more flexi-
ble. In such a context evocative metaphors are used not to aid the
scientist, whose own conceptualisation is at that point ready and
mostly fairly precise, but to aid the (often non-specialist) audience
to whom the scientist is attempting to convey that conceptualisa-
tion. These metaphors naturally exist as part of the cultural con-
text within which the explication appears. A classic example
within the history of chaos theory is the birth of Edward Lorenz’s
butterfly.23 Lorenz’s original idea was to illustrate the turbulence
23 One of the earliest discoveries of chaotic behaviour. The meteorologist
Lorenz was interested in finding regularities in a series of twelve calcula-
tions describing atmospheric conditions – wind direction, level of moisture,
temperature, and so on. What his research showed was that in chaotic sys-
tems the assumption that causes have proportional effects is not a valid
one, but instead one minute change sparks another and another, until the
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of weather by saying that the flap of a seagull’s wings might cause
catastrophic changes to the weather on the other side of the
world. His colleagues, however, drew his attention to Ray Brad-
bury’s short story ‘A Sound of Thunder’ (1952), in which a time-
traveller inadvertently kills a prehistoric butterfly and thus cancels
the development of human civilisation in its entirety. Seeing the
similarity between the sensitivity to initial conditions in both his
weather calculations and in Bradbury’s story, Lorenz decided to
change  the  gull  to  a  butterfly  (Hawkins  1995:  2  and  n.  2).  It  is
clear, therefore, that the individual evocative images chosen to
carry scientific theories are dictated by not only the requirements
of the theory itself but also by the scientist’s cultural context.
In the previous section I focused on the use of metaphor in
the context of scientific creativity, and here I move on to discuss
the forms of metaphorical usage waiting on the other side of the
mathematical formulation: scientific writing and, in particular,
popular science. Taking into account the kind of criticism aimed
at the strong sociology of science, many literary scholars find that
the  rhetorical  analysis  of  scientific  texts  is  a  much  more  natural
approach to take, as well as being one which need not embroil
them in the depths of philosophy of science. However, under-
standing ‘science’ as the texts produced by scientific activity can
also be a way of encompassing the whole of science within the
purview of literary theory and scholarship. As Halliday and Martin
suggest in the above epigraph, a language entails a world-view,
and through the analysis of language a literary scholar can also
conduct analysis of the entire world-view implied by that lan-
guage. In fact Halliday and Martin claim that contemporary phys-
ics is in itself more suited to being expressed through indetermi-
nate discourse than in the more strictly determined forms of ar-
gument formulated in the previous centuries. In some ways this is
true, but there is also a difference between, firstly, the claim that a
world-view which is as conceptually complex as the one presented
by contemporary physics is too odd to be explicated by the kind
behaviour of the system may bear no resemblance whatsoever to the origi-
nal predictions (Gleick 1987/1989: 9-18 and Stewart 1989/1997: 121-129).
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of discourse scientists usually adopt when using natural language,
and secondly, the more radical claim that that world-view would
be too complex to be precisely expressed in mathematics.
Rhetorical Aspects of Scientific Texts
In Rhetorical Figures in Science Jeanne Fahnestock (1999) makes the
point that the presence of metaphor in scientific texts has opened
various avenues of research for the cultural study of science. Re-
garding metaphors as the root of scientific creativity, she suggests,
could lead to a way of explaining the development of new knowl-
edge while still preserving the romantic idea of individual creativ-
ity. But Fahnestock also notes that in some literary scholars and
poststructuralist philosophers the discovery that scientists also use
metaphors ‘releases a unifying “cluster of pieties” about how sci-
entists and poets are basically alike’ (Fahnestock 1999: 5). Both of
these notions (metaphor as a heuristic, and as a sign of the con-
struction of scientific knowledge being fundamentally similar to
any other construction) were discussed in the previous section.
Fahnestock (1999: 5), however, also notes that the concreteness
of scientific metaphors as textual elements increases their attrac-
tiveness as an object of study: that ‘while metaphors are epistemo-
logical constructs, they are also identifiable, formal devices. Given
an appropriate definition, they can be pointed out, providing evi-
dence for the scholar working with texts’.24 This section concen-
trates on the interdisciplinary status of those literary interpreta-
tions of chaos theory that focus on science as writing, with the
particular aim of looking at the ways they treat scientific meta-
phors that appear in the texts published by scientists or popular
science writers.
The rhetorical analysis of scientific texts is a relatively mar-
ginal field in literary studies, but it has received increasing atten-
24 Fahnestock (1999) also includes analysis of other rhetorical tropes in sci-
entific writing, such as antithesis and antimetabole. For these and other rhe-
torical relations between popular science writing and contemporary litera-
ture see Aarnio (2008).
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tion within, for example, sociolinguistics. The benefit of such ana-
lyses for interdisciplinary discussion lies in the possibility of mak-
ing detailed mappings of an individual author’s background as-
sumptions, and in reading against the grain, which can be more
revealing than an interpretation that stays within the author’s de-
signs.  A  good  example  of  such  an  effect  is  Secor  and  Walsh’s
(2004) analysis of Alan Sokal’s hoax article. Their detailed exami-
nation of the rhetoric of both Sokal’s writing and the previous is-
sues of the journal Social Text shows that Sokal probably suc-
ceeded in getting his article accepted not just because of the ideas
presented in it, but because of the rhetoric used. Firstly, Sokal’s
text was a successful pastiche in the sense that it managed to rep-
licate the conventions of the articles usually published in Social
Text extremely well (Secor and Walsh 2004: 77-88). Because the
editors had become too blind to their own conventions, Secor
and Walsh (2004: 88-89) argue, they failed to see the oddness of
Sokal’s discourse, or, alternatively, they assumed that Sokal’s
overblown versions of the common rhetoric of cultural studies
was caused by the author being an over-eager outsider attempting
to  fit  in.  ‘Sokal’s  hoax,  and  all  media  hoaxes’,  Secor  and  Walsh
(2004: 89) suggest, ‘teach us that the very act of reading is an ines-
capably social and rhetorical event; it is a political statement, an
affirmation of group membership, and a continual reconstruction
of moral, ethical, and public reality’. A literary scholar approach-
ing science as writing can therefore take rhetoric as their starting
point and come to interesting conclusions as to the epistemologi-
cal assumptions prevalent in the texts. From this perspective,
metaphor is mostly seen as a rhetorical device among others, al-
though a particularly effective one, especially when the reader is
expected to formulate a new conception of the physical world.
It should be kept in mind that popular science writing as a
genre differs from professional science writing in many respects,
one of them being rhetorical.25 Where professional science texts
aim to impress their argument on an audience of peers who not
25 For an overview of the publication history of popular science writing in
the early 20th century see Whitworth (2001: 26-57).
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only require much less explanatory rhetoric, but are also expected
to be interested in the subject matter without having to be par-
ticularly persuaded to do so, popular science writing must attract a
lay audience, keep up their interest, and along the way explain
complex new concepts and phenomena without technical vocabu-
lary or (much) mathematics. This does not need to mean, how-
ever, that popular science texts should be taken as somehow less
complex or less worthy examples of science writing. They simply
have a different purpose and are (mostly) aimed at a different au-
dience.
In an article on the rhetoric in and the dissemination of
popular scientific books on chaos theory Deannette Paul (2004:
37-46) makes an important point concerning the increasingly var-
ied audience that such texts have in a world of scientific speciali-
sation. Paul argues that Gleick’s Chaos in particular had an impact
not only among the general public but also within the professional
scientific community. Increasing specialisation has led to a situa-
tion where scientific experts in one field may find themselves just
as ignorant as anyone else of the details and the import of a new
theory, and will turn to popularisations to gain a general view of
such  a  field.  Such  a  situation,  Paul  suggests,  arises  particularly  at
the birth of new theories. As a theory is developed further the
rhetoric of the popularisations changes to reflect the changing
aims from the early example-oriented rhetoric to the semipopular
stage aimed at other scientists and concentrating on staking
claims, and finally to the stage where the text is actually aimed to
inform and entertain a general audience.
In order to accommodate all these varieties of non-technical
writing, a panel of contributors to the 1995 meeting of the Society
for Literature and Science in Los Angeles suggested ‘reflective sci-
ence writing’ as an alternative term to ‘popular science’. The new
term was defined as ‘writing by scientists for nonspecialists in
prose styles that reveal recognizable “literary” qualities, differing
in  this  way  from the  writing  of  scientists  for  other  scientists’  (as
quoted in Cordle 1999:  64,  n24).  The new term has the value of
avoiding the stigma attached to the word ‘popular’, and although
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it is fairly cumbersome and has not managed in general discussion
to replace its predecessor, I shall adopt it in this context. I particu-
larly wish to keep in mind the implications of the phrase: reflec-
tive science texts are often not only aesthetically pleasing reading,
but also, while not being science (or at least all of science), they ‘re-
flect’ (on) the process and the knowledge produced.
The reflective nature of such writing carries with it certain
risks, however. It is typical of such books (whether written by
journalists or actual scientists) to make far-reaching philosophical
or ethical claims that are based on the new world-view presented
by the author. Michael H. Whitworth (2001: 50) has noted that
this has much to do with the structure of narrative expected by
readers, and that the story of the discovery has to end with suita-
bly extensive pronouncements about the changes the new knowl-
edge will bring:
The book format demands and facilitates such conclusions. It
demands them insofar as readers of books expect some form of
closure, and it facilitates them, in that the structure of a book is
less tight-knit than that of a short article; claims that would seem
illogical or ludicrous in an article seem plausible at the end of a
larger and more complex structure.
This  is  particularly  true  when  a  new  field  of  science,  like  chaos
theory, is attempting to establish itself. As titles such as Making a
New Science (Gleick) and Man’s New Dialogue with Nature (Prigogine
and Stengers) suggest, chaos theory was initially presented, espe-
cially in reflective science writing, as something radically different
in the sciences. Although its mathematical tools were not in them-
selves revolutionary, the combination of the mathematics, the
possibilities offered by powerful computers, and the wide variety
of systems to which the mathematics was being applied, made
chaos theory seem something more than a regular step in the de-
velopment of better mathematical models of physical systems.
But,  as  I  suggested  in  the  previous  section,  to  call  its  advent  a
paradigm shift to postmodern epistemology within natural science
is going too far. Many scholars have argued that the revolutionary
status of chaos theory in the sciences is little more than a mirage
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created by the popularisations (see e.g. Knoespel 1991: 104-105,
Matheson and Kirchoff 1997: 31).
The reasons for the mirage may, however, have their roots al-
ready in the professional science articles on chaos theory and on
an overenthusiastic reading of those articles. Firstly, the conven-
tions of scientific writing may themselves lead interpreters astray.
When a new field of professional science is developing, its practi-
tioners have a tendency to publish ‘revolutionary’ articles that dif-
fer from the normal scientific conventions used in presenting in-
formation and in attracting reader attention. In this chaos theory
is no exception. Paul and Charney (1995), in their analysis of the
rhetorical strategies of professional articles on chaos theory,
found that where the established convention is to begin a scien-
tific article by a review of previous work and then pointing to an
area which has not yet been explored, the very early articles on
chaos theory begin, instead, with a familiar example of a phe-
nomenon that has not been adequately explained by the existing
theories. This comes across not only as a more exciting starting
point  for  a  narrative,  but  it  also  allowed  scientists  ‘to  aim  for  a
broad audience of general scientists rather than appealing to the
narrow research concerns of a specialized field’ (Paul and Charney
1995: 427). However, as soon as chaos theory developed as a field
of research the earlier convention, along with other similar ones,
settled back into place (Paul and Charney 1995: 404-405).
Secondly, reflective science writing has perhaps overempha-
sised the novelties of the theory. Gleick, for example, has been
criticised for making his narrative of chaos theory’s development
into a story of anti-establishment frontiersmen (Hayles 1990: 145-
146, Porush 1993: 156). While Gross and Levitt (1994: 94) find
that Gleick’s book is ‘recommendably accurate on the underlying
mathematical principles and their relevance for a host of scientific
questions’, they also argue that it,
perhaps inevitably, overdramatizes the history of the subject in
trying to make its protagonists fascinating. In point of fact, there
is nothing, on the level of personal idiosyncrasy, that can be said
to distinguish specialists in chaos theory from other mathemati-
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cians and theoretical physicists. They are not pointedly more he-
retical in temperament. [...] Moreover, chaos theory, for all its
beauty and scientific relevance, is not the dominant theme in con-
temporary mathematics, for the simple reason that nothing is.
Prigogine and Stengers, on the other hand, do not focus on the
pioneers of chaos theory but on its philosophical, even transcen-
dental implications. According to Gross and Levitt (1994: 96), de-
spite his impressive career as a scientist, Prigogine has in Order Out
of Chaos ‘slipped into habits of speculation that involve him in very
shaky science and even shakier mathematics’, and even Hayles
(1990: 91), who finds herself attracted to Prigogine and Stengers’s
‘vision’, believes that the book ought to carry ‘a warning label’:
‘CAUTION: Use at own risk. Authors have speculated beyond data.
Conclusions are conjectural’.26
The point is that literary scholars who approach science as
text to be analysed have an opportunity to bring to light certain
rhetorical and even ideological characteristics of those texts that
might otherwise escape notice. Through their rhetorical analysis
Paul and Charney, for example, managed to show that some of
the revolutionary flavour of the early chaos theory publications
arises from the use of the argumentative conventions that are de-
pendent on the traditions of professional science writing as a
genre. As will be seen below, many literary researchers would
have benefited from familiarising themselves with such conven-
tions whereas, lacking that knowledge of context, they create
readings of the implications of chaos theory that the scientists do
not recognise as part of the same conceptual structure.
Among the general audience the very name of chaos theory
conjures up associations that do not, in fact, have anything to do
with the science itself. From Hayles (1990: 8-9) onwards, most lit-
erary scholars commenting on chaos theory have noted how the
term ‘chaos’ has travelled in and out of the scientific context.
Weingart and Maasen (1997), for example, discuss the way the
word has acquired several different meanings at different periods
26 For more in-depth analysis of the status of Gleick’s and Prigogine and
Stengers’s books see Porush (1993).
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of time and in both scientific and general usage. Chaos as the op-
posite of cosmos, as lack of differentiation from which the cos-
mos is born, is a meaning originating in Hesiod’s Theogony and was
in use through Aristotle and the Stoics, St Augustine and Paracel-
sus. In the nineteenth century thermodynamics and entropy em-
phasised the more limited idea of chaos as the opposite of order,
a sense which overwhelmed the parallel one in use by authors
such as F.W.J. Schelling and Friedrich Nietzsche, and which saw
chaos as the source of order. It is this latter sense which, Weingart
and Maasen argue, was resurrected by the natural sciences when
they spoke of ‘chaos’ theory (1997: 478-480).27
The first use of the term as descriptive of nonlinear dynamics
is accredited to Li and Yorke for their 1975 paper ‘Period Three
Implies Chaos’, and throughout the 1980s the word was widely
used in scientific texts (Weingart and Maasen 1997: 469-470).
Most  scientists  writing  about  chaos  are  of  course  aware  of  the
multiplicity in the meaning of the term. In reflective science writ-
ing, presentations of the theory often try to form a balance be-
tween chaos as a source of order on the one hand, and the conno-
tations of  disorder on the other, and suggest that what chaos
theory actually does is to open up a space between the concepts
of order and disorder. As Cordle (1999: 87-88) notes, ‘[t]he result
is a see-saw between two representations of reality: The first as-
sumes a sharp binary distinction between order and disorder, and
the second finds this distinction to be less meaningful’. This blur-
ring of order and disorder is manifest in particular kinds of oxy-
moronic rhetorical devices: ‘two antonyms are harnessed as adjec-
tives to describe the same noun [e.g. ‘fuzzy and detailed’, ‘struc-
tured and unpredictable’ from Feigenbaum], or one word is de-
ployed as an adjective to a describe a noun, normally associated
27 Weingart and Maasen themselves focus on the adoption of ‘chaos’ into
the discourses of the social sciences. They perceive the same reactions to
the use of the term in the social sciences as appear in literary studies: some
commentators are applauding the metaphorical usage as fruitful, whereas
others deplore the usage as being ‘merely’ metaphorical and thus only creat-
ing confusion in the reader (Weingart and Maasen 1997: 474).
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with an opposite meaning to that adjective [e.g. ‘deterministic
chaos’, ‘orderly disorder’ (Lorenz), ‘stable chaos’ (Marcus), ‘regu-
lar irregularity’ (Mandelbrot)]’ (Cordle 1999: 87-88).
The more popular chaos theory became outside the context
of pure natural sciences, however, the less interested scientists
were  in  using  a  term  so  fraught  with  cultural  associations,  and
‘chaos’ came to be seen as the popular name of a part of what is
called ‘nonlinear dynamics’ or ‘dynamical systems theory’ in scien-
tific usage (Stewart 1989/1997: vii-viii, see also Hayles 1990: 8-9).
But in literary discussions the thermodynamic implications of
‘chaos’ as disorder continue to influence the ways in which the
science is understood. Peter Francis Mackey (1999: 37), for exam-
ple, while acknowledging that scientists are turning away from us-
ing ‘chaos’, decides to stick to the term exactly because the dual
meaning of both generative void and disorder proper resonates
with his reading of James Joyce’s Ulysses:
in suggesting a void as well as utter confusion, ‘chaos’ provides
too useful a description of three aspects of Ulysses to forgo it: (1)
the way the life of its central character, Bloom, emerges for us
out of nothing as he enters and lives through Ulysses; (2) the con-
fusion that greets first-time readers of this demanding novel; and
(3) the similarities between Bloom’s encounter with life and ours.
Most literary scholars have interpreted some form of genera-
tive void, existing between order and disorder, as the most inter-
esting aspect of chaos theory. By alternating between expressions
of order and disorder, scholars refer to a third, alternative concep-
tualisation  of  reality,  and  thus  orderly  disorder  is  viewed  by,  for
example, Demastes (1998: xi) as a middle ground between the un-
bearable opposites of ‘static tedium’ and ‘random frenzy’ in the
universe.
The bleeding of these different meanings of ‘chaos’ from one
context to another has been both applauded and objected to. Sci-
entists themselves have argued for specificity and for keeping the
term clean of extra-contextual meanings. When discussing the de-
velopment of the term with Ken Baake, John Casti, for example,
argues that adopting a word with everyday connotations in scien-
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tific usage requires ‘sucking out or dramatically restricting in all
variety of ways the kinds of interpretations that it has in informal
everyday language’ (as quoted in Baake 2003: 102). Similar opin-
ions can be found even in literary studies: Willie van Peer (1998:
45) firmly believes that the everyday sense of the word must not
be allowed to seep into our understanding of what chaos theory
actually means within the context of a scientific text. Many cul-
tural theorists and literary critics, however, have criticised scien-
tists not only for attempting to limit the use of ‘chaos’ outside its
scientific context, but also for abandoning the term within scien-
tific discourse when its cultural baggage was deemed too over-
whelming. Rather than imagine that it is possible to keep the cul-
tural meanings out of any text where a term that has a history out-
side its scientific context is used, they argue that no such sterilisa-
tion of meaning is possible or even desirable. Demastes (1998: 8-
9), for example, dismisses the scientists’ decision not to use the
term and claims that the ‘richness and complexity’ of it is exactly
what should be paid attention to.
However, I would emphasise that contextual limitation of
meaning is not only possible, but both necessary and common in
all language use (see e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1986/2004). If liter-
ary scholars decide to ignore the contextual indicators of rele-
vance when interpreting the meaning of a metaphor in a scientific
text, they could also be said to dismiss the entire natural scientific
world-view which forms that context, and to bracket out of dis-
cussion exactly those parts of the model which make the meta-
phor mean something in that context. To implicitly assume, as
Demastes seems to do, that science would benefit from continu-
ing to use a heuristic metaphor at a point where scientists believe
it has served its purpose and expanded beyond the current needs
of the theory, is perhaps to assume that the kind of proliferation
of meaning considered valuable in literature is also valuable in sci-
ence – an assumption that may itself arise from regarding science
as text.
Scientific Metaphors
62
Explanatory Metaphors in Science Writing
Even though the purely rhetorical analysis of professional and re-
flective science writing rarely has transdisciplinary aims, in the
background of the view of science as text may lurk the more am-
bitious assumption that science as a whole can be reduced to an
object of literary and cultural analysis. When it does appear, such
an assumption tends to be connected to an unwillingness to ac-
knowledge differences between professional science and reflective
texts. For example, most literary scholars derive their understand-
ing of chaos theory from works of reflective science writing, but,
especially considering that they are professional analysts of texts,
they occasionally show a lack of critical focus as to the epistemo-
logical status of their sources.
One problem is confusing the explication of a theory with
the application of it. Ward (1998: 117-118), for example, argues
that demands for mathematical methods in literary applications of
chaos theory are ungrounded because popular science books have
demonstrated the ease with which metaphorical language trans-
mits the central ideas of chaos theory, without needing to rely on
mathematics. It is clear, however, that reflective science writing
avoids mathematics in order to stay popular, not because meta-
phors are inherently better at describing chaotic phenomena. Re-
flective science writing consists of the translation of the original
discoveries from mathematics into a natural language, made for
the benefit of those who do not ‘speak’ the original. They are ex-
pressions of mathematics but are not mathematics. The radical dif-
ference between natural language and mathematical notation was
remarked upon already by Werner Heisenberg (1967/1989: 169)
who warned his readers that using natural language to describe
quantum mechanics is bound to be inaccurate: ‘it is not a precise
language in which one could use the normal logical patterns; it is a
language that produces pictures in our mind, but together with
them the notion that the pictures have only a vague connection
with reality, that they represent only a tendency toward reality’.
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The conflict that arises from these different interpretations of
reflective science writing draws on two different conceptions of
the purpose of scientific writing in general: the scientists believe
that even reflective science writing is supposed to impart to the
reader knowledge of specific natural phenomena and therefore
the words should be understood within the scientific context,
whereas  cultural  theorists  wish  to  unhook  the  text  from  its  au-
thor’s original intention and allow connotations which might in-
crease the dissemination of the text’s meaning. As Beer (1996:
159-160, 181-184) has argued, even though within the natural sci-
ences technical terms are treated often much more like mathe-
matical symbols than words in a natural language, the scientist au-
thor cannot enforce that restriction. As emphasised above, the
discourse of science rests, rather, on the assumption that ‘the at-
tempt to control levels of statement and description must depend
more upon the agreement of a close professional community’
(Beer 1996: 159). That is, it relies upon the audience understand-
ing the restricted context of the expression and actively repressing
any other associations aroused by the term. However, as Beer
(1996: 164) points out, from the perspective of interpretation the
meaning of even scientific texts can no longer be restricted by the
author once they have been published, and exploratory misread-
ings are perfectly possible and legitimate (see also Waugh 2005:
236).
Literary works, naturally, have always played with the scien-
tific  discoveries  of  their  time,  and  few  would  be  as  churlish  as
deny them the right to extend the scientific metaphors to new,
imaginative directions. However, even when it is admitted that
metaphorical extensions within works of literature have their own
intrinsic value, their legitimacy in the context of literary analysis is
another issue. Much depends on the nature of the difference, re-
ferred to in the Introduction, between literature as an art form
and as a scholarly pursuit. Although Beer (1996: 164) correctly de-
fends the literary authors’ right to extend the implications of sci-
entific metaphors for artistic purposes, she does not take an ex-
plicit stand on the role of literary analysis. To be sure, there is not
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much point for a literary scholar to approach scientific texts and
aim only to reproduce the knowledge and attitudes already present
in the production of that  text.  Thus Gillespie (2003:  34),  for  ex-
ample, points out that ‘the discoveries of post-Einsteinian science
offer even more to humanists when they apply the concepts in a
fashion suited to the protocols of their discipline rather than ac-
cording to strictures imposed by the hard sciences’. Such explora-
tory research based on a deliberate misreading can be valuable for
literary studies, and is perhaps best achieved by using the toolbox
of  our  own discipline.  But  it  is  also  vital  to  remain  aware  of  the
fact that the transformations in the meanings of scientific termi-
nology that result from removing them from their original context
cannot, afterwards, be attributed to the science. Conceptual bag-
gage carried by a term in everyday language belongs to the context
of everyday language. Judging from the use of chaos theory in lit-
erary scholarship, I would argue that literary scholars have often
assumed the amalgamated position between the scientific refer-
ence of the original text and a literary proliferation of the meta-
phors: they read scientific texts as literary authors do, but produce
texts in which the scientific reference is still assumed to remain
valid, even though the meaning of the metaphors has been ex-
tended beyond the original, constricting context.
Science as Textuality
A  more  radical  view  of  science  as  text  considers  it  in  the  post-
structuralist paradigm of textuality. Peter Stoicheff goes far in
talking  about  science  as  discourse  on  a  par  with  literature,  and
takes the new conceptualisations of order and disorder as reasons
for dismantling what he sees as a long-established hierarchy of
value between them. Because the ‘margin’ between the text and
the world is ruled by the chaotic dynamics of language, Stoicheff
(1991: 86) suggests, any realistic attempt to represent it only re-
sults in an illusion, whereas metafiction, because of its self-
reflection and resistance to comprehensive meaning, actually rep-
resents that relationship in an accurate fashion. Stoicheff’s view of
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chaos theory and metafiction is seen from a perspective which
‘examines the similar roles of narrative and investigative proce-
dure’, and which presents scientific inquiry as one of ‘[o]ur
worldly narratives, through which we construct what we think of
as reality’ (Stoicheff 1991: 85, 95). This position subjects the con-
cepts of chaos theory to analysis which expressly does not allow
their original context any special authority.28
Since my focus is on the humanist end of the chaos spec-
trum, however, I will not discuss this poststructuralist interpreta-
tion of chaos in any detail. However, a point I would like to raise
is the contrast between such a view and the more conservative
rhetorical analysis of scientific texts. Most importantly, there are
cultural and ethical implications embedded in the different ways
of conceptualising the relationship between the natural sciences
and  humanist  research.  A  central  text  in  this  respect  is  Patricia
Waugh’s essay ‘Just-So Stories? Science, Narrative, and Postmod-
ern Intertextualities’ (2005), in which she argues that the post-
structuralist theories of language and current developments in the
natural sciences actually support each other in creating a new
grand narrative of textuality. This surprising but prescient claim is
based on Waugh’s analysis of the ‘scriptoral metaphor’ which she
sees as affecting both the sciences and the arts in the twenty-first
century. Poststructuralism, by presenting literature and culture as
a play of intertextualities, and current biochemistry and neo-
Darwinist sociobiology, by presenting nature as ruled by the code
of DNA, both create a view of all  being as ‘an autopoetic inven-
tion, a writing which writes itself, liberated both from demiurges
and authors’ (Waugh 2005: 243). What follows from the expan-
sion of this metaphor, Waugh (2005: 239-242) argues, is a blurring
of the fact-value distinction which has kept scientists from mak-
ing the leap from what they know to be the case to what they
28 In the same collection Knoespel (1991) also discusses chaos as a form of
discourse and compares it with deconstruction. Knoespel argues that even
though deconstruction and chaos theory differ both institutionally and epis-
temologically, a narratological analysis reveals that both rely on the rhetori-
cal strategy of examples.
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think ought to be the case. If the autonomy of the worlds of sci-
ence and art succumbs to the ‘condition of pervasive textuality’,
Waugh suggests, and all becomes story, postmodernism actually
ends up smoothing the way for the ‘expansionist turn’ in science
by strengthening the vision of life as code that can be cracked and
even modified:
Evolutionary theory [...] may consequently explain how the algo-
rithmic mechanism of natural selection has fashioned from this
universal grammar the neural networks of the human mind, the
principles of human culture, and the behaviors and impulses of
all living organisms. Science is therefore licensed to pronounce
on value. (Waugh 2005: 242)29
The reason why I want to bring up Waugh’s argument at this
point is to emphasise that, in contrast with the poststructuralist
scriptoral metaphor, the humanist perspective does not fall into
the trap of enabling scientific expansion while attempting to un-
dermine the premises of that expansion. In the following section I
will argue that the third conceptualisation of the science meta-
phor, science as knowledge, opens up the possibility for an ap-
proach that keeps the sciences from extending their purview from
‘is’ to ‘ought’, while it at the same time respects their expertise on
physical reality. It is possible to find in the theoretical discussion
on literature and chaos ways of approaching the sciences that
make them relevant to the humanities but do not allow one to
subsume the other, and that do not deconstruct the autonomy of
the sciences as a form of genuine inquiry.
29 See also Paulson (2001b: 82-83)
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1.3 Conceptual Metaphor: Science as Knowledge
Why stretch and twist, press and expand, concepts
in this way – Why try to see A as metaphorically B,
when it literally is not B? Well, because we can do
so, conceptual boundaries not being rigid, but elas-
tic and permeable; and because we often need to do
so, the available literal resources of the language be-
ing insufficient to express our sense of the rich cor-
respondences, interrelations, and analogies of do-
mains conventionally separated; and because meta-
phorical thought and utterance sometimes embody
insight expressible in no other fashion.
Max Black, ‘More About Metaphor’
Whereas previous sections presented examples of literary scholars’
attitudes towards the natural sciences which aimed either at effect-
ing a change in the natural sciences or even at explaining the natu-
ral sciences through the methodology of literary studies, this sec-
tion will focus on the work of scholars who regard the metaphori-
cal use of chaos theory as a way of changing the methodology of
their own field. Furthermore, even though there were doubts ex-
pressed in the previous section as to whether metaphor can con-
vey knowledge that has been formulated in the language of math-
ematics, in this section I try to see to what extent it could indeed
carry the kind of knowledge difficult or even impossible to con-
vey in any other form of natural language.
In the field of chaos theory and literature the most complex
interdisciplinary positions are held by scholars who aim, through
metaphorical use of the terminology of chaos theory, to destabi-
lise the borders between different forms of knowledge, and thus
change the methods of literary studies themselves. Underlying this
kind of thinking is the conceptualisation of ‘science’ as the knowl-
edge that has come out of scientific research. In this section I will
focus on the work of Michael Patrick Gillespie and William Paul-
son who both argue that the knowledge that chaos theory has
produced concerning the behaviour of dynamical systems changes
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the way causality should be understood. Such a change would not
affect  only  mathematics  and  physics,  but  all  forms  of  human
thought, including literary analysis, even though it has not (at least
yet) been established that dynamical systems theory and its dis-
coveries are directly applicable to cultural systems. The reason
why these scholars take the metaphorical adoption of chaos the-
ory into literature to be fruitful is that they, like Max Black above,
believe that metaphorical meaning can be irreducible. The phrase
‘conceptual metaphor’ in the title of this section thus refers to a
genuinely new semantic entity which can carry a meaning that is
not expressible by any paraphrase, i.e. it is not a heuristic which
can be abandoned once a more precise expression is formulated.
Thus these critics argue that the metaphorical combination of
chaos and literature would make a certain kind of thinking about
literature possible.
 I, too, agree with Black’s suggestion and argue that some
metaphors can convey ideas in a way that no other expression
can. However, I also would like to distinguish between conceptual
metaphors that are, indeed, inexpressible in any other way, and
the scientific concepts expressible in no other form of natural lan-
guage, but which are initially formulated as knowledge about the
world in the language of mathematics. The reason for this distinc-
tion is pragmatic: I am not qualified to pronounce on the meaning
of mathematical statements, nor is their inclusion here necessary,
since the importance of conceptual metaphor can be established
even without extending the theory beyond natural language. With
this caveat in mind, I suggest in the following that interdiscipli-
nary metaphors, when they understand ‘science’ as knowledge
about physical reality, can clarify the relationship between the
natural sciences and literary studies as disciplines. The meeting of
different disciplines can then be conceptualised as an encounter
with otherness, where the respect felt for the other discipline is
built into the metaphorical uses to which its world-view is being
put.
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Chaos as Conceptual Resource
As discussed above, Matheson and Kirchoff’s argument against
the use of chaos as a metaphor denied that any truly new knowl-
edge can be produced by modelling literature as chaos. However,
the problem in their argument is that they take literature to mean
only specific literary works, whereas many other critics have sug-
gested that metaphorical uses of chaos theory precisely can help
us to learn more about literature and its study as general phenom-
ena. For example, Weingart and Maasen (1997: 478-479, 518)
have suggested that examining the uses of the chaos metaphor in
the social sciences reveals that the metaphoric transfer of knowl-
edge is itself a chaotic process in which the different uses of the
‘hybrid’ metaphor of chaos form a feedback loop through which
‘chaos has assumed ever-increasing semantic facets, rendering
(aspects of) it more and more attractive’.30 Whether or not we ac-
cept the claim that interdisciplinary knowledge is at its root a cha-
otic process, Weingart and Maasen’s point is valid in emphasising
the possibility that interdisciplinary metaphor is capable of gener-
ating new knowledge.
The basis of such a view of metaphor was suggested – from
as early as the 1980s – by Black, whose ‘strong creativity thesis’
stated that some metaphors create similarities rather than just de-
scribe existing ones, making ‘connections that, once perceived, are
then truly present’ (1980/1993: 37). More recently the view has
been extended and made popular by the conceptual metaphor
theory of George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, Mark Turner and Gilles
Fauconnier.31 One central idea in conceptual metaphor is the
blending process, whereby the characteristics of a source domain
are mapped onto a target domain to create a conceptual structure
not quite like either the source or the target, and which can
change the way both the source and the target are understood.
30 In this their approach is very similar to that of Hayles (see p. 46).
31 See e.g. Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff and Turner (1989), Faucon-
nier and Turner (2002).
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From this perspective chaos theory in literary studies appears
as the conceptual metaphor LITERATURE IS A CHAOTIC SYSTEM, a
notion that cannot be formulated or understood in any other than
metaphorical terms. Such an approach aims at taking chaos theory
as a source domain and using its fusion with literature (the target
domain) as a way of reconceptualising both literature as a phe-
nomenon and the methods used in its study. For example, Gilles-
pie suggests in The Aesthetics of Chaos (2003) that chaos theory
should be used to reveal the nonlinear patterns of reading which
are obscured by the argumentative structure of the critical essay.
Rather than positing that the literary texts in themselves would
necessarily be chaotic, Gillespie (2003: 34) argues that ‘patterns of
reading for almost everyone adhere to an epistemology shaped by
nonlinear complexity’ and that ‘formal criticisms that do not re-
flect that condition simply fail to address aesthetic experience’.
Thus he suggests that critics could (and should) learn to display in
their readings a more comprehensive, though necessarily less co-
herent view of the literary work:
What I am advocating here is not a reconfiguration in our habits
of reading but rather a new awareness of what we already do. So-
phisticated readers have learned to balance ambiguity with such
dexterity that the process moves forward without conscious ef-
fort. So far, formal criticism has not generated a metaphoric sys-
tem that can articulate the complexities of that process. My ef-
forts do not aim to dismiss the achievements of previous critics
but rather to introduce a vocabulary and an analytic method that
allows expansion of existing formal responses to literature. (Gil-
lespie 2003: 25)
According to Gillespie (2003: 110-111), the metaphorical system
offered by chaos theory not only provides critics with a vocabu-
lary to express the ambiguity of readings, but it also boosts their
credibility by matching their argument with suitable rhetoric. By
concentrating on nonlinearity chaos theory has drawn attention to
the disproportionally large effects of small causes and, by implica-
tion, to a multiplicity of responses to literature. Thus,  as  long as
natural language is ruled by the metaphorical system of cause and
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effect, Gillespie (2003: 30) suggests, the desired ‘pursuit of ambi-
guity’ will be frustrated.
I take Gillespie’s work as an example of a theory that adopts
the knowledge produced by the sciences as a metaphor for literary
analysis. The connection formed between the two fields of study
functions as a conceptual metaphor which, rather than focusing
on the scientific process or science as discourse, suggests that the
knowledge produced by scientific activity can cause a new con-
ceptualisation of what literary criticism can and should be. I
should note, however, that Gillespie’s argument rests on the as-
sumption that the task of scholarly reading is to reconstruct the
reading experience, and that the difference he observes between
‘the cognitive process followed by a reader’ and the method dis-
played in literary analysis automatically ‘challenges the relevance
of traditional interpretive commentary’ (Gillespie 2003: 4).32 Be-
low I will suggest that Gillespie is too hasty in dismissing more
traditional forms of interpretation and that metaphorical interdis-
ciplinarity may, indeed, benefit from their methods and perspec-
tives.
The conceptual metaphor LITERATURE IS A CHAOTIC SYSTEM
opens certain issues to discussion that may have been thought to
have been exhaustively analysed and defined, not only because it
emphasises certain characteristics in literature that are also found
in chaotic systems, but also because once that metaphor is exam-
ined and queried, certain things are seen not to match. Daniela M.
Bailer-Jones (2002: 112, 120) makes the point of emphasising that
the power of metaphor as a theory-constitutive device depends on
it being open to critique. ‘The effective use of analogy presup-
poses that its users know, or can explore, what the positive and
32 Also, while Gillespie admits to his own writing occasionally being too
logical and linear to match his own arguments, his real failing is in the liter-
ary readings. His analysis of Finnegans Wake, for example, is limited to relat-
ing the gists of previous readings and commentaries on, for example, the
multiple allusions in the text, and then exhorting future critics not to
choose between them. He attempts to describe the experience of thinking
about several things simultaneously, but ends up just prescribing it (Gilles-
pie 2003: 34-42).
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the negative analogies between two domains are’, Bailer-Jones
notes. ‘Knowing what the model is not a model of is part of the
model’. This negative comparison is also seen to be central to the
development of interdisciplinary research by Beer (1996: 195),
who argues that in order to count as successful, interdisciplinarity
does not always need to find similarities and reconciliations, but
rather, ‘transformations and imbalances reveal as much as con-
gruities’.
In the case of chaos theory and literature, the problem is that
the negative analogies tend to be ignored and the neutral analogies
are used to support claims that are to all intents and purposes un-
falsifiable. There is no way in which the claim that a literary work
is a chaotic system could be falsified, since the mathematical
methods for identifying chaotic systems cannot be applied to lit-
erary works. Therefore, however useful metaphors and analogies
between different disciplines can be for conceptualisation, critics
and theorists using them should also show an awareness that even
the most intriguing metaphorical connection does not establish a
real interdisciplinary link (in the sense defined by Klein; see pp.
20-21) between two fields of research. Similarly, the way that the
previous interpretations of chaos theory within literary studies
have emphasised its revolutionary status, and have been blind to
those aspects of chaos theory which do not match their vision of
the erosion of scientific epistemology, shows that they have been
uninterested in exploring the differences between their model of
literature and that presented by chaos theory.33
William Paulson is a scholar whose approach to literature
very much emphasises the interpretive act, and who explicitly ex-
tends his understanding of the dynamics of interpretation to in-
terdisciplinary interactions. Like Gillespie, he is interested in com-
plexifying prevalent notions of causality, but instead of focusing
33 I should stress that since my aim is to bring out certain aspects of the
chaos and literature discussion that have been left in the shade, not to pro-
vide a complete, alternative metaphorical model for that discussion, I also
refrain from making actual comparisons between literature and chaotic sys-
tems, whether positive or negative.
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on making scholarship reflect the multiplicity of interpretations,
he argues that interpretations should approach the literary work as
an object external to the interpreter, even while being aware of the
implicatedness of the interpreter in the hermeneutic process. In
‘Literature, Complexity, Interdisciplinarity’, his contribution to
Hayles’s 1991 volume, Paulson presents different disciplines as a
hierarchy of descriptive levels, where interdisciplinarity would en-
tail moving between levels or choosing an unusual level of de-
scriptive reduction for a particular phenomenon. From this point
of view, the benefit of introducing scientific vocabulary in the
study of literature would be the production of new knowledge
from  the  noise  created  in  the  interaction  of  two  such  different
forms of discourse.34
If I practice interdisciplinarity by importing terms and concepts
such as those of information theory and self-organization, violat-
ing conventional boundaries by identifying textual ambiguity and
rhetoricity with noise, I do so not to produce a Grand Synthesis
but to disturb, enrich, and perhaps displace the study of literature
by injecting into it some information sufficiently foreign as to
function initially as ‘noise, the only possible source of new pat-
terns’. (Paulson 1991: 49, quoting Gregory Bateson)
Thus Paulson, like Gillespie, aims to destabilise the assumptions
prevalent in literary studies. He also explicitly equates literature
with  literary  study  as  a  discipline,  and  suggests  that  as  forms  of
knowledge both differ from the scientific endeavour in their abil-
ity to deal with several levels of description simultaneously (Paul-
son 1991: 46-47). Therefore literature, by being able to comment
on several layers of reality, is able to refer both to itself and to re-
ality without having to exclude either. What the sciences of com-
plexity have done, Paulson (1991: 51) argues, is to add to the
toolkit of the literary scholar ‘new kinds of concepts of causality’,
in particular the idea of emergence, which then change the way
the context of literary works, ‘our material, organic, and social
world’, is understood. I find Paulson’s work to be a valuable ex-
34 For a further discussion of the role of information theory and the con-
cept of noise in literary studies see Paulson (1988).
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ception in that he manages to present an argument where litera-
ture both differs from the epistemology of the natural sciences
and remains connected to reality.
Encountering Science
Ten years later, in an essay titled ‘For a Cosmopolitical Philology:
Lessons from Science Studies’ (2001a), Paulson formulates an im-
portant addition to his theory of postmodern, interdisciplinary lit-
erary analysis, and one that might change the metaphor for inter-
disciplinarity from war to diplomacy. He begins by reiterating the
point about the importance of context to literary phenomena.
‘One crucial reason for doing “literature and science”’, Paulson
(2001a: 101-102) argues, ‘is to help literary studies [...] fit into a
world where nonhuman things matter’. Therefore any kind of
scholarship that wishes to go beyond pure formalism needs to
work out how cultural objects connect to material reality, ‘how
our cultural texts fit into collectives that are not just cultural’.
What Paulson would like the humanities to adopt is a method of
investigating text as something which is (at least to a large extent)
independent of the researcher’s will, and create theories which can
(at least up to a point) be falsified. ‘What matters’, he (2001a: 112)
argues, ‘is that the knowledge and assumptions of the knower be
put at risk: that whatever the knower is interacting with have the
power to make a difference in the process’.35 This power given to
the object of research to deny the researcher’s assumptions and to
resist the very interpretation that is being constructed, leads to a
‘cosmopolitical philology’, itself based on Isabelle Stengers’s pro-
ject of defining for the human sciences an ‘ecology of practices’
towards the other, of ‘encountering one’s “object” as a fellow
human “subject”’:
35 See also Umberto Eco, who separates ‘interpreting’ texts from ‘using’
texts (1992b: 68-69) and introduces a principle of falsification to the evalua-
tion of interpretations (1992a: 52).
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To interact sociably with a text is to posit that it is the delegate of
a person, even if we are obliged to (or think it wiser to) construct
that person entirely from the evidence of the text. Our respect
for the ‘ghost’ and its intentions may enable us to respect the
text’s resistance, and keep us from taking it as simply an occasion
for our own critical constructive performance. (Paulson 2001a:
115)
Paulson, then, is willing to transgress disciplinary boundaries, but
does so in order to change the methods of his own discipline,
rather than impose his own methodology on another. In particu-
lar, he introduces the idea of falsification into contemporary liter-
ary studies in the shape of giving the literary work a position as a
member of a communicative situation, as an entity with the (at
least hypothesised) capacity to claim a reading to be wrong.
The idea of an encounter with another being can itself be
seen to be at the root of metaphorical meaning. Roger D. Sell
(2000: 250) argues that literary encounters are like metaphors be-
cause they ‘raise possibilities, open up new perceptions, generate
enquiry’. Similarly, I would suggest that scientific metaphors at
their best are what literary encounters should be: models where
there is space left for what the model is not a model of, or meet-
ing points between two fields of knowledge where both elements
of the metaphorical blend are allowed a voice and the possibility
of saying ‘no, this misrepresents me’. I realise that my own rheto-
ric is slipping into dangerously anthropomorphised ways of pre-
senting abstract concepts, but, fittingly, the metaphor of an en-
counter of equals carries meanings that are difficult to express
otherwise.
This irreducibility is one of the central meanings of the word
‘texture’  in  the  title  of  this  study.  Metaphorical  uses  of  scientific
knowledge create meanings that, whether they occur within the
context of scientific, literary or theoretical texts, can only be ap-
proached through a combination of analysis and interpretation.
This is why the tasks designed by Cordle (1999) for literary inves-
tigation into science (tracing influences and shared metaphors,
rhetorical analyses of scientific texts, and the larger philosophical
questions of what counts as knowledge in the different fields; see
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p. 50), all retain their basis in interpretation. This position offers
the possibility of seeing science and the knowledge it produces as
connected to, but not completely encompassed by the study of
culture and meaning. A similar argument has been presented by
Martin Eger (1993: 205), who suggests that even though the
highly formal expressions of mathematics lie beyond hermeneutic
practice, the texts produced in natural language do not, but rather
consist of concepts and metaphors that ‘come to us with a con-
text and a history’. Therefore both the texts produced by scientific
activity and the knowledge presented in them through culturally
contextualised language are subject to interpretation.
Conversely, however, the extension of interpretive issues into
the field of scientific texts can be understood to mean that scien-
tific knowledge is able, in an unprecedented manner, to pro-
nounce on value. At the end of the previous section I referred to
Patricia Waugh’s (2005) criticism of the sciences are expanding
their  purview  from  ‘is’  to  ‘ought’.  A  similar  argument  has  also
been formulated by Slavoj Žižek (2002), who focuses on the
‘Third Culture’, a community of scientists brought together by
publisher John Brockman, which attempts to merge the latest sci-
entific discoveries with the age-old questions of what it means to
be human, and to do so through reflective science writing in a
fashion that is understandable to the general audience.36 These
writings  have  won  a  lot  of  ground  from  cultural  studies,  argues
Žižek (2002: 20-22), who points out the vast popularity of the
Third Culture authors compared to those representing cultural
studies.  He  also  notes  the  ‘missionary  zeal’  of  the  scientists  in
building a new paradigm of knowledge, and suggests that they
have not shown any sensitivity to the complexities of ideological
debates (Žižek 2002: 22-23). On the other hand, the Third Cul-
ture writers obviously have revitalised the discussion by bringing
back the kinds of metaphysical questions cultural studies has
bracketed. ‘So in clear contrast to the strict prohibition of direct
36 Third Culture members include, among others, Richard Dawkins, Daniel
C. Dennett, Murray Gell-Mann, Stuart Kauffman, Lynn Margulis, Marvin
Minsky, Steven Pinker and Francisco Varela (Brockman 1995).
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ontological questions in cultural studies’, Žižek (2002: 26) sug-
gests,
the proponents of Third Culture unabashedly approach the most
fundamental pre-Kantian metaphysical issues (such as the ulti-
mate constituents of reality, the origins and end of the universe,
the nature of consciousness, and the emergence of life) as if the
old dream which died with the demise of Hegelianism, of a large
synthesis of metaphysics and science, the dream of a global the-
ory of all grounded in exact scientific insights, is coming alive
again.
Although considering such metaphysics an important area of
thought, Žižek (2002: 27-28) argues that the Third Culture and its
members are blind to the difference between ‘knowledge inherent
to the academic institution, defined by the standards of profes-
sionalism’  and  ‘the  truth  of  a  (collective)  subject  engaged  in  a
struggle’.
Taking Waugh’s and Žižek’s criticism into account it could be
said that, on the one hand, reflective science writing has provided
literary and cultural studies with new, enriching metaphors, but,
on the other hand, it has confused descriptive and prescriptive
ways of talking about reality and about human values. At the same
time as cultural studies have been adopting scientific metaphors,
the  writers  of  the  Third  Culture  have  also  been  busy  utilising
those metaphors in texts that seem to have much more influence
on the current Zeitgeist among the general public than cultural the-
ory does. While it is true that this constitutes an encroachment of
the natural sciences into discussions usually reserved for the hu-
manities, the solution is not only to dismiss those texts as unintel-
lectual and lacking in theoretical understanding, but to approach
them as reflective science writing, as writing which takes knowl-
edge produced by the natural sciences and through the use of
conceptual metaphors attempts to pronounce on issues relating to
human culture and values. Only if literary and cultural scholars
themselves are able to make this distinction can the general audi-
ence do the same and, consequently, keep in focus the difference
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between scientific pronouncements on what is and reflective pro-
nouncements on what ought to be.
Similarly, it is clear that the humanities must not allow the
sciences to pronounce alone on the human value of their discov-
eries. Eger (1993: 188-189) brings up the ‘ancient practice of sci-
entific study for the sake of self-formation’. This connection be-
tween the scientific world-view and the values of an individual is
reopened, Eger argues, not because of people undertaking actual
scientific inquiry, but through the process of contextualising lives
within the physical universe. This process, Eger (1993: 202-203)
further suggests, functions through metaphor:
although we do understand that a knowledge of stellar structure
cannot affect our self-concept directly, that nonequilibrium ther-
modynamics will not give purpose to life, we are beginning to re-
alize that this is not the end of the matter. For it is not in themselves
that these bits of knowledge exert their effect; today they do so
through the metaphors they support, especially the high-level
metaphors – extrapolations and integrative appropriations of
many disciplines. Through this channel the sciences do indeed
have action-orienting power.
Thus the natural sciences can be producers of ‘socially orient-
ing theory’ and blur the borderline between the ‘value spheres’ of
the human and the natural sciences (Eger 1993: 203). For as long
as the humanities dismiss the sciences altogether as a conversa-
tional partner they leave reflective science writing to carry on
shaping the cultural meanings of scientific knowledge. Instead, by
encountering the scientific knowledge as a conversational partner
the humanities are in a much better position to critique the value
judgements being made on the basis of that knowledge.
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Conclusion: The Ends of Metaphor
‘Metaphors [...] are not called fertile or generative for nothing’,
notes Ellen Spolsky (2003: 161).
They breed promiscuously in the brain, producing analogies
among unconnected or incommensurable ideas. These analogies
are not only illimitable in number; they cannot, in principle, be
restrained semantically. It is hard to separate the legitimate off-
spring from the bastards until it becomes clear that the latter are
sterile.
Spolsky’s reproductive metaphor changes the basis on which sci-
entific metaphors are judged from legitimising their creation to
observing their effects. Rather than arguing whether it is correct
to create and to use a particular metaphor, it makes more sense
for interdisciplinary literary scholars to analyse the usefulness of
the conceptual structure produced by that metaphor. In this I lean
towards interdisciplinary pragmatics and suggest that the lack of
actual applications of the mathematical methods of chaos theory
to literary phenomena should be taken as a strong indication of
the reduced reproductive capabilities of LITERATURE  IS  A
CHAOTIC SYSTEM.
However, this is not meant as a dismissal of either interdisci-
plinary literary studies in general, or those based on metaphorical
transfers in particular. How, then, should scientific activity, as well
as the texts and the knowledge produced by science be conceived
of within literary studies? One important guideline is a certain
level of humility towards the methods of and the information
produced by other disciplines. As has been pointed out, becoming
an expert in more than one field nowadays is nearly impossible,
and for many people within the humanities, seeking the help of a
scholar already familiar with the issues within another field of re-
search is tantamount to selling out. ‘Although any one of us may
be specialists in our field’, Conte (2002: 202) warns us, ‘we be-
come the latter-day equivalent of informational Luddites when
faced with the expertise and guidance required to approach an-
other field’. As long as the commentary on interdisciplinary pro-
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jects tends towards dismissing the knowledge produced by the
other side as irrelevant or misguided, rather than just difficult to
master, there is going to be little change in this reaction.
I am not in a position to suggest how the natural sciences
should change their approaches to interdisciplinary humanities. As
far as my own field is concerned, however, I believe that, difficult
as it is to define the various ontologies of different forms of liter-
ary discourse, literary scholars venturing into interdisciplinary
fields should display just such a conscious awareness of the com-
plexities within their own discipline and position their research
accordingly, as well as use the tools they already have to contextu-
alise, analyse and evaluate the scientific sources they use. But even
this kind of ‘disciplined’ idea-swapping should not need the war-
like rhetoric of transgression and transdisciplinarity to justify it-
self.
To conclude, it is clear that there are intriguing similarities
between the ways in which nonlinear mathematics is able to de-
scribe the complexity of the universe and the ways in which liter-
ary scholars attempt to capture the complexity of a text, and
metaphorical connections drawn on such similarities can be an
important source of inspiration for a scholar in either field. How-
ever, some theorists and critics working with chaos theory and lit-
erature have declared, with very little actual evidence, that chaos
theory is the next universal explanatory model, suggesting that the
equations of nonlinear dynamics describe everything from the
movement of matter to the emergence of literary meaning.
On the other hand, chaos theory has in literary studies drawn
attention to ways in which literary culture could oppose the de-
velopments noted by Waugh (2005) and Žižek (2002). The use of
chaos theory as a metaphor for literature (either the textual object
or the process of reading) can re-engage literary scholars in the is-
sues of ontology and value which poststructuralist theory has
seemed to bracket  from discussion,  and which have to some ex-
tent been taken over by reflective science writing, with arguably
less than sufficient sensibility. Therefore, as long as literary schol-
ars retain one eye on those aspects of metaphorical models that
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do not match, it is possible and commendable to try to engage in
the context of literary studies the questions thrown up by the
natural sciences, and not leave the entire field of human value to
be discussed by the reflective science writers alone.
Although it is common for abstract theorizing and specula-
tion to outrun the applicability of the new ideas to detailed analy-
sis, there is, undeniably, groundbreaking work being done in many
disciplinary margins. It is therefore important to acknowledge the
heuristic benefits of cross-disciplinary metaphors, as long as their
ends, both in the sense of underlying goals and of limitations, are
kept in sight. The following chapters, therefore, analyse the ways
in which chaos theory has been adapted to the field of literature,
but with the specific aim of focusing on the larger questions au-
thors and literary scholars have attempted to answer with its help.
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2.  Strange Attractors in Literature:
Constraints on Form and Meaning
HANNAH  This feedback, is it a way of making pic-
tures of forms in nature? Just tell me if it is or it
isn’t.
VALENTINE  (Irritated) To me it is. Pictures of turbu-
lence – growth – change – creation – it’s not a way
of drawing an elephant, for God’s sake!
Tom Stoppard, Arcadia
One of the most prominent characteristics of chaotic systems is
that they display symmetry across scales. This is visualised in
computer graphics as the many-coloured fractal marvels and loop-
ing trajectories of strange attractors (see illustrations on pages 7-
8). Such graphs keep on repeating similar shapes on different lev-
els of magnification so that, however closely a fractal picture is
examined – however great the zoom factor – the deep structure
does not reveal either homogeneity or irregularity, but shows a
high degree of organisation that occurs on each level throughout
the graph. The suggestion of chaos theory is that such self-
similarity is a crucial governing rule in the function of the entire
universe, and that certain patterns occur on every scale of dy-
namical behaviour, from gas molecules to stock-market prices.
What makes such graphs special, however, is not only their
beauty or their visual resemblance, particularly in the case of frac-
tal landscapes, to physical reality, but also the fact that they turn
dynamic behaviour into visual models. As Stoppard’s mathemati-
cian says in the epigraph, a strange attractor is not ‘a way of draw-
ing an elephant’ but a way of visualising dynamics that appear in
the natural world. Similarly, a fractal is not a picture of a fern or a
mountain, but a graphic representation of a mathematical object –
although ferns and mountains themselves do possess fractal char-
acteristics. Because of this ability to graph complex behaviour in
geometrical forms, chaos theory has been seen as a tool with
which both the details of literary form and even the process of
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making meaning might be visualised and thus be rendered com-
prehensible.
In chapter 1 I referred to Matheson and Kirchoff’s list of
possible reasons as to why literary scholars would want to create
analogies between literary works and chaos theory. One of these
reasons was that  ‘B is  structurally  similar  to A,  and this  is  inher-
ently interesting’ (Matheson and Kirchoff 1997: 41). Although
Matheson and Kirchoff themselves are dismissive of this, as they
are of all the other reasons for the use of chaos metaphors in lit-
erary studies, many scholars have discussed the structural similari-
ties between literature and chaos, and have found them useful in
constructing their interpretations. In this chapter, while not at-
tempting to mine the indefinable and perhaps nonexistent gaps
between form, content and meaning, I will approach the humanist
conceptualisations of literature via the question of form before
concentrating in chapter 3 on the emergent self as a source of
meaning, and in chapter 4 on the relationship between both the
form and  the  contents  of  literature  and  physical  reality.  Form is
here defined pragmatically as the literary techniques used in a
work, without attempting to claim that such techniques are strictly
separate from the content manifested by them, or from the mean-
ing that a particular content presented in a particular form has to
readers and audiences. My aim is to show how the age-old dilem-
mas of literary ontology are present in the ways chaos theory has
been used by authors and scholars, and to point out some ways in
which the approaches representing the humanist perspective have
tried to deal with them.
It has been proposed that the use of scientific concepts in lit-
erary studies only makes sense in the context of formal analysis.
Michael H. Whitworth (2001: 3), for example, argues that scien-
tific metaphors in works of literature only become interesting
‘when they shape ideas about literary form’ (Whitworth 2001: 3).
In his volume on modernist literature and the theory of relativity,
Whitworth explicitly attempts to limit his discussion to the effects
science has had on literary form. By doing so, he believes he is not
only reflecting the modernist interest in formal explanation but
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also better able to make generalisations than if he was discussing
the thematic contents of individual works (Whitworth 2001: 3-4).
Examples of a similar emphasis on structure rather than
themes can be found in the approaches that use chaos theory.
However, while scholars are keen to formulate theoretical state-
ments about the ways in which chaotic structures could be re-
flected in literary forms, their actual analysis often focuses on
thematic representations. In Beautiful Chaos Gordon E. Slethaug
(2000: 164) specifically presents chaos theory to be most valuable
as a structural principle: works with ‘structures based upon mod-
els of chaotic activity’, he argues, are inherently more interesting
than those which, for instance, just include metaphors of chaos
and order. Slethaug approaches various literary works through
formal concepts based on different aspects of chaos theory, in-
cluding fractals and strange attractors. His discussion includes
many of the central elements of the humanist perspective on
chaos theory and literature, and presents thought-provoking read-
ings of several American postmodern novels. But while there is a
clear focus on the forms of chaotic dynamics, Slethaug’s book, in
fact, gives more space to the way in which the forms of chaos ap-
pear in the content of his chosen works than to the characteristics
of the narrative structures themselves.37 In  this  Slethaug  is  not
alone. The way in which critics slide from first conceptualising lit-
erary form through chaos theory to analysing not actual literary
forms but general ideas about (not necessarily literary) structure
which appear as themes in literary works, reveals a deep ambiguity
as to what is meant by literary form and how its relation to mean-
ing is conceived.
I would argue that this tendency to slide from theoretical
conceptualisations of form to thematic analysis is due to at least
two fundamental problems, one of which is interdisciplinary and
the other intradisciplinary. Firstly, there is the difficulty of fitting
37 Slethaug’s book does not engage recent narratological research at all, but
refers to theorists who concentrate on postmodernism as a larger cultural
field (e.g. Gilles Deleuze, Jean-François Lyotard, Michel Serres and Brian
McHale).
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literary works into the structural model provided by chaos theory,
which in its original field requires strictly defined variables (how-
ever unpredictable the behaviour of those variables turns out to
be). A strange attractor drawn by the complex behaviour of x’s
and y’s still requires a scholar numerically to define some x’s and
y’s. Since describing the structural qualities of a literary work in
such terms is probably impossible, the analogy is suggestive but
necessarily imprecise. Secondly, the conceptualisation of the liter-
ary object itself is so much in flux within literary studies that the
chaos-influenced interpretations are understandably ambivalent as
to the difference between form and content.
Most often the comparisons drawn between chaos theory
and literary form tend to be superficial and less than innovative.
There is not much novelty or explanatory force in Patrick Brady’s
description of the narrative structure of Marcel Proust’s In Search
of Lost Time as chaotic simply because ‘the crucial but trivial inci-
dent of tasting that tea-cake (madeleine) soaked in tea [...] produces
from his simple cup of tea the whole town of Combray with its
gardens, and ultimately the entire huge novel’ (Brady 1989: 186).
Equally indistinct is the reason why Hilary Rhodes Bailey (2000)
should need the concept of the strange attractor to describe the
thematic complex of fate, determinism and free will in Denis
Diderot’s Jacques the Fatalist and His Master, rather than referring to
it just as a ‘unifying matrix’ of three interwoven themes – an ex-
pression which she also uses (Bailey 2000: 59). This kind of schol-
arship is certainly susceptible to Matheson and Kirchoff’s (1997:
42) criticism that in ‘applied chaos theory’ the interpretation pre-
sented could have been arrived at without the use of ‘laboriously
explained’ chaos terminology.
However, while it now seems that chaos theory does not lend
itself usefully to formal analysis as such, I suggest that the struc-
tural models based on chaos theory have inspired a particular kind
of conceptualisation of literature that should be further developed
within literary studies. What chaos theory can do when used as a
conceptual tool is to help us to think of literature simultaneously
in terms of structure and dynamics. Envisioning the literary work
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as a peculiar hybrid between a process and an object, as a rhetori-
cal entity that allows both for intended meaning and endless varia-
tions in interpretation, could be a way of combining humanist
theories and postmodern literary forms. The ideas and values as-
sociated with humanism in this chapter are the pre-structuralist
ideal of a literary work as a coherent whole and the romantic re-
spect  for  it  as  an  autonomous  entity.  These  two  strands  of
thought are combined with chaos theory’s presentation of com-
plex form and result in a re-evaluation of the romantic metaphor
of the literary work as an autonomous organism.
My own readings of Stoppard and Barth in the last two sec-
tions of this chapter discuss both their narrative structures and
their thematic handling of the idea of form. In John Barth’s short
story series On With the Story (1996/1997) reflective form and
metafictional frame-breaking are utilised not in order to empha-
sise form over content and thus estrange readers from literary
meaning, but in order to create a coherent whole in which form
and content reflect each other. In Stoppard’s case the analysis of
form is immediately complicated by the fact that Arcadia is drama,
not narrative fiction. However, I shall take my cue from Manfred
Jahn  (2001:  674)  who  has  argued  that  plays  can  be  analysed  in
much the same way as any other kinds of narrative in the sense
that they ‘have a story and a plot, and even if they do not literally
“tell” their story, tellability and experientiality are dramatic crite-
ria’. I shall therefore approach Arcadia mainly as a literary narra-
tive, even though printed stage directions are also taken into ac-
count.  As  with  Barth,  the  play  can  be  seen  to  marry  form  and
content by creating a narrative structure which reflects the the-
matic discussion of apparent chaos and emergent order.
The answer to the question of why chaos theory can be use-
ful in comprehending the conundrum of form, content and mean-
ing lies in the humanist aims of both the authors and the scholars
discussed here. In order to combine contemporary literature with
humanist concepts they present ways of discussing postmodern
literary forms in terms other than those associated with disjunc-
tion and fracture. Since chaos theory is able to present seemingly
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fragmented and unpredictable dynamics in visual forms that show
coherence, harmony and even beauty, these shapes give authors
and scholars new conceptual tools with which to present literary
form as infinitely complex, yet describable. Further, they search
for ways to describe the plural, yet bounded meaning of literary
works, and they even establish an iconic connection between liter-
ary form and the dynamic function of reality. In fact, I would ar-
gue that the reason why the humanist scholars would search for
answers to the questions of literary ontology outside the field of
literary studies, or even philosophical aesthetics, is that their work
is to a large extent a reaction to the widespread concept of textu-
ality in literary studies. The fact that so many literary critics and
scholars have drawn parallels between literary structure and dy-
namical systems, despite the difficulty of doing so profitably, re-
veals a deeply felt interest in physical reality and its relationship
with verbal works of art.
2.1  The Literary Work as Object and Process
A novel is a living thing, all one and continuous,
like any other organism, and in proportion as it lives
will it be found, I think, that in each of the parts
there is something of each of the other parts.
 Henry James, ‘The Art of Fiction’
As an element in the world revealed by computer
exploration, the strange attractor began as a mere
possibility, marking a place where many great im-
aginations in the twentieth century had failed to go.
Soon, when scientists saw what computers had to
show, it seemed like a face they had been seeing
everywhere, in the music of turbulent flows or in
clouds scattered like veils across the sky. Nature
was constrained. Disorder was channelled, it seemed,
into patterns with some common underlying theme.
James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science
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This section focuses on how the literary scholars have approached
the concept of form with the help of chaos theory. Is a literary
work an autonomous object and its form therefore something
‘continuous’ and organic, as Henry James famously suggests? Or
is it a complex process of meaning-making? Is literary form best
conceptualised through spatial or temporal models? What my an-
alysis of the writings on literature and chaos theory shows is that
in addition to the poststructuralist approaches which link chaos to
the fracturing of both form and meaning, there is another per-
spective which uses chaos theory to re-evaluate and re-institute
the romantic metaphor of artworks as autonomous organisms.
One major difference between what I have termed the post-
structuralist and the humanist approaches to chaos theory is the
move from using mainly temporal models of literary form to fo-
cusing on spatial ones. In some sense this is a move back from
open-ended postmodern narratological conceptualisations to-
wards the older Jamesian tradition where narrative is seen in terms
of framing and closure. This tradition and its ‘geometric imagi-
nary’ has been strongly criticised by Andrew Gibson (1996), who
argues with reference to Michel Serres, Jacques Derrida and Julia
Kristeva that narratology’s attachment to spatial models perforce
bounds its horizon to ‘a unitary, homogenous space, determined
by and organised within a given set of constants’ (Gibson 1996:
7). Thus it is hardly surprising that in the poststructuralist texts
that build on the work of the theorists Gibson cites, the focus is
on the fragmentation of postmodern narrative, and the most
common metaphor used to describe such structures is nonlinear
temporality. The term ‘linear’ is, of course, a familiar one for nar-
ratology and most scholars adopt a meaning for ‘nonlinear’ that
entails a negation of the temporal and causal sequentiality gener-
ally referred to by the expression ‘linear narrative’.
For instance, Thomas P. Weissert (1991) detects the contrast
between linear and nonlinear in Jorge Luis Borges’s short story
‘The Garden of Forking Paths’. At the centre of the story there is
a fictitious novel which consists of a series of narratives that seem
to contradict each other. Only one of the characters of Borges’s
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story manages to realise the meaning of the novel – that instead of
representing a normal linear temporality, it is a collection of alter-
native events. Thus linearity is here an aspect of narrative time –
of a narrative moving through time in the direction of causality,
whereas nonlinearity describes a narrative in which this traditional
movement is broken: instead of a single time-line there are several
possible universes. Weissert also suggests that even though the
postmodern and subjective aspects of Borges’s story-within-the-
story can be fruitfully analysed by using the concepts of chaos
theory, the narrative of ‘The Garden of Forking Paths’ itself fi-
nally turns back to order and determinism by making it clear that
the nonlinearity of the fictitious novel is embedded in the con-
straining structure of Borges’s story (Weissert 1991: 240). Thus
Weissert equates chaotic structures with postmodern temporal
fragmentation and the crafted representation of linear temporality
with modernist order, and suggests that these are the two poles
between which Borges’s writing fluctuates.
It is clear, however, that the only structure actually present
for Weissert to analyse is Borges’s linear and modernist narrative.
The nonlinearity of the fictitious novel can only be discussed
thematically, since it is only described, not reproduced in Borges’s
text. Thus Weissert’s analysis does not really get to grips with ana-
lysing a nonlinear narrative structure, even though it does provide
interesting points about how such a structure can be thematised
while using a more traditional narrative form.
David Porush (1991), on the other hand, sees nonlinearity
both in the thematic elements and in the narrative structure of
William Marshall’s novel Roadshow.  He  points  out  the  way  the
novel’s detectives notice small clues which eventually will form
the  solution  to  a  crime,  and  the  way  small  explosions  set  by  the
criminals eventually lead to the complete gridlock of all traffic in
Hong Kong. These plot elements, Porush (1991: 71) argues, can
be equated with the butterfly effect of small events causing large-
scale changes in the dynamics of the city. But he also suggests that
Marshall’s disjointed narrative technique – that is, the way the nar-
rative ‘leaps about with unexplained hiatuses and discontinuities in
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discrete packets of uneven length (fluctuates nonlinearly) follow-
ing no apparent order’ – is similar to the unpredictability displayed
by chaotic systems (Porush 1991: 70-71). What is more, the fore-
shadowing used in the novel, Porush argues, can be equated with
the sensitive dependence on initial conditions, since those mo-
ments develop into disproportionately meaningful elements in the
reader’s mind as the narrative progresses (Porush 1991: 71). Thus
Porush thinks it possible to use the terminology and concepts of
nonlinear dynamics to shed light on particular kinds of narrative
structures.
Porush’s argument, even though it involves actual analysis of
narrative techniques, leaves the reader asking what exactly is
gained by introducing the concepts and vocabulary of chaos the-
ory. The narrative structure he describes could have been ap-
proached with the existing tools of narratological analysis (tempo-
ral concepts such as order and duration of events, story time, dis-
course time and foreshadowing). But Porush is less interested in
developing new analytical tools than in creating a conceptual
structure whereby the presence of nonlinear dynamics in literary
texts is revealed and, due to the universality of those dynamics,
the difference between natural and artificial systems is blurred
(Porush 1991: 74-75). Hence, Porush’s text reflects his desire to
emphasise the universality of nonlinear temporality, whereby the
same dynamics are shown to be at work both in nature and in cul-
ture.
A similar impulse can be seen in Paulson’s The Noise of Culture
(1988), where the aim is to blur the boundary between natural and
artificial expressly in order to re-evaluate the organicist metaphor
and to integrate it to the postmodern conceptualisation of litera-
ture as a complex process of meaning-making. In doing so, Paul-
son constructs a humanist theory of literature in which the auton-
omy of the literary work does not imply that it is disconnected
from its author or that its meaning is inaccessible to readers.
Rather, in order to be meaningful, the literary work must be seen
as an ‘artificially autonomous’ entity (Paulson 1988: 135). While
Paulson’s is the most comprehensive re-evaluation of chaos the-
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ory and the organicist view of art, I will first look at the work of
other scholars who have also, though less explicitly, moved in a
similar direction in their interpretations of what chaos theory
might mean for our conceptualisations of literary form.
Attractive Structures
While Weissert and Porush combine nonlinearity with the post-
modern fragmentation of narrative temporality, among the hu-
manist interpretations it is more common to connect narrative
structures to forms that are more obviously spatial, particularly to
strange attractors. As Gleick so poetically notes in the epigraph to
this section, strange attractors are now recognised as the ‘face’ of
chaos, as the constraints that restrict the ways in which complex
systems behave, and his vision of repeated structures on different
scales in different phenomena strongly echoes James’s organicist
view of literature. Among literary scholars, such aspects are com-
bined to produce conceptualisations where the temporality of the
literary work is visualised in terms of chaotic geometry, and its au-
tonomy is connected to the idea of emergent, living structures.
Jo Alyson Parker (1997, 2000, 2007) has analysed the tempo-
rality of postmodern narratives and she presents the strange at-
tractor as a model that can help us better understand complex
narrative structures as ‘spatialisation of a temporal process’
(Parker 1997: 117). In her article on William Faulkner’s Absalom,
Absalom! Parker (1997) argues that the multiple narratives pre-
sented in the novel create a structure in which ‘each of the intra-
diegetic narrators might be considered as beginning from a differ-
ent set of “initial conditions”’, but eventually they all ‘fall onto an
attractor’ that structures the overall narrative (Parker 1997: 110-
111). Although her use of chaos theory is mostly well thought-out
and her presentation of the combination of form and content in-
triguing, Parker (1997: 111) confuses the issue by proposing that
the  strange  attractor  is  an  implied  central  motif,  a  point  that  the
narrative trajectories approach but never reach: ‘All of the trajec-
tories are attracted to, but never pass directly through, what seems
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to be the crucial event – the revelation of [Charles] Bon’s black
blood. We might consider that event as the unstable attracting
point, concurrently attracting and repulsing each narrative trajec-
tory’.38 However, a strange attractor is not a point – that’s what
makes it so strange. The strange attractor’s loops are not them-
selves attracted to anything, they themselves are the attractor. Be-
hind Parker’s description is not anything as simple as a faulty un-
derstanding of physics, but a fluctuation in her conceptualisations
of  structure  and  theme,  and  an  attempt  to  see  the  literary  work
simultaneously as a narrative process and a structured object. Ini-
tially, Parker’s argument focuses on the narrative trajectories, pre-
senting both the attractor and the work as dynamic processes
where the narrative itself is a strange attractor. But once she be-
gins to describe the crucial but unnarrated event of the ‘black
blood’, however, the attractor is no longer the narration itself, but
a void within it, the moment that is not narrated but whose pres-
ence can be discerned from the other strands of story. Parker’s
image of the empty space in the middle of the story that draws on
all the different trajectories takes the metaphor ‘attractor’ to mean
a point of attraction (in other words, a single state) and a strange
attractor to be a system of trajectories approaching such a point.
However,  in  the  first  part  of  the  essay  the  strange  attractor  was
understood to be not a state but a pattern of behaviour.
Many attempts to use the strange attractor as an explanatory
tool for literary structure could be similarly criticised for making
mistakes in what a  strange attractor is  and what characteristics  it
actually has.39 Although I do not wish to deny that creative analo-
gies have their place in interdisciplinary literary studies, I want to
point out these confusions because they reveal the underlying
conceptual structures used by Parker and others. The attractor is
38 This conception is repeated in Parker (2000: 148): ‘Like the trajectory of
a Lorenz or butterfly strange attractor, the trajectory of Sterne’s text hovers
between two powerful but unattainable attracting points – sex and death’;
and in Parker (2007: 28): ‘In the narrative text, the attracting point com-
prises motifs that concurrently attract and repel the writer’.
39 E.g. Gillespie (2003: 56-60), Nemesvari (1997: 17-18).
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twisted out of shape because, while making the comparison be-
tween literature and phase space diagrams, the scholars are re-
quired to switch back and forth between different views of the
protean conceptual complex of form and content. Is the literary
work an object or a process? Is its meaning a point or a trajectory?
A different approach to that of Parker, yet one that is equally
revealing of the author’s conceptualisation of literary form, can be
found in Joseph M. Conte’s impressive Design and Debris: A Chaot-
ics of Postmodern American Fiction (2002), one of the few book-length
studies on chaos theory and literature that explicitly focus on
formal characteristics. What Conte does is combine the spatiality
of  the  strange  attractor  with  an  image  of  the  literary  work  as  an
organism, particularly in the sense of having the capacity for au-
tonomous growth. Conte concentrates on describing two kinds of
American writing which both rebel against the repetition of the
formal conventions of any genre – against what he (2002: 76) calls
‘writing within the paradigm’. The first group, the ‘disruptors’,
Conte (2002: 29) suggests, include authors such as Paul Auster,
Thomas Pynchon and Don DeLillo, whose works ‘disdain the
readerly conveniences of a linear narrative, with its neat propor-
tionality of cause and effect, which is deemed inadequate to the
complexity of the postmodern condition’. Such writing he equates
with the order-out-of-chaos paradigm identified by Hayles (1990:
9-10  and passim),  and  suggests  that  it  relies  on  the  reader’s  per-
formative choices which make the inherent ‘disorderly openness’
of the text produce both an emergent structure and its meaning
(Conte 2002: 31).
The second branch of American anti-formalism is ‘proce-
duralism’, a way of writing that allows the content of the work to
arise from the constraints adopted for its form. The procedural-
ists, like their European counterparts in the Oulipo group, ‘for-
mulate a plan comprised of arbitrary and exacting rules, carrying it
out in spite of – or in anticipation of – the narrative conse-
quences’ (Conte 2002: 27). This group, in which Conte includes
Gilbert Sorrentino, Harry Mathews and John Barth, is equated
with Hayles’s order-within-chaos paradigm because of the as-
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sumption that order and structure are inherent to a chaotic sys-
tem, not created by chaotic processes. The ‘content, trajectory,
and orderliness’ of the proceduralist works are generated by the
constraints during the composition, rather than emerging in its re-
ception, as is the case with the disruptors (Conte 2002: 27).40 The
proceduralists, therefore, seem to be relying on a conceptualisa-
tion of literature in which the form produces the content but both
exist within an autonomous literary work, whereas the disruptors
take the view that literature is inherently a process of interpreta-
tion where both form and content emerge only in the interaction
between the text and the reader.
What is striking about Conte’s presentation of the proce-
duralists is that despite noting their clear commitment to post-
modern literary technique, it shows how their underlying philoso-
phy carries strong echoes of Jamesian organicism. Pure formalism
is for Conte (2002: 76) ‘the equivalent of determinism in the phys-
ical sciences’, whereas proceduralism ‘recognizes an essential un-
certainty in the universe of its making’. This uncertainty, however,
does not lead the proceduralists to abandon the idea of the literary
work as an object that has coherence and meaning of its own. Ra-
ther, Conte suggests, the work created by the interplay of essential
uncertainty and the constraints set by the author leads to ‘synergy’
or autonomic growth:
Synergy in literary design arises when the complex dynamical sys-
tem initiated by the constraint has the capacity to exceed author-
ial control. Even though the author is responsible for the a priori
establishment of the constraint, the unpredictable nature of the
language system may result in a creative autonomy, a generative
text that far exceeds the enumeration of its preordained structure.
In the synergy of the design the text may write itself. (Conte
2002: 84)
‘Synergy’, understood as the chaotic system’s potential for emer-
gent order, is much like James’s idea of the autonomous work that
is successful – that ‘lives’ – only to the degree that it manages to
be a whole that is larger than the sum of its parts. For Conte,
40 Paul A. Harris (1997) also equates Oulipo writing with chaos diagrams.
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chaos theory thus provides geometrical forms that point to the
conceptualisation of literature as autonomous and alive, while at
the same time such forms are able to handle the open-endedness
and complexity of the postmodern narrative techniques and avoid
the historical baggage of direct reference to the tradition of or-
ganicism.
This balance struck between literature as an autonomous ob-
ject and as a complex process comes out most clearly in the work
of Paulson, who in The Noise of Culture (1988) explicitly sets out to
dissect the organic metaphor but also to show how many aspects
of the concept can survive the poststructuralist critique. His vol-
ume analyses the concepts through which we think of entities, of
their environments and of the way information passes between an
entity and its environment. Paulson aims to retain the double in-
fluence of the autonomous and the contextualist views, but to do
so with a new understanding of what the chaotic interaction of an
autonomous system and its context is like. On the basis of Fran-
cisco Varela’s theories of the structural organisation of living
things Paulson (1988: 121) suggests that while literary works are
autonomous to the extent that ‘as observers we identify the text as
a unity’, their structure need not be considered a semi-theological
mystery. Comparing certain characteristics of literary works to or-
ganisms needs no longer be a gesture against analysis, since the
dynamic structures of organisms have themselves become analys-
able. Thus for Paulson (1988: 119) the equation of a literary work
with some characteristics of an organism does not mean that its
form should be considered as ‘synonymous with an ineffable, un-
definable organicity’, but, on the contrary, by understanding the
ways  in  which  it  is  like  an  organism allows  for  a  formal  analysis
that captures both its object-like and process-like characteristics.
This re-evaluation of the organic metaphor also allows Paulson to
approach the notion of a bounded, yet infinitely variable literary
meaning.
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Bounded Meaning
Much of the previous work on chaos theory and literature focuses
on the notion of text as information. This perspective reveals
many interesting aspects of postmodern writing, in particular the
way textuality is connected to Claude Shannon’s groundbreaking
theories of information (see e.g. Paulson 1988, Schachterle 1996
and Terranova 2004).41 Hayles (1990: 31-60, 236-264) examines
the implications of Shannon’s theories in chapter 2 of Chaos
Bound,  and  in  chapter  9  gives  a  reading  of  Doris  Lessing’s The
Golden Notebook. In the latter she argues that the form of the novel
is based on a conceptualisation of information as entropy, and
that it therefore highlights the absence of a shared context and the
resulting incommunicability of human experience. If the tradi-
tional novel is a literary form that represents an individual experi-
ence as some kind of a coherent whole, Hayles (1990: 240-241)
maintains, the postmodern textuality of The Golden Notebook re-
flects a culture in which such a whole can only be represented by
fragmentation and chaos. The postmodern text benefits from the
concepts of chaos theory, Hayles suggests, because as an object it
manifests the lack of shared meaning in human experience.42
 A similar emphasis on subjectivity appears in presentations
of the process of reading. Gillespie’s The Aesthetics of Chaos (2003),
41 Shannon’s (1946-2001) work in information theory and digital computing
has been crucial to the development of our current information society.
Literary scholars most often refer to his definition of information as sepa-
rate from meaning, that is, the idea that the amount of information carried
by a message actually increases with errors in transmission, although its
comprehensibility may decrease.
42 In My Mother Was a Computer: Digital Subjects and Literary Texts (2005)
Hayles continues to discuss the ontology of literature and sharpens her fo-
cus on the questions of the materiality of literature and the translations that,
she argues, inevitably occur when print documents are transferred to an
electronic format. In this, as in many of the issues discussed below,
Hayles’s career shows how questions she maps out through chaos theory in
the early 1990s are later on discussed more deeply and without direct refer-
ence to chaos theory as such.
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to which I  referred in section 1.3 as  an example of  a  text  which
attempts to change the conceptual metaphors that govern critical
writing, offers this idea in a fairly radical form. Gillespie uses
chaos theory in a series of readings from the Book of Job to Fin-
negans Wake in order to advocate a view of literary interpretations
as collages of impressions created differently for every reader and
during every reading. While no current theory of interpretation
would deny that individual reading experiences vary, Gillespie
claims that literary criticism should express the contradictory as-
pects of reading rather than point to cohesive structures in the
work itself. ‘The point is’, he suggests, that ‘my reading resists the
linear patterning inherent in the work of the traditional critic’, and
that ‘speaking subjectively is just as valid as perceiving subjec-
tively’ (Gillespie 2003: 4, 12). Such a view, I argued, assumes that
the critical essay is a detailed reflection rather than a thoughtful
distillation of a reading experience, and it purposefully dismisses
the idea of a literary work as a structured object.43
Many postmodern works yield perfectly to readings that fo-
cus on the dissemination of meaning. But where poststructuralist
analysis concentrates on presenting the form of narratives as cha-
otic and meaning as indeterminate, humanist interpretations take
strange attractors as symbols which can be used to conceptualise
not only coherent narrative structure but also the boundedness of
literary meaning. Alexander J. Argyros emphasises the fact that
even when the complexity of the individual readings is accepted,
chaos theory can justify the use of causality in drawing up the lar-
ger structures of narrative which then can be seen as the sources
of stable meaning. In A Blessed Rage for Order Argyros (1991: 317-
319) discusses the structure of traditional narrative in terms of
43 Valdés and Guyon (1998: 31-32) present a very different view and argue
that there is a fundamental difference between the reading of a poem and,
say, creating a critical reading of it. While the construction of meaning dur-
ing a reading is, they suggest, ‘a non-linear process’ (in the sense of being
dependent on repeated checks backward and intimations forward in the
text), hermeneutic criticism, in particular, ‘is able to reconstruct the path of
bifurcations and place the reading in question in the company of the many
other readings that might have been’.
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turbulent flow. Adopting the anthropological term of ‘causal op-
erator’ to describe the ‘universal human imperative to explain
phenomena  by  situating  them in  a  causal  frame’,  Argyros  (1991:
317) argues that the global, causal form of traditional narrative
may encompass many smaller, local narrative structures which can
work in many different directions within the larger stream.
Traditional narratives can be viewed as chaotic laminar systems,
rivers characterized by an overall vector, the plot, itself composed
of areas of local turbulence, eddies where time is reversed, rapids
where it speeds ahead, and pools where it effectively stops. [...]
Just as the energy powering the river is supplied by a topographi-
cal gradient, narrative tends to function like a dynamical system
able to contain a congeries of different temporal relations, each
with a specific ability to encode causal information, precisely be-
cause of the gradient generated by the temporal asymmetry con-
stitutive of narrative causality. (Argyros 1991: 318)
Thus Argyros (1991: 319) suggests that traditional narrative struc-
tures can be both stable and infinitely complex, and that they have
both ‘recognizable structure’ and ‘flexibility’ because their dynam-
ics are ruled by strange attractors. What unifies them are the cau-
sal connections the text suggests to readers in search of meaning.
Argyros’s point is that traditional narrative can be described in
terms of nonlinear dynamics without suggesting that the nonlin-
earity implies a radical indeterminacy as concerns either the liter-
ary work as an object or its meaning to readers.
This humanist perspective on the production of meaning by
narrative dynamics has also been applied to non-traditional, ex-
cessively reflective narratives. In addition to conceptualising
Faulkner’s narrative structure in terms of strange attractors,
Parker (1997: 99, 117) wishes to ‘put forward a heuristic frame-
work for modeling narrative dynamics’ which would be ‘a means
of getting beyond the infinite regress of the poststructuralist theo-
retical perspective’. While the meaning of a literary work is always
multiple and moves dynamically along the attractor’s trajectory,
Parker (1997: 105) finds that ‘out of the plurality of meanings
mobilized by its writerly nature emerges the structure of the
strange attractor, bounding the text’s plural in a zone of meaning’.
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This desire to conceptualise variable but bounded rather than ab-
solute literary meaning is a major common denominator in the
humanist interpretations of what chaos theory might mean for the
analysis of literary structure.44 Even as humanist scholars rely on
the organicist ideal which sees the literary work as an autonomous
object, the perspective on dynamics offered by chaos theory
makes it possible for them to accommodate the multiplicity of in-
dividual interpretations within such an ideal.
William Paulson, whose re-evaluation of organicism depends
on blending the notions of autonomous object and contextualised
process, also calls for new ways to handle the fact that literature is
to an extent autonomous from the ends of its authors and audi-
ences. But in the same breath he argues that this can only be
achieved by acknowledging the fact that literature is a human ac-
tivity that, at least to an extent, relies on communicative proc-
esses: ‘It will  be necessary, in order to describe in a new way the
impossibility of treating literary texts as simply messages, to sup-
pose that messages are indeed what they are. In other words, we
will often have to treat literature as an instrument of communica-
tion in order to prepare a theory of its autonomy’ (Paulson 1988:
54). Paulson (1988: 85) thus aims to show, with the help of the
concept of self-organisation from noise, how ‘literary texts, in
spite of everything, manage to signify, how poetry can be valued
as an intense, exquisite communication rather than dismissed as
poor communication’. A similar attitude lies behind my use of the
word ‘work’ in the title of this section. Even though I do occa-
sionally use ‘text’ in this study as a synonym to ‘a piece of writing’,
I in fact wish to disassociate that word from the theories of textu-
ality.45 Thus I support the notion that works of literature are ob-
jects which have been crafted by an author and which have a dy-
namic communicative dimension.
 What Paulson does in his 1988 volume as well as later in the
article ‘For a Cosmopolitical Philology’ (2001a) is to combine lit-
44 See also Hawkins (1995: 5) and Kundert-Gibbs (1999: 179).
45 For a more detailed argument for the use of ‘work’ rather than ‘text’ see
Pettersson (2005).
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erature’s communicative dimension with the organic metaphor in
order to formulate what I would call a humanist theory of literary
encounters. Paulson’s argument is partly based on Shannon’s
theories of information, which have been so influential among the
poststructuralist approaches to chaos theory, and, as mentioned
above, partly on Varela’s definitions of biological life as emergent
and autonomous. By adding the dimension of intention, Paulson
(1988:  135)  underlines  the  fact  that  literary  works  are,  after  all,
crafted objects and therefore ‘artificially autonomous’. In other
words, their unique way of producing meaning depends on their
being treated as autonomous objects, even while they owe their
existence to various external networks.
To those who would investigate it, the literary text implicitly says:
‘Consider me an autonomous, natural object. Try to discover my
laws of organization, of operation, laws which you must assume
to be specified only by what you find within me. To do so, of
course, you will have to study the communicative components of
which I  am made,  the  signs  of  language,  even though if  you as-
sume from the outset that I am a vehicle of communication, you
risk missing what is most specific to me. And yet, for all this, my
autonomy or organicity is in the end a fiction. I am not a natural
object but an artifact, and my meaning is a function of my com-
municative participation in a larger system’. (Paulson 1988: 140-
141)
For Paulson, then, chaos and information theories may dismantle
the organicist view so that those elements which he still finds
valid (including the coherence of literary meaning) can be retained
without losing sight of the valuable contributions of the post-
structuralist critique. Paulson’s (1988: 120) own conceptualisation
of literature in terms of organicity is thus based on both a ‘reval-
orization’ and a ‘demystification’ of the romantic idea: he retains
for literature a capacity for meaningfulness over and above other
forms of writing, but at the same time argues that the mechanisms
on which that capacity is based are part of the universal dynamics
of all (physical and cultural) systems. If the natural sciences have
found the formal mechanism for the creation of new structures in
nature, there is no reason to claim that understanding literature in
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terms of life-like properties relies on some kind of vitalistic mysti-
cism (Paulson 1988: 119-130).
Once the organic metaphor is emptied of its mysticism, its re-
instatement allows Paulson (2001a: 111-118) to formulate the
‘cosmopolitical philology’ to which I referred in the previous
chapter, a view of literary encounters where the artificially au-
tonomous object is met as ‘a delegate of a person’. This is not to
say  that  Paulson  commits  what  Bo Pettersson has  called  the  ‘in-
teractional fallacy’ (1999: 49), but that he believes the whole en-
terprise of literature to depend on the reader encountering the
work as an object that can put their understanding of how the
world is ‘at risk’ (Paulson 2001a: 113). Thus, despite the fact that
Paulson (1988: 137) is ready to accept what he calls ‘the most dis-
comforting truths of deconstruction’, his thinking draws at least as
much on the humanist tradition. While his conceptualisation of
literature as ‘noise’ rather than pure communication assumes that
a literary work cannot avoid the ‘blind spot of the text to itself’
where some undecidability will function as a fracture in the coher-
ence of the work, I take his vision of the literary work to be that
of an artificially autonomous, semi-organically coherent object
which can engage readers in a dynamic process that has the po-
tential to change and surprise them. This vision Paulson arrives at
with the help of chaos theory, which allows him to reconceptual-
ise literary works as organisms in a way that does not involve the
extremes of the near-mystical view of literature as an unanalysable
entity or the poststructuralist negation of its coherence.
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2.2 Chaotic Geometry in Tom Stoppard’s ‘Arcadia’
A farmer, it is said, hired a team of scientists to ad-
vise him on improving his dairy production. [...] Af-
ter six months’ work they prepared their report.
The farmer began to read, only to encounter the
opening sentence: ‘Consider a spherical cow’.
 There’s an important message behind this hoary
tale. The shapes that we see in nature, and the tradi-
tional geometric shapes of mathematics, do not al-
ways bear much resemblance to one another.
 Sometimes they do.
Ian Stewart, Does God Play Dice?
Tom Stoppard’s play Arcadia, like Stewart’s ‘hoary tale’ in the epi-
graph, contrasts the traditional, Euclidean geometries of spheres,
cubes and cones with the infinitely more complex geometrical
forms described by chaos theory. The new mathematics may not
help  us  draw  a  picture  of  an  elephant,  as  Stoppard’s  frustrated
mathematician says (A 47),  but  it  does  help  to  visualise  the  dy-
namics of natural systems. Whether it is also a method for pictur-
ing the shape of narrative dynamics is a question that may be im-
possible to answer in terms that would be fully acceptable in the
study of literature, but such an idea can be suggested by literary
works themselves.
Arcadia is  a  play  about  the  balance  between  variety  and  in-
variance in human life. It thematises life’s unpredictability and un-
controllability, but also the eternal recurrence of sex and death.
These themes are folded together with the loss of innocence, the
eternal  gap  between  the  real  and  the  ideal,  and  finally,  with  the
question of what exactly counts as beauty for human beings. The
interplay of form and disorder is both thematic and structural: the
play not only discusses the coherence of human experience in
terms of chaos theory, but it also incorporates the structures
found in nonlinear mathematics in its very form. The setting of
the play, the English parkland that is metaphorically also the clas-
sical Arcadia and the Christian Eden, reflects form and content
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onto each other by representing two different versions of artisti-
cally conceived nature.
The fact that Stoppard uses chaos theory in Arcadia is evident
in the dialogue, and he has even been cited as acknowledging
Gleick’s Chaos as a source (Nathan 1993/1994: 263),46 but what
has been debated is his motivation in doing so. Simon Jenkins
(1993: 16) seems to suggest that Stoppard has simply been at-
tracted to the beauty of fractal surfaces when he states that Arca-
dia is ‘the authentic post-modern play, eclectic, picturesque, de-
void of morality, glittering with [the director] Trevor Nunn’s sur-
face dazzle’, and that in it Stoppard ‘brushes aside’ the question of
lost meanings. In a similar vein, Irving Wardle’s review in The In-
dependent on Sunday (1993: 23) emphasises the play’s form over its
content in a series of expressions reminiscent of a firework dis-
play (‘dazzlingly elaborate’, ‘irregular and unforeseen’, ‘strikes in-
creasingly brilliant sparks’), and praises Stoppard for finally aban-
doning any attempt to write about social or ethical issues.47 While
such interpretations forge a connection between Stoppard’s work
and poststructuralist attitudes to epistemology and ethics by ig-
noring some of the major thematic elements in Arcadia,  they  do
draw attention to the way chaos theory informs the structure of
Stoppard’s play. What must be added to them, however, is the
way that chaos theory functions in Arcadia as not just a reflection
of  complex  form  and  flashy  style,  but  as  justification  for  much
more old-fashioned concepts, such as crafted and harmonious
form and the value of literary meaning.
Stoppard (as quoted in Melbourne 1998: 563) has stated that
his aim as an author of drama is to create a form which may seem
46 See also Fleming’s (2001: 192-193) study of Stoppard’s private papers.
47 Fleming (2001: 3) notes similar opinions among critics discussing Stop-
pard’s earlier work: ‘the postmodern and poststructuralist critics elevate
form to the level of content and meaning as they valorize form in and of
itself, thereby deprivileging the dialogue as they argue that Stoppard’s plays
accent the unknowability of the world, the elusiveness of true knowledge,
the fallibility of human memory, and the relativity of almost all aspects of
life’. However, the earlier plays have also been read as focusing on human-
ist themes: see e.g. Delaney (1990) and Sammells (2001).
Strange Attractors in Literature
105
a riot of shifts and breaks in the narrative and in the relationship
between the characters and the audience, but which, nevertheless,
retains the essential structure of story-telling. What he ideally
wants is to ‘organize this impossible Rubik’s cube, so that it still
has the architecture of a – what’s the word? – not conventional, not
traditional, but somehow atavistic archetypal architecture of narra-
tive’. In a radio interview in 1970 he also commented that
the thing which I respond to whole-heartedly is a free mind
working within a disciplined form. What I can’t take is an anarchic
mind – not an anarchic spirit, which I admire, but a mind which
has no formality to it when it comes to structuring and commu-
nicating its thoughts. (Stoppard 1970/1994: 27)
Thus the essential recognition that his own art, and indeed,
all  art  is  in  some  sense  disciplined  and  structured,  is  a  central
theme in Stoppard’s plays. Furthermore, this commitment to co-
herent structure does not deter him from utilising the possibilities
offered by postmodern literary techniques and structural innova-
tions by which meaning may appear. For example, in Travesties
(1975) the constant presence of form is emphasised by having
Tristan Tzara, in his attempt at portraying total formlessness, end
up producing sounds that in another language happen to make
perfect sense. As Jim Hunter (2000: 135) has pointed out, the Da-
daist poem read out by Tzara at the beginning of Act I:
Eel ate enormous appeltzara
key dairy chef’s hat he’lllearn ooparah!
Ill raced alas whispers kill later nut east,
noon avuncular ill day Clara!
can be understood as a limerick in French:
Il est un homme s’appelle Tzara
Qui des richesses a-t-il nonpareil
Il reste á la Suisse parce que il est un artist
‘Nous n’avons que l’art’ il déclara!48
48 ‘The man called Tzara, of unparalleled talents, stays in Switzerland as an
artist, declaring that all that matters is Art’ (Hunter 2000: 135). Stoppard
(1981: 156) has explicitly stated his disagreement with the aims of Dadaism.
Of course this limerick, just as everything else in Travesties takes place within
Strange Attractors in Literature
106
Through such linguistic play Stoppard underlines the ubiquitous
presence of meaning in all human action. As John William Cooke
(1993: 203-204) has noted, in Stoppard’s plays even such ‘appar-
ent “scraps” of language gain not only meaning, but multiple
meanings’, and ‘nothing expressed through any formal arrange-
ment can fail to signify, to “mean”’.
It is also clear that intertextuality has been a major source of
formal invention for Stoppard (see e.g. Levenson 2001). Plays
such as Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead (1967/1968) draw not
only on Shakespeare’s plot, but on the form of Samuel Beckett’s
Waiting for Godot, whereas Travesties relies on Oscar Wilde’s The Im-
portance of Being Ernest for  both plot  and dramatic  structure.  Such
use of host-texts gives his plays a firm base which functions as an
anchor for the multiple points of view presented by the charac-
ters. Thus Stoppard sees intertextual borrowing not so much as a
universal condition than as a stylistic and formal challenge, as a
way out of the Beckett-inspired impasse of ‘an ever-narrowing
field of vision which has its ultimate in two men locked in a ward-
robe’ (Stoppard as quoted in Sammells 1988: 19). Even in his first
play he solved that impasse by situating the claustrophobic exis-
tential arguments of his own two men, Rosencrantz and Guilden-
stern, within the familiar and richly patterned plot of Hamlet, and
in both Arcadia and its predecessor Hapgood (1988) there are not
only intertextual references to various literary genres but also to
scientific texts.
In Arcadia form  appears  both  as  dramatic  structure  and  as
one of the major themes of the play. The events depicted take
place in a single room of an English manor house in two time pe-
riods: the early nineteenth century and the late twentieth. In the
nineteenth century the daughter of the manor, Thomasina Cov-
erly, is being tutored by a young scholar named Septimus Hodge,
and is developing the rudiments of chaos mathematics. Mean-
while the adult population of the manor goes through several
rounds of love affairs, challenges to duel and arguments about the
Henry Carr’s idiosyncratic memory and therefore is not a ‘real’ Dadaist
poem even in the world of the play.
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nature of beauty. In the twentieth century three scholars, Hannah
Jarvis the popular historian, the Byron expert Bernard Nightin-
gale, and Valentine Coverly, mathematician and heir to the manor,
attempt in their various ways to discover the truth about the
events of the earlier period. The major dramatic tension is centred
around two questions: Did Byron kill another poet in a duel in Si-
dley Park, and who exactly was the hermit who so picturesquely
resided in a hut in the middle of the manor’s Gothic garden? Ber-
nard rushes to publish his story of Byron’s duel, but at the end of
the play he leaves in embarrassment when his hypothesis is de-
molished by Hannah, who finds documentation of the fact that
no fatal duel took place. Hannah herself, on the other hand, dis-
covers that the hermit was the tutor Septimus, who withdrew into
the garden to mourn the death of Thomasina in a fire, and to try
to finish her work on the geometry of nonlinear dynamics. The-
matically speaking, interlacing the nineteenth-century arguments
over aesthetics with the twentieth-century characters debate on
the sciences and the arts creates a play in which the patterns
formed in nature and in art are vital to both beauty and meaning.
Classical Geometry and Romantic Freedom
When Stoppard was asked at a conference in the USA to demon-
strate how a play germinates in his mind, he used the beginnings
of Arcadia as an example. The first element, he said, had been nei-
ther the plot nor the characters, but ‘a passing idea that something
could be done with the supposed differences between or conflict
between the romantic and the classical’ (Stoppard as quoted in
Kelly and Demastes 1994: 2). What he did in Arcadia was to com-
bine that conflict with chaos theory in order to explore, both on
the level of characters and of dramatic structure, the combination
of determined form and infinite freedom.
The respective merits of classical and romantic definitions of
artistic beauty are present in the dialogue of both sets of charac-
ters in Arcadia. In the twentieth century, the classically-minded
Hannah’s projected critical work is on ‘the nervous breakdown of
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the Romantic Imagination’ (A 25), and it leads her into several ar-
guments with Bernard, the Byron scholar. Byron himself, whose
visit  to  the  manor  is  one  of  the  main  elements  in  the  plot,  also
functions as a marker for the classical/romantic dichotomy in the
play. Naturally, the stereotypical image of Byron fits the role of
the dashing adulterer, as required by the plot of Stoppard’s play,
but as his literary career shows elements of both an eighteenth-
century satirist and a brooding romantic hero (Rutherford 1990:
xiii), Byron’s (off-stage) presence also has a thematic function.
The historical person used in the play to anchor it in this particu-
lar era and in this particular debate can be regarded as a Janus fig-
ure facing both classicism and romanticism.
The interplay between form and freedom is contextualised
not only in terms of art history, but also by metaphysics and the
history of science. Arcadia presents the nineteenth-century debate
as arising from the clash between two different views of the uni-
verse and its laws: whether determined and consisting of stable
forms, or undetermined and changeable. The classical world-view
is one dominated by Newton’s theories of a deterministic, clock-
work universe, and by the artists’ renewed interest in the pastoral
tradition of ancient Greece. Trust in the stability of the physical
properties of the world, coupled with belief in the existence of a
perfect state of being, feeds an interest in definitions, rules and
formality, which would reveal all things in their perfection. Stop-
pard’s version of romanticism, on the other hand, sets up sponta-
neity and freedom as the most important ideals that human beings
can strive for, and considers man free from the determinism im-
plied by Newton’s mechanical universe. Against the classical in-
terest in systems and the will to external control, Stoppard pre-
sents a romantic emphasis on the sublimity of the individual and
of phenomena that are beyond human control. The same argu-
ment is continued in the dialogue between the twentieth-century
scholars, with Bernard taking the position of romantic individual-
ism and Valentine that of systematic science.
However, the most elaborate extension of this clash between
classicism and romanticism as regards the laws of the universe in
Strange Attractors in Literature
109
general and artistic representations of them in particular, is the
development of the garden of Sidley Park from an Italian geomet-
rical design to a Gothic wilderness. The grounds of the manor
function as the field of action for the debate between the neo-
classical and the nineteenth-century scientific world-views, as well
as classical and romantic aesthetics. Whether following a strictly
defined and obvious form or a carefully constructed imitation of
irregularity, the garden represents both nature and art, and
through it Stoppard explores the continuities between the laws of
natural forms and the human need to invest the world with mean-
ing.
In  the  early  eighteenth  century,  Hannah  tells  us  in Arcadia,
Sidley Park had a formal garden of a neo-classical geometrical de-
sign  (A 23).  This  ‘Paradise  in  the  age  of  reason’  had  a  ‘topiary,
pools and terraces, fountains, an avenue of limes’ and ‘the best
box hedge in Derbyshire’ (A 27). In the late eighteenth century
the fashion changed, and the garden was re-designed by Lancelot
‘Capability’ Brown, perhaps the most famous landscape gardener
in history, who was known for his ability to create a sense of or-
der and harmony without the strict geometrical shapes typical of
the parks designed in the French style of the early part of the cen-
tury.  This  is  the  sort  of  garden  which  surrounds  Sidley  Park  in
1809, when the play opens. Hannah describes it as ‘smooth, undu-
lating, serpentine – [with] open water, clumps of trees, classical
boat-house’ (A 25).  This  garden is  a  pastoral  dream, constructed
to give the inhabitants of the manor a feeling of ‘living in God’s
countryside’ (A 27).  Such imposed order of  a  landscaped garden
is finally rendered ironic by the nineteenth-century Gothic design,
which, while as carefully designed as the previous versions, aims
to give the impression of the irregularity and freedom that roman-
ticism regarded as the central laws of nature. Lady Croom’s indig-
nant reaction to this design serves as a description of what is to
transpose the smooth pastoral charm of Capability Brown. Point-
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ing at the before-and-after pictures49 drawn by the new landscape
architect she complains:
Where there is the familiar pastoral refinement of an English-
man’s garden, here is an eruption of gloomy forest and towering
crag, of ruins where there was never a house, of water dashing
against rocks where there was neither spring nor a stone I could
not throw the length of a cricket pitch. My hyacinth dell is be-
come a haunt for hobgoblins, my Chinese bridge [...] is usurped
by a fallen obelisk overgrown with briars [...]. (A 12)
Lady  Croom’s  neo-classical  way  of  looking  at  nature  –  her  as-
sumption that its orderliness conforms to an idea of perfection
defined by God – is contrasted with the new architect Richard
Noakes’s romantic design, which strives to convey an impression
of the drama of the individual’s struggle against the overpowering
forces of nature. Naturally, the new design follows not only a new
vision of natural law, but also one of aesthetic value. As much as
Noakes takes it for granted that the jagged, wild and sublime
counts  as  beauty,  so  Lady  Croom  finds  it  completely  natural  to
defend the pastoral garden for exactly the opposite reason:
The trees are companionably grouped at intervals that show them
to advantage. The rill is a serpentine ribbon unwound from the
lake peaceably contained by meadows on which the right amount
of sheep are tastefully arranged – in short, it is nature as God in-
tended [...]. (A 12)
The irony regarding the Gothic garden arises from the di-
chotomy between the impression of freedom that it is intended to
produce, and the immense mental and physical effort that Noakes
puts into creating that impression. In Act II, when the conversion
is actually under way, the play’s action is accompanied by the con-
stant noise created by Noakes’s steam pump, working with an
ironically ‘regular thump’ (A 81). Lady Croom complains about
the condition of the grounds when the transformation is still in
49 An idea based on the ‘Red Books’ of landscape architect Humphrey Rep-
ton, which were used for the before-and-after effect in negotiations with
his patrons (Barrell 1994: n.p.).
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progress, pointing out the fact that nature will not comply to
Noakes’s designs without considerable use of violence:
My lake is drained to a ditch for no purpose I can understand,
unless it be that snipe and curlew have deserted three counties so
that they may be shot in our swamp. What you painted as forest
is a mean plantation, your greenery is mud, your waterfall is wet
mud, and your mount is an opencast mine for the mud that was
lacking in the dell. (A 85)
Such dialogue presents to the audience the idea of a garden which,
designed to the last ruin and crag, cannot be an expression, but a
representation of spontaneity. By these means, Stoppard under-
lines the difference between organic form and form imposed, be-
tween natural forms and works of art, even while presenting them
as related conceptualisations that change during the history of
human thought.
The lack of originality in the garden designs is another point
of irony, suggested by the before-and-after pictures and spelled
out by Hannah, the twentieth-century historian. In Act I Noakes’s
design book is on display as a reminder of his premeditation, a
tendency which goes against the ideals of spontaneity and individ-
ual freedom of romantic aesthetics. Further, every garden design
in the play, including Lady Croom’s pastoral version, has been a
derivative form of popular art. ‘English landscape was invented by
gardeners imitating foreign painters who were evoking classical
authors’, explains Hannah:
The whole thing was brought home in the luggage from the
grand tour. Here look – [she shows Bernard Noakes’s book of
designs] Capability Brown doing Claude, who was doing Virgil.
Arcadia! And here, superimposed by Richard Noakes, untamed
nature in the style of Salvator Rosa. (A 25)
All three designs for the garden have been created through con-
scious control and by copying an aesthetic from another art
form.50 Noakes’s intention is, like that of the classically-minded
designers, to impose a derivative order on a landscape, even
50 For the development of nineteenth-century landscape aesthetics see
Hussey (1927/1983) and Budge (2001).
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though that order is in this case masquerading as natural irregular-
ity.
While I leave the discussion on the accuracy of representa-
tion in Arcadia to chapter 4, this overview of the debate between
classicism and romanticism in the play reveals the extent to which
the two world-views dominate the play. Thematically, the debate
brings out the positive and negative qualities in both, and shows
how  elements  combined  from  each  attitude  can  form  a  view  of
the world which allows for both structure and individual freedom,
for both reality and representation. The solution to the contrast
between the determined and the truly free is not made in the play
by replacing the classical garden with the romantic version, since
both  are  shown to  be  equally  determined.  Instead,  it  is  found in
the freedom with which the mind of the daughter of the house
moves in its strictly determined surroundings.
Nature’s Picassos: Entropy vs. Chaos Theory
In Arcadia classical and romantic attitudes towards form are found
to be equally lacking, but elements from both are taken up and
shown to be combined in chaos theory. Unlike Heinz Antor
(1998: 328-329), who equates the elements of chaos theory in the
play with ‘post-structuralist scepticism’, I would argue that the
role of such scepticism is played by the concept of entropy,
whereas chaos theory is presented as the synthesis of the best
parts of classical formalism and the romantic appreciation of dis-
order. Thomasina Coverly, the precocious daughter of the nine-
teenth-century house, is a mathematical genius who during the
course of the play discovers both entropy and the principles of
chaos theory. Each theory breaks open the classical view of the
universe, but where the laws of entropy reveal that the universe
cannot be a perpetuum mobile and is instead moving towards an in-
evitable stasis, chaos theory shows that such laws can be tempo-
rarily and locally inverted by dynamic and unpredictable, but still
inherently harmonious systems. In the course of the play Tho-
masina’s discoveries force the classical mind of Septimus Hodge,
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her tutor, to face the idea of true freedom and natural variation in
a way that the artificial freedom of Noakes’s garden could not.
Further, the aspects of the organic metaphor that turn out to be
the most valuable are found not in the designed and controlled
plants and animals of the garden, but in the abstract worlds of art
and mathematics.
In Stoppard’s play Thomasina’s first inkling of the idea of en-
tropy comes with her contemplation of a rice pudding:
When you stir your rice pudding, Septimus, the spoonful of jam
spreads itself round making red trails like the picture of a meteor
in my astronomical atlas. But if you stir backward, the jam will
not come together again. Indeed, the pudding does not notice
and continues to turn pink just as before. Do you think this is
odd? (A 4-5)
Soon she stumbles upon the same irreversibility in her calcula-
tions on the functioning of Noakes’s steam engine. Her realisation
is that an engine, which produces work from heat, will always
need more work to be put into creating the necessary heat than
will ever come out of the engine. ‘Newton’s [gravitational] equa-
tions go forwards and backwards’, she tells Septimus, ‘they do not
care which way. But the heat equation cares very much, it goes
only one way. That is the reason Mr Noakes’s engine cannot give
the power to drive Mr Noakes’s engine’ (A 87). More than a cen-
tury later, Valentine interprets her diagram to Hannah:
A  film  of  a  pendulum,  or  a  ball  falling  through  the  air  –  back-
wards,  it  looks  the  same  [...].  But  with  heat  –  friction  –  a  ball
breaking through a window [...]. You can put back the bits of
glass  but  you  can’t  collect  up  the  heat  of  the  smash.  It’s  gone.
(A 93)
The implications of this realisation, known as The Second Law of
Thermodynamics, seriously undermine the Newtonian clockwork
universe. The law shows that instead of ticking on indefinitely in a
regulated  manner,  the  universe  as  a  whole  will  inexorably  move
towards a state of ever-increasing disorder. The process has been
illustrated by the image of dividing a swimming pool, filling one
half with water and the other with ink, and then removing the
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barrier.  The  two  liquids  would  eventually  form an  even  mixture
through the random movements of molecules. The process is ir-
reversible, and no amount of further stirring would ever produce
a state where there would happen to be even a millilitre  of  pure
water in the mixture (Gleick 1987/1998: 257). ‘You cannot stir
things apart’, realises Thomasina (A 5).
The implications of entropy have been taken to be twofold.
Firstly,  the  Second Law of  Thermodynamics  proves  that  time  in
the universe can move only in one direction. The heat produced
by, for example, steam engines and living beings, inevitably dissi-
pates into the mix. ‘And everything is mixing the same way, all the
time, irreversibly [...] till there’s no time left’, Thomasina realises.
‘That’s  what  time  means’  (A 94). The second implication of the
Law is that as the amount of entropy in the universe can only in-
crease existence will eventually end in a state of complete absence
of form, pattern or hierarchy, or, as science writer John Gribbin
(2004/2005: 25) puts it: ‘all the energy will end up as heat, and all
the temperature differences will smooth out to leave a bland and
featureless system where nothing interesting happens’.
The concept of entropy has influenced the arts, modernist
and postmodernist American literature in particular (e.g. Thomas
Pynchon and William Gaddis), where the increase of inert uni-
formity in the universe is coupled with deep feelings of anxiety
(Lewicki 1984). As Thomasina’s lines show, entropy is also one of
the motifs of Arcadia, supporting the play’s general themes of or-
der and disorder. However, here entropy does not get the final
word, and its effects should not be confused with those of chaos
theory. As Stoppard has noted in an interview (Kelly and De-
mastes 1994: 5), Arcadia has a structure which is modelled on the
idea  of  a  system  which  moves  from  order  to  chaos:  ‘in  a  very
crude way the structure of Arcadia mimics the reiteration towards
chaos [...]. The play bifurcates two or three times and then goes
into  the  last  section,  which  is  all  mixed  up.  So,  it’s  very  chaos
structured’.
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The mixed-up effect is created by the increasing speed of the
scene changes between the two time periods,51 until the twentieth-
century garden party in Act II scene 5, where the stage is simulta-
neously occupied by characters from both time periods, oblivious
to each other and to the collection of incongruous items from the
two periods, which have accumulated on the large table on the
stage (A 96).  At  times  the  characters  even  handle  objects  that
should belong to the other era, as when the twentieth-century
Hannah fills the nineteenth-century Septimus’s wine glass and
takes  a  sip  (A 93). While this development has been noted by
many critics (e.g. Fleming 2001: 203-205), it is also important to
point out that it does not constitute a descent into entropy, but
towards chaos in the sense of nonlinear dynamics. The increase in
the seeming disorder of events contains a very clear pattern of al-
ternations between the time periods, and at no point do the narra-
tive or temporal structures of the play entirely collapse. Instead,
the nightmarish vision of the entropic universe is counter-
balanced by the creative, pattern-making effects of nonlinear dy-
namics. Even though the time periods on the stage may initially
seem to bleed into each other, the characters do not collide with
each other or speak to each other across the centuries, and the
structure of the alternating time periods effortlessly leads the au-
dience to the complex but ordered experience of the last scene of
the play.
Thematically, the same effect is achieved by combining in
Thomasina the best of both the classical and the romantic views
of order and freedom in the universe. Thomasina’s calculations
on chaotic form are, first of all, contrasted with Septimus’s New-
tonian principles. Septimus supports the theories of linear motion
in the universe, and dismisses Thomasina’s first mathematical dis-
coveries as fancies (A 37). He also accepts unquestioningly the
precise rules of classical geometry, and calls it, after Hobbes, ‘the
only science God has been pleased to bestow on mankind’ (A 84).
Thomasina, in contrast, is reaching for a science that would ex-
51 See Fleming (2001: 195) for the exact structure of these scene changes.
Strange Attractors in Literature
116
plain phenomena and forms which are not so sterile as the ones
grasped by classical geometry:
Each week I plot your equations dot for dot, xs against ys in all
manner of algebraical relation, and every week they draw them-
selves as commonplace geometry, as if the world of forms were
nothing but arcs and angles. God’s truth, Septimus, if there is an
equation for a curve like a bell, there must be an equation for one
like a bluebell, and if a bluebell, why not a rose? [...] Mountains
are not pyramids and trees not cones. God must love gunnery
and architecture if Euclid is his only geometry. (A 37, 84)
In her search for a new kind of geometry Thomasina arrives at the
first principles of chaos theory, which do admit the existence of
an equation for a bluebell, even though that equation might be
much too difficult for her to formulate. Her calculations, once
pushed through Valentine’s computer in the twentieth century,
reveal the fractal patterns of nature. ‘In an ocean of ashes’, Valen-
tine points out, there are ‘islands of order’ (A 76). In a universe
that moves irrevocably towards the ultimate heat death of en-
tropy, patterns still spontaneously emerge.
In the dialogue of the twentieth-century characters Stoppard
continues to combine the debates over the nature of the universe
and of beauty, and reaches out to twentieth-century science and
art history to gain more metaphors. While Valentine discards en-
tropy and points out the more optimistic characteristics of chaos
theory, he also makes an analogy between the new mathematics
and modernist art:
When your Thomasina was doing maths it had been the same
maths for a couple of thousand years. Classical. And for a century
after Thomasina. Then maths left the real world behind, just like
modern art, really. Nature was classical, maths was suddenly Pi-
cassos. But now nature is having the last laugh. The freaky stuff is
turning out to be the mathematics of the natural world. (A 45)
Thus Stoppard presents chaos theory as the Picasso of mathemat-
ics, as the method of creating pictures of dynamics that previously
were regarded as much too complex to be mapped in a meaning-
ful way. Therefore, where Antor (1998: 349) takes chaos theory to
represent Stoppard’s critique of the (sometimes misdirected) ‘pat-
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tern-building activities’ of the characters, I would argue that Stop-
pard is actually emphasising the pattern-making possibilities in
chaos itself. In his article on the chaotic elements in contemporary
drama Demastes (1994) describes the difference in the attitudes to
pattern in Stoppard and, for example, Ionesco. In absurdist
works, Demastes (1994: 251) suggests, there is
a presentation of existence in the pure chaos-as-randomness
phase of human dynamics, decidedly opposed to any causally-
informed rationality whatsoever, oblivious [...] of windows of or-
der within the chaos phases of human dynamics.
By contrast, in Arcadia the presence of those windows of order, of
form in life and art, is underlined. Stoppard’s aim has been to give
the play shape, and in accordance with chaos theory, that shape
has symmetries and reflections which weave a complex, harmoni-
ous picture.
The pattern-making abilities of chaotic dynamics are also un-
derlined by the theme of lost and recovered time. One of the ma-
jor questions presented in the play is whether it is possible to find
out the truth about events in the past (see further chapter 4). In a
universe ruled by the Second Law of Thermodynamics such a
thing is not possible and time only moves in a single direction to-
wards increasing disorder. What Stoppard does in Arcadia, how-
ever, is to use both self-similarity and temporal loops to create a
structure in which time periods alternate and finally coalesce to
share the same space.
Furthermore, the play tells a poignant story in which timeless
ideas are contrasted with the irreversible death of individuals. The
self-similarity of fractals is reflected in the repetitive elements of
both dialogue and, as Fleming (2001: 195-196) has noted, in the
music, costumes and props specified in Stoppard’s stage direc-
tions. These echoes connect the two time periods to each other
by suggesting that one set of characters self-similarly repeats an-
other. Thomasina’s ideas, for instance, were lost to the world until
Valentine thinks of them again in the late twentieth century.
‘Mathematical discoveries glimpsed and lost to view will have
their time again’, Septimus predicts. ‘You do not suppose, my
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lady, that if all of Archimedes had been hiding in the great library
of  Alexandria,  we  would  be  at  a  loss  for  a  corkscrew?’  (A 38).
However, there is an important difference between the progres-
sive procession of scientific discoveries which are not dependent
on a particular individual, and the utterly unique creations of the
artistic imagination. Thomasina’s romantic sensibility emphasises
the uniqueness of works of art and therefore mourns the manu-
scripts that burned with the library of Alexandria. ‘All the lost
plays of the Athenians!’ she exclaims. ‘How can we sleep for
grief?’ (A 38). This difference in artistic and scientific develop-
ment is also made evident in the arguments between Bernard and
Valentine in the twentieth century, and I will return to it in chap-
ter 4. But Thomasina’s point about loss being permanent, about
creativity being not only about the circulation of ideas but also
about personalities, is brought home by her own death in a fire,
by her personal genius dissipating in an instant of heat.
One of the odd temporal loops of the play, on the other
hand, is Thomasina’s jokingly drawn hermit on Noakes’s designs
for the planned hermitage, which Hannah later takes as the ‘only
known likeness for the Sidley hermit’ (A 25).  The  fact  that  the
drawing took place before the hermitage was built, and thus pre-
dates the life of Septimus as the hermit, evokes the possibility that
time might circle back to pick up a thread dropped during the
previous round. That faint echo is strengthened at the end of the
play when Hannah is handed another drawing, this time of Sep-
timus and his tortoise Plautus, a drawing which proves to her that
Septimus was indeed the tragic hermit. Such loops in Stoppard’s
play are suggestive of temporal distortions similar to John Barth’s
Möbius narratives discussed in the following section, but while
they cause momentary disorientation, they do not actually break
the causality of the play’s story-time.
Ira Nadel (2002: 428) has suggested that Stoppard’s temporal
loops reflect ‘art’s attempt to delay the bleak ending established by
time moving only in one direction and entropy controlling all’.
Certainly, the final coalescence of the temporal iterations in the
structure of the play is a re-enactment of the merging of individ-
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ual lives to the flow of history and of the inevitable end of both
individuals and of the universe itself. However, rather than simply
postponing that end, Stoppard’s art establishes a bitter-sweet
moment where the awareness of inevitable loss is tempered with
joy at the creation of pattern and harmony. The final scene of the
play is a culmination of the deterministic chaos created by the mix
of the two time periods: two couples from different times waltz in
the same room to the same music, but both obviously following
their own separate orbits in their own separate eras. The simulta-
neous freedom and harmony Thomasina envisions is symbolised
by the equally harmonious though unpredictable patterns of the
waltz, a dance which, when compared to the more structured
formal dances of the eighteenth century, was initially seen as ir-
regular both in the sense of lacking discernible form and of bring-
ing the opposite sexes to a much closer physical contact than be-
fore. In the scenes leading up to the final dance Septimus – who
would gladly credit the Germans with the invention of the waltz,
as long as the inventor of calculus is acknowledged to be an Eng-
lishman (A 81) – is again contrasted with Thomasina and her de-
sire for freedom. What Septimus does not initially see is that, just
like chaotic dynamics, the waltz has form and harmony, even
though that form cannot be pinned down to a simple predictable
pattern, and that what Thomasina is actually asking him to do is
to  help  her  create  their  own,  unique  pattern  from the  simple,  it-
erative steps of the waltz (A 94).
These two main characters from the nineteenth century func-
tion as an opposing pair whose debates allow Stoppard to explore
attitudes to determinism from both classical and romantic angles,
and to combine them in Thomasina’s discovery of chaos theory.
Septimus’s classical mind can initially only fathom two options:
either the universe is completely ordered, or everything is disorder
and darkness. Thomasina, on the other hand, a romantic mind
with a classical education, is able to see that the universe moves
according to the unpredictable and unique patterns of turbulence,
and therefore has shape and harmony without the strictness of
classical forms. In this way, the play explores different sides of the
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question as to whether the universe is and should be regarded as
determined or free, whether an individual human existence is or-
dered  or  random  and  whether  beauty  resides  in  repetition  or  in
surprise. From classical thought Stoppard borrows the importance
of structure; and from romanticism he takes the desire for free-
dom as well as the appreciation of the unpredictable. These as-
pects he combines in his artistic rendition of chaos theory.
Thus,  despite  the  fact  that  it  was  initially  praised  by  theatre
critics for its fractured, postmodern structure, the play’s chaotic
form does not imply the abandonment of textual unity. Instead,
chaos  is  presented  as  the  creator  of  a  fluid  form  which  gives
shape, meaning and beauty to the characters’ lives. What is more,
Arcadia is  a  play  in  which,  as  Prapassaree  and  Jeffrey  Kramer
(1997: 1) put it, the ‘realistic frame holds’ despite the ‘seemingly
surrealistic’ moments in the dialogue. For example, even though
Septimus’s description (A 3), in a single breath, of both ‘carnal
embrace’ and Fermat’s Last Theorem creates a bizarre moment so
typical of Stoppard’s plays, the dialogue soon offers a perfectly
reasonable explanation for the juxtaposition of those topics in a
single speech. I will discuss this realistic frame further in section
4.3, but its presence in Stoppard’s play also forms a link to the fol-
lowing section of the current chapter. If Arcadia retains a frame
that closes the events of the play within a realistic causal structure,
John Barth’s narratives utilise the technique of frames to empha-
sise both the craftedness of story-telling and the endless possibili-
ties of artistic reinvention.
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2.3  John Barth’s Arabesque Frames
The elaboration of texture invariably has the effect
of arresting movement – whether of thought or ac-
tion – and substituting the opaque for the transpar-
ent in language. At its furthest extremes such devel-
opments lead to CONCRETE POETRY or Euphuistic
Prose involving a progressive elimination of mean-
ing, until a point is reached where the textural de-
vices – dependent as they are on the meaning of
words – become ineffective.
Allan Rodway, ‘Form’ in
Roger Fowler’s Dictionary of Modern Critical Terms
Like Stoppard, John Barth is an author who has found in chaos
theory the perfect metaphor and structure to express what he has
been doing for decades rather than an inspiration for something
completely new.52 His novels, which range from the comparatively
brief and in some senses nihilistic The Floating Opera (1956/1967)
and The End of the Road (1958) to the massive cornucopiae Letters
(1979) and Tidewater Tales (1987),  all  stem from their  author’s  in-
terest  in  the  nature  of  stories:  how  they  are  created;  how  they
change from author to author and reader to reader; and how they
live on after their creators. This section focuses on the way Barth
uses fractals and strange attractors as symbols for a particular kind
of narrative structure. His stories play with both the temporality
of narrative and the geometrical form of the literary work, and
balance a humanist preference for formal closure with a post-
modern desire for open-endedness. His works also seek to com-
bine the readerliness characteristic of the postmodern novel with
a more traditional form of literary meaning.
52 Words like ‘feedback loop’ are already in Barth’s vocabulary as early as
The Friday Book (1984: xii). I disagree, however, with Slethaug’s (2000: 117)
suggestion that Barth is consciously using chaos theory already in the 1987
Tidewater Tales. I believe that this novel owes more to his previous interests
in the Möbius strip and the Fibonacci spiral than it does to fractals or
strange attractors.
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In the epigraph above, Allan Rodway suggests that an explicit
emphasis on the forms of literature has the double effect of both
‘arresting’ the movement of the narrative and undermining its
meaning. Using a similar point of departure, Alan Lindsay (1995:
106) has argued that Barth’s virtuoso use of form ‘is nothing more
than part of the game’, and that his aesthetic is very much part of
the poststructuralist paradigm. Thus Lindsay suggests that ‘Barth
employs form against the idea that the relationship between the
form of the story and analogous forms outside of the story is in-
herently meaningful’ (Lindsay 1995: 106). However, I would con-
test Rodway and Lindsay by pointing out how Barth’s temporal
structures combine the experience of dizzying speed with arrest-
ing passages of metafictional digression, and by suggesting that in
his works explicitly crafted structure and the relationship of that
structure to reality are central to literary meaning. As an example,
I focus in particular on Barth’s On With the Story (1996/1997), in
which such notions are explicitly linked to chaos theory.
On With the Story is only Barth’s second book of short stories,
and like the earlier Lost in the Funhouse (1968/1972), it includes
both a self-conscious frame tale and a strong thematic unity.
Barth himself describes Lost in the Funhouse as a ‘series’ of stories
(Barth 1968/1972: 7), and such a description is more apt for both
the Funhouse and On With the Story than either ‘collection’ or ‘vol-
ume’ of stories, since the books exist in a curious middle state be-
tween collected, separate stories and a volume of new stories de-
signed from the start to be read as a whole.53 Many of the narra-
tives have been published separately before, but the presence of a
frame tale, crafted particularly for the publication of each book,
creates and reflects a network of meaningful relationships be-
tween the shorter pieces. In On With the Story the frame consists of
53 I follow Suzanne Keen’s (2003: 25) definitions of ‘volume’ (original sto-
ries designed to be read as parts of a whole) vs. ‘collection’ and ‘selection’
(stories that have been previously published separately). See also Slethaug
(2000: 19-20), who connects the separate-yet-part-of-a-whole structure of
On With the Story to the quantum mechanical wave-particle duality Barth
also uses as a metaphor in the series.
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a late-middle-aged couple checking in to their tropical ‘last resort’
(OS 4), where their life together seems to end (either by terminal
illness or by suicide before they are incapacitated by that illness).
In a reversal of Scheherazade’s situation, the husband attempts to
put off  death by reading his  wife stories,  each in one way or an-
other about love and story-telling, about beginnings, middles and
endings, and about the similarities and differences between life
and narrative. As such it is a book centrally concerned with the
‘laws of narrative’, which are already in the epigraphs – the equa-
tion for Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and a quotation from
Scholes and Kellogg’s The Nature of Narrative –  equated  with  the
laws  of  physics  (OS n.p.).  One  critic  has  even  suggested  that  ‘if
Mr. Barth could ascertain [the laws of narrative] more precisely he
would happily formulate them in mathematical signs’ (Lehmann-
Haupt  1996:  n.p.).  All  of  these  themes  are  familiar  from Barth’s
previous works, but this time the narrative structure and the ter-
minology used to describe the themes are derived explicitly from
chaos theory.
Barth’s interest in chaos theory dates at least as far back as
1991,  when  he  took  part  in  a  symposium  called  ‘The  End  of
Postmodernism’ in Stuttgart. His contributions to the seminar
were subsequently published in Further Fridays under the joint title
‘4 ½ Lectures: The Stuttgart Seminars on Postmodernism, Chaos
Theory, and the Romantic Arabesque’. Citing both Gleick’s ubiq-
uitous Chaos and Hayles’s Chaos Bound as his sources, Barth (1995:
276-348) lays out his vision of what chaos theory might mean to
him as a writer. He focuses mainly on the idea of a feedback loop,
or what he prefers to call a ‘coaxial esemplasy’ – a vision of an in-
dividual  work  of  art  as  a  reflective  and  interconnected  whole  in
which major characteristics are repeated on different levels all the
way  down to  linguistic  detail.  It  is  easy  to  see  how the  narrative
structure of On With the Story conforms to such a vision, and I will
focus on the series as a geometric structure further on in this sec-
tion. First, however, I would like to draw attention to some of the
temporal structures in the individual stories themselves, which
also draw on chaos theory.
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Chaos and Narrative Time
Even if the analysis of temporal structures were not such a natural
starting point in the study of narrative, On With the Story plays with
time explicitly enough to make such analysis a sine qua non for any
interpretation of the book. Interestingly, On With the Story shares
with Stoppard’s Arcadia not  only  its  clear  interest  in  chaos  as  a
shaping force in art and nature, but also a striking formal similar-
ity in that both works switch back and forth between story-lines
that are finally fused together. Where Arcadia moves between the
two time lines which at the end of the play share the same space
on stage, Barth’s series alternates between individual stories and
sections of the frame tale. The culminating story, ‘Countdown:
Once Upon a Time’ is a collage of events, characters, concepts
and metaphors, working itself backwards through all the previous
stories until the couple’s time runs out at ‘T-zero’ (OS 257).
Barth is well-known for his habit of playing with the tempo-
ral structures of his narratives. Tidewater Tales, for example, is con-
nected to Don Quixote by a suggestion that Miguel de Cervantes’s
protagonist, while destined to end his life as narrated in the Span-
ish original, is able to escape into Barth’s story through a portal in
the cave of Montesinos, and that until he returns into his own
narrative he is able to have untold adventures in Barth’s novel (see
Barth 1987/1997: 521). Another technique appears in Lost in the
Funhouse where the story called ‘Frame Tale’ consists of a strip of
paper that could, according to printed instructions, be cut out and
twisted into a Möbius strip so that the text on its two sides, ‘ONCE
UPON A TIME THERE’  and  ‘WAS A STORY THAT BEGAN’,  form  a
continuous refrain. In On With the Story we  find  both  kinds  of
temporal play connected to certain characteristics of chaotic sys-
tems. Time conceptualised as a fractal allows Barth’s characters to
slip into ever tinier moments in narrative time and extend them by
spinning out digressions, while self-similarity and feedback proc-
esses are reflected in the idea of time having loops which can re-
turn us to earlier  moments and be repeated until  the narrative is
ready to move on.
Strange Attractors in Literature
125
Both of these techniques depend on the manipulation of the
concept of narrative time. Characteristically, in On With the Story
Barth draws many of his central symbols from the world of writ-
ing and story-telling, in particular from the classical narrative arc
of beginning, middle and end. The series includes stories which
are still only beginning – where the narrators are yet to encounter
the ‘Dramatic Vehicle’ which will move the story forward from its
‘Ground Situation’ (OS 36) – or where they are consciously refus-
ing to leave the middle of the story and use all means available to
postpone its end. The conflicting desires for stalling and for act-
ing are also reflected in the title of the collection: ‘on with the
story’ refers both to the desire to speed a story along towards its
destination and to the wish that it should never end. The ways in
which these narratives stall, stop and speed up again are also
techniques by which the narrators attempt to control the passing
of time by slowing down their life story, even to the point of
changing their life by telling it differently. In chapter 3 I will re-
turn to the question of the relation between life and story, which
is of course not only a temporal but also an ontological question.
The best example of the principle of fractured time in Barth’s
series is ‘Ad Infinitum: A Short Story’, which even in its title pre-
sents the paradox of endless time within the limited parameters of
ten printed pages. In the story a woman receives bad news over
the phone and moves from the house through the garden to tell it
to her husband. The brief action required to complete the narra-
tive is extended by asides, digressions, hypotheticals and philoso-
phisings, with the specific aim of delaying the moment when the
husband’s innocent view of their future is irrevocably altered. The
narrative is presented as an ever-fracturing series of moments, as
Zeno’s paradox in narrative time: ‘If our lives are stories’, the nar-
rator  muses,  ‘and  if  this  story  is  three-fourths  told,  it  is  not  yet
four-fifths told; if four-fifths, not yet five-sixths, et cetera, et cet-
era – and meanwhile, meanwhile it is as if all were still well’ (OS
30). By connecting traditional concepts of story-telling to fractal
geometry Barth’s narrator envisions literary forms in which end-
less  time  resides  in  a  limited,  yet  infinite,  narrative  space,  and,
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conversely, limited real time can be turned into an infinite narra-
tive:
History is a Mandelbrot set, as infinitely subdivisible as is space in
Zeno’s paradox. No interval past or future but can be partitioned
and sub-partitioned, articulated down through ever finer, self-
similar scales like the infinitely indented coastlines of fractal ge-
ometry. (OS 28)
‘Ad Infinitum: A Short Story’ also contains one of the more
interesting uses of the idea of feedback loops. The husband, in the
midst of his gardening, finds himself musing (via recollections of
Dante) on a form of punishment in Renaissance Florence, which
involved being buried alive upside-down.
Before that hole is filled, the officiating priest bends down [...] to
hear the condemned man’s last confession – which, in despera-
tion, the poor wretch no doubt prolongs, perhaps adding ficti-
tious sins to his factual ones in order to postpone the end – and
in so doing (it occurs to him now, turning another trowelsworth
of soil as his wife approaches from the cherry tree) appending
one more real though venial sin, the sin of lying, to the list yet to
be confessed. (OS 28)
If Zeno’s paradox of infinitely divided moments of time post-
pones the end by slowing down narrative time, the invented sins,
which themselves engender an another thing to confess, put off
the approaching end by redirecting the narrative back onto itself.
In the title story of the series Barth provides an even more
theoretically explicit handling of the relationship between lived
time and narrative time and emphasises the contrast between the
seeming slowing down of lived time and the speeding up of its
narrative equivalent. The story depicts an author sitting on a
plane, discussing with a fellow passenger a short story he has writ-
ten. Barth’s narrator digresses repeatedly, ‘freeze-framing’ the nar-
rative in order to create ‘arresting passages’ of descriptive or phi-
losophical discourse (OS 86). The structure and the setting of the
story echo its theme, the one by creating a series of nested narra-
tives that each break off from time to time to digress from the
events, the other by depicting the paradoxical speeding limbo of a
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passenger plane. The story discussed is printed in the in-flight
magazine and is about a woman stuck in traffic, stuck in a life she
does not recognise as her own, while her narrative is equally stuck
as the narrator in the magazine digresses into the physics of rela-
tive motion. But during his digression the nested narrator picks
up incredible speed, increasing the movement of his traffic-
jammed protagonist with the spin of the earth’s axis, the move-
ment of the earth in orbit and that of the solar system in the gal-
axy, to which all, the author of this embedded story realises during
his flight, he should have added the almost imperceptible crawling
of continental drift. Thus, rather than accepting the usual inter-
pretation of Zeno’s paradox – that the logic of infinitely divisible
time means that any actual movement is an illusion – Barth’s nar-
rator reverses such a suggestion and makes stillness the illusion:
All stories are essentially constructs in time, and only incidentally
in the linear space of written words. Written or spoken, however,
these words are like points in space, through which the story-
arrow travels in time. Just now it rests at this point, this word, this
– yet of course never resting there, but ever en route through it to
the next, the next, from Beginning through Middle et cetera.
Even if and when we linger over an ‘arresting passage’, we’re only
apparently at rest in the story’s suspended but incessant motion;
likewise in our manifold own. (OS 94)
Thus Barth plays in a virtuoso fashion with the very same prob-
lem of conceptualising narrative time as both a point and a trajec-
tory that critics such as Parker struggle with (see 2.1). Here both
aspects are retained by presenting narrative as a temporal process
that depends on words being ‘like points in space’. A similar em-
phasis on a balance between motion and rest, between continu-
ance and closure, can be seen in the story series as a whole. While
the temporal effects of the narration draw attention to the endless
regression that digressive narration implies, Barth’s self-conscious
metafictional structures place equal emphasis on the idea of the
work of literature as a crafted object. The back-and-forth move-
ment between the individual stories with their repeated themes
and tropes, and the frame tale which, again, forms another version
of those same themes, creates a self-similar structure so explicit
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that it borders on opaque in the sense described by Rodway in the
epigraph. However, while such focus on texture is an undeniable
part of Barth’s fiction, it should be understood in conjunction
with the romantic qualities of his writing.
 ‘Chaotic-Arabesque Postmodernism’
The  explicitness  of  Barth’s  narrative  structures  has  been  seen  as
deliberate opacity by many critics, especially when they discuss his
early work (e.g. Gross 1968/1980, Lindsay 1995 and Nas 2000).
In addition to temporal loops, the novels and stories are stylisti-
cally dense (Barth’s characteristic punning is always present) and,
with very few exceptions, they contain explicit play with fiction
versus non-fiction. Barth’s writing is usually metafictional, and in
addition to open references, autobiographical hints and intertex-
tuality, one of the most distinct ways he draws attention to the na-
ture of his narratives as fictional constructs are the evident frames
built  into  each  book.  However,  my  claim  is  that  for  Barth,  the
presence and the metafictional effects of such explicit forms do
not imply a loss of faith in meaning or in the power of literature
to represent reality.
Frames (and frame-breaking) have been seen as one of the
most wide-spread characteristics of metafiction (Waugh
1984/1985: 28-34, McHale 1987: 197-198). The most common
interpretation of the function of frame-breaking has been that it
undermines the illusion of realism and causes a domino-effect of
relativisations of the levels of reality in a work of fiction. I will
discuss Barth’s way of using metafictional frame-breaking in rela-
tion  to  his  authorial  identity  in  chapter  3.  Here  I  would  like  to
draw attention to the paradoxical robustness of his frames – or
perhaps I should say their flexibility. For even when they are
punctured  or  turned  inside  out,  the  narrative  frames  of  Barth’s
stories do not shatter but merely bend in unexpected ways. In-
deed,  Barth’s  most  frequently  used structural  symbol,  present al-
ready in Lost in the Funhouse,  is  the Möbius strip,  a  surface which
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moves from inside out and outside in with no violence or break-
age.
The metafictional twists in On With  the  Story also follow the
Möbius pattern. For example, ‘Stories of Our Lives’ narrates the
finding of a loose leaf (page numbers 179/180) from a book
which is On With the Story itself. ‘What’s going on here?’ asks the
narratee wife in the frame story and receives the reply: ‘Stories-
within-stories stories, tails in their own mouths like the snake
Ouroboros. Bent back on themselves like time warps’ (OS 180).
Such a blurring of the boundaries between the frame and sub-
stance, between a field and its border, Barth (1995: 328-331) sug-
gests in one of his chaos theory essays, is typical of both post-
modernism and fractals, as well as the romantic concept of the
arabesque  –  a  work  of  art  which  includes  its  own frame,  that  is,
brings the frame inside the work by explicit references to the craft
of writing. The frame story of On With the Story has  just  such  a
function. By providing the context within which the individual
stories are told it is outside those stories, but some details within
the stories loop to contain the frame, while the loop itself alerts
readers to its metafictional qualities.
However, Barth’s writings also involve other species of
frame, in addition to the malleable fictional/metafictional divide.
The frame of On With the Story is clearly one that collects the varia-
tions and fragmentations Barth creates within the series. Even
though most of the stories first appeared independently in peri-
odicals and were only later collected to form a single volume, the
frame tale makes explicit the thematic connections between them.
Furthermore, the frame is not just a loose overall structure, but
aspires to Barth’s own ideal of a frame tale that reflects and com-
pletes the individual tales. This would be
a frametale so constructed that the plot of the inmost tale, far
from merely bearing upon the plot of the next tale out, actually
springs that plot, which in turn springs the next, etc., etc., etc.,
etc., at the point of concentric climax to which the whole series
has systematically been brought. (Barth 1981/1984: 234)
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Such an effect can be seen in the final story of the series, ‘Count-
down: Once Upon a Time’, where sections numbered backwards
reintroduce the characters and situations from the previous sto-
ries.54 Unlike Slethaug (2000: 21), who suggests that the final sec-
tion of the series ‘leaves the reader uncertain about any ending’, I
believe that, on the contrary, it produces formal closure, even
while it thematically speaks of the ‘multiverse’ of stories in which
other endings may take place (OS 251-257). Thus On With the Story
is a series of stories about beginnings, middles and endings which
are given their closure by a final story that, as such, might seem
fragmented, but taken as a part of the whole it completes all  the
others in the series.
Hence, Barth’s use of narrative conventions can be consid-
ered revolutionary in the sense that he often turns the story in-
side-out  like  a  Möbius  strip,  but  it  must  also  be  noted  that  his
writing has not dispensed with traditional literary conventions in
doing so. Where Stoppard’s Arcadia links chaos theory to the
nineteenth-century debates between romanticism and classical
formalism, Barth takes Friedrich Schlegel’s idea of the romantic
arabesque as a forerunner to his own ideas about chaos and
postmodern repetition of older conventions. For Barth the inter-
est in frames, however fractured and blurred, reveals an interest in
formalism – an interest inherent in both the romantic arabesque
and its postmodern progeny, which not so much reject literary
forms as become self-conscious and choosy about their use:
There is a popular misconception of the Romantics as rebelling
against all formal constraints in favor of untrammeled freedom
(as in their fondness for ‘wild’ gardens around those ‘broken’ col-
umns) [...]. But it is clear that in fact [they] have a veritable pas-
sion for form – in Wallace Stevens’s famous phrasing, [in ‘The
Idea  of  Order  at  Key  West’]  a  ‘rage  for  order’  –  and  that  what
they’re rejecting is only certain conventions of order and form. [...] I
will venture to say that the principal difference between Romantic
54 The precise counterparts of the sections are: 11 – ‘Ever After’; 10 –
‘Goodbye to the Fruits’; 9 – ‘Closing Out the Visit’; 8 – ‘Stories of Our
Lives’; 7 & 6 – ‘“Waves” by Amien Richard’ and ‘Love Explained’; 5,4,3,2
and 1– the frame tale itself.
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formalism and Postmodernist romantic formalism is that the lat-
ter, more than the former, inclines to the ironic (though impas-
sioned) reorchestration of older conventions – including the clas-
sical and the neoclassical – rather than to their rejection in favor
of ‘new’ forms. (Barth 1995: 326-327)
By drawing comparisons between Persian carpets, the frames of
arabesque tales, the denaturalisation of narrative in romantic
irony, and Mandelbrot sets with their almost-but-not-quite-
repeating fractal patterns, Barth (1995: 288-289) defines in the
Stuttgart essays his own postmodern aesthetic as ‘chaotic-
arabesque Postmodernism’. In this conception Barth’s (1995: 326-
327) original idea of postmodern repetition is ‘potentially revali-
dated – refreshened, reinforced, replenished – by contemporary
chaos theory’, and he considers it to be his own ‘working aes-
thetic’.
In addition to his interest in romantic formalism, Barth also
shares Stoppard’s view of the implications of chaos theory in gen-
eral. In his discussion of Hayles’s Chaos Bound, Barth, while not
dismissing the Prigoginian order-out-of-chaos interpretation, does
find a better match for his ideas of romantic formalism in the
strange-attractor branch, as Hayles (1990: 9-10 and passim) de-
fines it. The emphasis on fragmentation and discontinuity, Barth
believes, is more of a modernist than a postmodernist characteris-
tic, and the location of hidden self-similar patterning in cultural
production much better describes the formal aspects of postmod-
ern writing. Further, Barth (1995: 335-341) refers to the theory of
self-organised criticality and suggests that its combination of self-
organisation with infinite sensitivity to initial conditions is an apt
symbol for literary form. Thus, like Stoppard, he is more inter-
ested in chaos theory’s explanation of the generation and presence
of pattern than in its proof of the existence of uncontrollable dis-
order. Further, as I will argue in the following, the deep interest in
formalism and in messages oriented towards themselves does not
prevent Barth from creating literary works that nevertheless have
a meaning which bootstraps itself beyond self-referentiality.
Strange Attractors in Literature
132
From Postmodern Irony to Literary Meaning
Stan Fogel and Gordon Slethaug (1990: 215, 217) have com-
mented on Barth’s relation to postmodern irony and find that de-
spite the fact that Barth uses many of the techniques of estrange-
ment, his texts do not seek to widen the gap between the story
and the reader: ‘He is not a remote novelist, one whose deploy-
ment of scholarly elements removes him from contact with his
readers; rather, the stories are connecting instead of estranging’.
This aspect of Barth’s use of frames is rarely commented on, but I
suggest  that  there  is  much to  support  it.  Even a  cursory  look  at
Barth’s  use  of  chaotic  dynamics  suggests  that  it  is  employed  not
only as a metaphor for a complex yet coherent literary structure,
but also as a way of conceptualising the author’s long-standing use
of explicit framing as a source of literary meaning.
Story-telling, according to Barth (1984: 167), combines the
skill of rearranging formal elements with human passion – algebra
and fire, as he calls it, after Borges – and thus, though his literary
technique coincides with exhausted postmodernism in repeating
established conventional devices and playing with the formal ele-
ments of texts, he goes beyond irony by emphasising the passion
required to give the story meaning. ‘Wait long enough’, he writes
in Further Fridays,
for  the  end  of  art  or  of  the  world,  and  you  may  be  inspired  to
build a half-ironic monument to mark if not redeem your pro-
longed attendance. In that monumental labor, moreover, you may
well find your irony fired after all with a profound though post-
innocent passion; so much so that should Godot in fact arrive,
anticlimactically, you would shrug your shoulders and go on with
what you’re now much more committed to than waiting. Among
the opportunities of Postmodernism, for the novelist, is the quix-
otic revivification – with the right irony to leaven its pathos and
the right passion to vitalize the irony – of that noble category of
literature: the exhaustive but inexhaustible, exhilarating novel; the
long long story that, like life at its best, we wish might never end,
yet treasure the more because we know it must.
     But not in a hurry. (Barth 1990/1995: 88)
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Barth  is  thus  not  only  very  aware  of  his  own  technique  of  re-
invention (see further chapter 3), but also consciously connects it
to the modernist cul-de-sac of art. Postmodernism, as he has argued
ever since the word entered his vocabulary in the mid-1970s (see
e.g. Barth 1984: 129), should be understood as the means through
which authors are able to keep on writing when faced with the
end of art, as the ‘half-ironic monuments’ they build, even if only
to acknowledge that there is nothing much else to do. Such an at-
titude  might  be  seen  as  a  mark  of  creative  nihilism,  but  Barth’s
postmodernism is not about sterile repetition or enforced silence,
but about a ‘profound though post-innocent passion’ which trans-
forms the monuments into something more lively. Robert L.
McLaughlin (2004: 58) points out that ‘the used-upness [Barth]
talks about is akin to the loss of innocence of language or repre-
sentation’s loss of transparency’. But after the loss of innocence
one can turn either to detachment or to passion, and Barth, as
McLaughlin (2004: 58) realises, has chosen the latter. Even after
the medium becomes opaque, the passion still gives his writing
meaning. This aspiration is most perfectly manifested in the narra-
tives of sex and story-telling, which Barth often interweaves in his
fictions (see further pp. 180-181).
But how is it possible for Barth to conceptualise the reani-
mated monumentality of impassioned postmodernism? In 1967
Barth (1967/1984: 62-76) published a much-quoted but often
misunderstood55 essay called ‘The Literature of Exhaustion’, and
thirteen years later (1980/1984: 193-206) another entitled ‘The
Literature of Replenishment’. In these essays he describes the
kind of writing which aims at bringing to a completion, or ex-
hausting, a particular convention or style, while at the same time
creating something new out of that exhaustion. What Barth sug-
gests  is  a  method  of  creativity  that  does  not  rely  on  a  romantic
ideal of genius, or creating something out of nothing, but on a
process of repetition and feedback which, if skilfully done, hoists
the writing onto a new level.
55 Porush (1991: 77), for example, takes Barth to mean that the exhaustion
is a cause for the loss of faith in representation.
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The  simple  burden  of  my  [first]  essay  was  that  the  forms  and
modes of art live in human history and are therefore subject to
used-upness, at least in the minds of significant numbers of artists
in particular times and places: in other words, that artistic con-
ventions are liable to be retired, subverted, transcended, trans-
formed, or even deployed against themselves to generate new and
lively work. (Barth 1980/1984: 205)
This combination of exhaustion and replenishment is crucial both
to the author’s relationship with inherited literary conventions and
the structure of an individual work. While his use of established
conventions is deeply connected to the question of irony and
postmodern repetition, the narrative structure of each of Barth’s
works in its own way underlines the opacity of language and thus
exemplifies the autonomy of the literary object.
Lost in the Funhouse is closely related to Barth’s original ex-
haustion essay and embodies his idea of a literary style or concep-
tualisation taken to extremes. If its temporal structure is that of a
Möbius strip, the central figure in terms of theme is that of a laby-
rinth of mirrors. Stoicheff (1991: 89-90) notes how the stories
thematise the endless reflectivity of fiction and suggests that in
this they, firstly, are ‘analogous to’ fractals and strange attractors,
and secondly, form examples of metafictional texts which remain
within the circle formed by a created illusion and the deconstruc-
tion of that illusion. Lost in the Funhouse is, certainly, a good exam-
ple of how closely Barth’s themes and structures resemble the
characteristics of chaotic systems, even before he could have be-
come aware of their formulation in mathematics. But more im-
portantly,  it  is  also  an  example  of  his  aim  of  exhausting  literary
conventions and conceptualisations. A labyrinth, he argues in
‘The Literature of Exhaustion’, is ‘a place in which, ideally, all the
possibilities of choice (of direction, in this case) are embodied,
and – barring special dispensation like Theseus’s – must be ex-
hausted before one reaches the heart’ (Barth 1967/1984: 75).
Stoicheff cites this same passage but crucially excises Barth’s
comment about Theseus and his ‘special dispensation’. What must
be remembered about Barth’s essay (and about Lost in the Fun-
house) is that his point is not to confine fiction and metafiction in
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the endless labyrinth, or claim that all authors can do is keep re-
peating the turns within it in a vain attempt to exhaust them and
thus gain the centre, but that some authors can make new fictions
and new forms from the exhaustibility of the old ones. The centre
of a centreless fiction like Lost in the Funhouse is the fact that it is a
fiction about a centreless labyrinth, a bootstrapped metaconcept
which,  like  Borges’s  story  about  Pierre  Menard,  is  able  to  rise
above its own problematics (see further pp. 167-168).
Thus the effect of elaborate structure is not to detach the
narrative from meaning but to emphasise the status of the text as
a work of art crafted by an author. In this Barth’s writing embod-
ies the humanist principles formulated in William Paulson’s cos-
mopolitical philology: a work of literature is an artificial object
which, in order for it to be a part of the dynamic process of inter-
pretation, must be treated as if it were autonomous. Similarly, the
position envisioned for the reader of Barth’s fictions is a combi-
nation of narrative revelation and consciousness of the story as
representation. Charles Harris (1995, n.p.) importantly recognises
the way Barth’s insistence on the importance of narrative arises
from an emphasis on the centrality of meaning. Barth, he sug-
gests, both ‘shares the incredulity toward metanarratives Lyotard
identifies as postmodernism’s signature’ and ‘celebrates the narra-
tive urge, which is really the urge to construct meaning’.
This aspect of Barth’s writing comes out clearly in On With
the Story and its references to chaos theory and quantum physics.
Here stories gain a status that is simultaneously autonomous and
artificial, both metafictionally labyrinthine and meaningful. Thus
in ‘Ever After’ (OS 223) the single point of ink that is the story’s
final  full  stop opens a  dizzying internal  space,  as  well  as  extends
the story’s temporal existence beyond what common sense would
say is its end:
Closer, closer, obliging reader: the millions of molecules of
printer’s ink composing that full stop; the several atoms of car-
bon in each of those molecules; the furious motion of subatomic
particles in any one of those virtually immortal atoms, all but
oblivious to time, raging on like so many separate universes [...] to
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whatever comparably ephemeral next and next and next and on
and on, neither happily nor un-, ever after.
As objects, Barth’s stories are endlessly looping trajectories in the
finite space of their words. Their meaning is similarly dependent
on the double status of words: stories are both semantic and aes-
thetic, that is, they are ‘waves, propagated from mind to mind and
heart to heart through the medium of language via these particles
called words’, which themselves are but temporarily standing
waves in the diachronic flow of language (OS 143). Thus On With
the Story embodies Heisenberg’s principle turned into a law of nar-
rative. Stories are at the same time points and trajectories, both
particles and waves, both objects and processes, and by too much
concentration on one aspect you will lose sight of the other.
Therefore the metafictional forms employed by Barth do not
serve the purpose of enclosing the fiction in a textual bubble. As
Marjorie Worthington (2001: 116) notes about Lost in the Funhouse;
‘the structural strategies it employs serve also as an attempt to re-
center – to reauthorize – the author in twentieth-century fiction’.
The virtuoso author is a recurring character in Barth’s writing, and
even when the narrative is turning in on itself, the recounting of
that process of inflection requires ‘the emergence of a writer, of a
creator’ who witnesses and documents that process (Worthington
2001: 129). The analysis of the ways in which chaos theory func-
tions in Barth’s fictions shows that his extensive play with texture
is not done at the expense of meaning. It also, as Worthington
notes, draws attention to the craftedness of narrative and thus to
the topic of chapter 3: Barth’s conceptualisation of the impor-
tance of the author.
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Conclusion: Postmodern Romantic Formalists
Connie Willis’s comic romance Bellwether (1996/1997) is a fine ex-
ample of how chaos theory’s implications for literary form can be
handled with a light touch. Willis, better known for her science-
fiction novels, has crafted a narrative which draws on chaos the-
ory for its plot, themes and structural metaphors. The novel tells
the story of an American multidisciplinary research and develop-
ment institute, an establishment which is, to the despair of its re-
searchers, devoted to the furthering of management rather than
science. Willis’s story is narrated in the traditional female first per-
son of romance novels and is interspersed with short paragraphs
of encyclopaedic information on American fads. This combina-
tion produces a fast-flowing narrative which does not distract the
readers’ attention from the novel’s action and themes. The struc-
ture of the narrative also follows a traditional dramatic arc of in-
creasing tension and final release, but Willis explicitly connects
this familiar technique to the dynamics of increasing chaos and
leap to a new equilibrium. Unlike Stoppard, who in Arcadia builds
on the mathematics of period doubling towards chaos, Willis uses
the physical turbulence of a river as her plot guideline. The tur-
moil caused by Flip the disastrous office assistant increases from
chapter to chapter until a resolution and an equilibrium is reached
at the end of the novel.
Similarly to Willis’s narrative, which toys with the notion of
the traditional novelistic form as a reflection of the turbulence and
flow of real rivers, Stoppard’s Arcadia and Barth’s On With the
Story both reflect in their form the dynamics found in chaotic sys-
tems.  While  they  do  so  in  a  way  that  is  more  ambitious  than
Willis’s, the complexity of these works should not be equated with
the breaking of traditional forms for the sake of replacing them
with fragmentation. Stoppard’s longing for a literary form resem-
bling ‘an impossible Rubik’s cube’ (see p. 105) is much like Barth’s
conceptualisation of an ideal work as a ‘coaxial esemplasy’ (see p.
123), and I hope that the arguments presented above demonstrate
that both authors’ works reveal the respect they have for disci-
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plined form. The fact that they have chosen chaos theory to ex-
press and shape that form suggests that chaos theory’s implica-
tions can indeed be connected not only to fragmentation and loss
of communicable meaning, but also to dynamic structure and in-
finitely nuanced but nevertheless largely successful communica-
tion of meaning.
While  it  is  obvious  that  a  literary  author  may  draw  on  the
natural sciences in order to spark off his creativity – to ‘renew his
stock of metaphors’ (Barth 2000: 612 with reference to Coleridge)
–  it  is  also  evident  that  literary  scholars  do  the  same.  Thus  the
non-verbal graphs and calculations of chaos theory have spawned
valuable insights into the ontology of the literary work. Informa-
tion theory and the theory of complexity have been explicitly
connected by Paulson to a re-evaluation of the romantic meta-
phor of the literary work as an autonomous organism. Such a
conceptualisation attempts to integrate the seemingly opposing
views of the work as an object of interpretation and as the process
of interpretation itself. What literature seems to require is an ap-
proach that, as Paulson (1988: 121) puts it, cannot settle that
question but must, instead, accommodate both perspectives:
The peculiarity of literature’s status in our late romantic era is that
while we cannot give up the convention of autonomy – that is,
the fact that as observers we identify the text as a unity – we no
longer believe that autonomy suffices as an explanation of the
text’s existence and form. Our understanding no longer coincides
with the conventions to which the object we try to understand
owes its existence. We cannot get along with or without literary
autonomy. As critics and readers, we move from moments when
we must treat the literary text as autonomous to moments when
we must not.
The movement between the moments of encounter with an
autonomous entity and those when literature is seen as dependent
on a variety of influences (author, reader, history, ideology, not to
mention language itself) is a process that in its complexity defies
any real attempt at reduction to anything resembling a method of
structural analysis. If chaos theory teaches us literary scholars any-
thing, it is that the study of complex systems involves seeing un-
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derlying laws of order within apparent chaos, but also recognising
that those laws lead us only to a particular conceptualisation of lit-
erature as both object and process. The rigorousness implied by
the  use  of  a  well-defined  formal  model  may  thus  turn  out  to  be
fool’s gold, and more valuable principles of detailed research are
found within literary studies themselves.56 Thus, while chaos the-
ory seems to have played a crucial part in Paulson’s and other
humanist interpreters’ formulations of the kind of object a literary
work is and how its form can be described, other scholars have
arrived at similar conclusions by other routes. For example, Argy-
ros’s (1991: 318, see pp. 98-99) conceptualisation of narrative dy-
namics as an ‘overall vector’ which holds within it many smaller
‘areas of local turbulence’ points in the same direction as the nar-
ratological analysis advocated most recently by James Phelan in
Experiencing Fiction (2007). Phelan (2007: 3) sees form as ‘the tex-
tual dynamics that govern the movement of narrative’ and thus
presents the text itself as dynamic rather than monumental, and
his descriptions of ‘the temporal process of reading and respond-
ing’ present also the readers’ experience of engaging with the text
as kinetic. However, he also sees the text as an object in a triangu-
lar ‘recursive relationship (or feedback loop) among authorial
agency, textual phenomena (including intertextual relations), and
reader response’. Even while the relationship between the three
entities is dynamic, there is also a clear implication that the inter-
action depends on each of them being in some sense autonomous
from the others.
What the comparison between Phelan’s approach and the
humanist interpretations of chaos theory shows is that the proces-
sual notions approached in the 1990s explicitly through the con-
ceptual tools of chaos theory are currently being discussed else-
where in literary studies. While Parker and Argyros needed strange
56 This does not, of course, apply to those approaches that aim to trace
crafted mathematical structures in literature (see e.g. Fowler (1970) on nu-
merological criticism of Renaissance literature) or to the analysis of inten-
tionally mechanical literature (see e.g. Conte (2002) on ‘proceduralists’ and
Oulipo).
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attractors to conceive of literature in terms that would avoid the
Scylla and Charybdis of postmodern fragmentation and mechani-
cally linear narrative (see 2.1), it now seems possible to discuss the
literary work as an object and a process in terms that stay within
the boundaries of the literary discipline. Similarly, Paulson’s view
of literature as artificially autonomous also finds echoes in current
narratology. This kind of thinking is mostly connected to a rhe-
torical view of literature, currently represented by Phelan as well
as Richard Walsh (2007), where the feedback loop between au-
thor, text and reader is viewed in pragmatic terms. Furthermore,
such scholarship presents the analysis of literary form as a task
which no longer restricts itself to the description of the text’s in-
ternal features, or exists merely in service of interpretation, but as
a project that has new relevance to the discipline as a whole, since
it suggests that the forms discovered in literature reflect and re-
peat the forms discovered in cognitive processes more generally.
It is also important to note that now that the object/process con-
ceptualisation has been expressed with the help of chaos theory,
new research need not necessarily attempt to move further to-
wards chaos theory, but it can also fashion the new view into
terms and arguments that are more familiar to the discipline of lit-
erary studies.
Barth’s reference (see p. 131) to ‘Postmodernist romantic for-
malism’ usefully epitomises the many views of literary form pre-
sented in this chapter. While the interest in the laws of form re-
main paramount for both the authors and scholars considered, it
is  tempered  by  the  desire  to  regard  a  work  of  literature  as  a
uniquely autonomous, semi-organic entity. Added to the mix is a
postmodern awareness of the complexity of the relationship be-
tween creativity, conventions and meaning – between thought and
the already-thought. In the following chapter I move my focus to
such issues and consider the ways in which chaos theory can be
seen to support a view of coherent human identity in general and
John Barth’s recognisable authorial identity in particular.
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3.  Emergent Identities:
Complexity as the Source of Coherence
Despite the residual attraction of some form of
mind-body dualism, I take it as fairly well settled
that mind is simply a higher level description of the
brain, much as wet is a higher level description of
certain molecular structures.
Alexander J. Argyros, A Blessed Rage for Order
This chapter will focus on consciousness and identity as phenom-
ena that arise from the feedback process between a self and its
images, and on the ways in which such a self can be understood as
a coherent entity despite also being in a constant process of emer-
gence. Furthermore, I will argue that chaos theory has acted as a
catalyst to the formulation of a humanist view of the self which,
intriguingly, draws support from the natural sciences. At least
from Descartes onwards the concept of human identity has been
threatened by the sciences and their presentation of, first, the hu-
man body as a biological machine, and later of consciousness as
just one node in a vast network of information. However, more
recent writings emphasise the possibility that discarding teleology
and emphasising materiality could also, with the help of chaos
theory, lead to a humanist view of identity according to which ag-
ency and free will are possible. Thus a central theme in this chap-
ter is the humanist search in a postmodern world for room for the
self, and in postmodern literature for room for an authorial pres-
ence.
William Gibson and Bruce Sterling’s novel The Difference En-
gine (1990/1996) depicts the events of a turbulent summer during
an alternative nineteenth century, a version of history where com-
puterisation has arrived in step with industrialisation. The calculat-
ing machines designed by Charles Babbage have been manufac-
tured, and powered by steam engines, they ‘clack’ their way
through punch cards to conserve and circulate information on the
inhabitants of London. The plot of the novel revolves around a
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few weeks of rioting in the summer of 1855, when social order in
London comes apart, and Lord Byron and his Industrial Radical
Party lose control of the populace. A set of main characters is at-
tempting, on the one hand, to manage the social chaos and, on
the  other,  to  obtain  a  computer  programme  designed  by  Ada
Byron and printed on a set of punch cards. In following the fate
of these cards the novel also narrates the appearance of an emer-
gent consciousness within the feedback processes between the
programme, the computers and the totalitarian society they were
built to monitor. Once Ada’s Modus Programme is fed into the
computer network it creates self-referential loops of information
which finally evolve into a conscious creature.
A central symbol in Gibson and Sterling’s novel is an eye
looking upon itself, instantiated by the computers that monitor
the society which built them. This feedback between the input
and the output of  the system feeds the emergence of new quali-
ties, and the evolving Modus programme uses the flows of infor-
mation to bootstrap itself towards consciousness. ‘If we envision
the entire System of Mathematics as a great Engine for proving
theorems’, Lady Ada proclaims, ‘then we must say, through the
agency of the Modus, that such an engine lives,  and could indeed
prove its own life, should it develop the capacity to look upon it-
self’ (Gibson and Sterling 1990/1996: 336-337). At the very end
of  the  novel  Lady  Ada  has  a  vision  of  a  future  where  not  only
mathematics, but society itself is a system of information process-
ing that sees individuals only as ‘borrowed masks, and lenses for a
peering Eye’, a system which actually does become self-aware: ‘In
this City’s centre, a thing grows, an autocatalytic tree, in almost-life,
feeding through the roots of thought on the rich decay of its own
shed images, and ramifying, through myriad lightning-branches,
up, up, towards the hidden light of vision, [...]. The Eye at last
must see itself’ (Gibson and Sterling 1990/1996: 382-383).
The cybernetic conceptualisation presented in The Difference
Engine of consciousness as computation, and of the brain as a
computer, has helped scientists to formulate ever more exact
models for how the brain functions, but among those who see re-
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ductive theories of the mind as a threat to free will this notion has
also raised as much alarm as, for example, the advances of evolu-
tionary psychology. Complete success in forming a computational
model of consciousness, Porush (1985: 22) writes, would ‘provide
a powerful philosophical weapon against the notion of free will
and a powerful technique for control and manipulation of human
activity’. Thus the traditional humanist conceptualisation of con-
sciousness has tended to see the natural science models of the
mind as threatening.
However, no purely computational nor physical explanation
of consciousness has succeeded in understanding the phenome-
non of individual identity. An example of the kinds of problems
they run into is the gap between the activity of individual neurons
or even between the various areas of the brain on the one hand,
and the unity of conscious experience on the other. If the view of
a summer shore is processed by my visual cortex, the feel of the
wind in the parietal lobes and the sound of the waves in the tem-
poral lobes, how is my conscious awareness of standing on that
beach formed as a unified, singular experience?
[N]eurons span large regions and connect with thousands of
other neurons. They are organized into functional maps so that
different regions of the brain do different things. Yet the result is
a single consciousness. This conflict between integration and seg-
regation is a paradox central to the effort to provide a theoretical
understanding of the brain. (Coveney and Highfield 1995: 286-
287)
This paradox of a unified consciousness in a functional brain
points to a space in which a humanist view may be combined with
the latest neurological research. Even if consciousness is a prop-
erty that arises out of the physical action of the brain, it is not re-
ducible to that physical action since it displays properties (the uni-
fied experience) that cannot be described or explained by only re-
ferring to the action of the constituting neurons.57
57 From the perspective of the sciences this solution has been presented by
the ‘Third Culture’ (see 1.3). Scholars who concentrate on the question of
Emergent Identities
144
The  explanatory  model  that  makes  such  a  view  possible  is
that of emergent complexity. Generally viewed as part of the same
group of mathematical models as chaos theory, complexity theory
aims to explain the behaviour of systems that are more than the
sum of their parts, or as Argyros frames it in the epigraph to the
present chapter, molecular structures that are best described as
‘wet’.58 According to one definition, emergence involves
the study of the behavior of macroscopic collections of such units that are en-
dowed with the potential to evolve in time. Their interactions lead to co-
herent collective phenomena, so-called emergent properties that
can be described only at higher levels than those of the individual
units. (Coveney and Highfield 1995: 7)
This idea that certain properties of a system can only be de-
scribed by accepting them as emergent qualities has also been
made use of in works of fiction that refer to chaos theory. Connie
Willis’s Bellwether not only models the development of its plot on
turbulent flow (see p. 137), but it also presents emergent complex-
ity as being at the heart of many human endeavours. The two
main characters of the novel, a cultural historian trying to trace
the  origins  of  different  fads  in  American  popular  culture  and  a
chaos theorist trying to prove that systems develop chaos all on
their own, set themselves the task of trying to decipher how in-
formation passes in a flock of sheep. The breakthrough in under-
standing comes when all the different elements of the story – in-
cluding not only the behaviour of the sheep but also the spread of
fads and the inane management strategies  of  the R&D section –
are plotted on a computer and form a graph that explains at a
glance the circumstances of both scientific discovery and falling in
love.59 The idea that such diverse phenomena are ruled by the
same dynamics, and that the human mind can only perceive those
consciousness and identity include, for example, Francisco Varela, Daniel
C. Dennett and Steven Pinker (Brockman 1995).
58 Popular accounts of emergent complexity include Casti (1994), Coveney
and Highfield (1995), Kauffman (1995) and Lewin (1993).
59 See Polvinen (2003: 51) and for more details supporting this reading,
Aarnio (2008: 184-192).
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dynamics when it  lets  go of the attempt to understand such sys-
tems through reduction, is at the heart of the theory of emergent
complexity.
In literary studies the idea of emergent complexity and its
implications for our understanding of consciousness have been
received with some enthusiasm. In particular, many scholars have
argued that as a result of the discoveries, the humanities must re-
think their understanding of what human identity actually is. ‘[A]t
the very least’, Stuart Sim (2002: 93) suggests, ‘complexity asks for
a reassessment of our concept of personal identity’ and, conse-
quently, of all texts that portray, discuss or analyse that concept.
However, even if this principle is accepted in literary studies, ex-
actly how the concept of identity should be changed remains un-
clear. The article in which Sim presents his claim is rather vague as
to the actual implications of complexity. It consists of a brief in-
troduction to the main characteristics of emergent complexity and
then presents them side by side with some of the recent develop-
ments in literary and cultural theories concerning identity (with
Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy as a literary example), but does
not specify what the parallels are supposed to show.
In How We Became Posthuman (1999) Hayles also takes on the
issue of complexity and identity, and does it with much more pre-
cision than Sim. Hayles presents the development of the concept
of  self  from  the  liberal  humanist  view  of  identity  to  the  frag-
mented postmodern subject that exists in the flow of information.
While appreciating many of the aspects of the new conceptualisa-
tions she also argues for the need to re-engage human identity
with individual embodiment and consequently also with what the
natural sciences have to say about the embodied brain. In this
chapter I follow Hayles in emphasising the need for re-embodying
the human, but take up works of literature and literary theory that
have appeared since the publication of Chaos Bound, as well as
point  out  humanist  aspects  which,  while  they are theorised from
the point of view of embodiment in How We Became Posthuman, are
not in that later study connected specifically to chaos theory or to
texts that utilise chaos theory as a central theme.
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Some authors and critics have also seen in emergent com-
plexity a way of re-thinking the issue of authorial identity by view-
ing it as simultaneously a singular entity and an interactive process
in much the same way as the literary work was seen in chapter 2.
Hayles (1990: 115-121) discusses Stanislaw Lem’s conception of
his own writing as a ‘dialectic’ between the creative process and
the textual object produced by that creation. Hayles regards Lem’s
movement between the two extremes as a sign of his desire to
hold on to the tension between creative chaos and stable order,
and argues that  Lem thus straddles the divide between the para-
digms of rational authority and postmodern play. A similarly pro-
tean view of writing as object and process can be seen in John
Barth’s works, where the author’s own literary creativity is in con-
stant dialogue with the works he has already produced, making his
entire corpus a reflective whole. One major effect of this view is
that it creates an authorial presence that balances the playfully
postmodern effects of Barth’s semi-autobiographical fictions. The
authorial presence emphasises one of the central themes in
Barth’s fiction (and one that makes his works particularly reveal-
ing about the nature of literary identity): the relationship between
life and story. Barth’s fictions, while playing with postmodern
themes and techniques, have their roots deep in a conceptualisa-
tion of story-telling as an intentional act of an embodied human
being.
As I suggested in section 2.2, one of the central themes of
Stoppard’s Arcadia is the difference between the romantic and the
classical world-views, and I would like to make the point that this
applies to the characters’ temperaments as much as to aesthetics.
The differences between Thomasina and Septimus, and between
Hannah and Bernard, are most fruitfully viewed in terms of such
temperamental differences (see further 4.3). Equally, Septimus’s
choice not to sleep with Thomasina, and her accidental death dur-
ing the very same night, are in the play presented in terms of the
interwoven powers of fate and free will, or determinism and indi-
vidual independence. However, as Stoppard (as quoted in Fleming
2001: 194-195) has noted, such differences are not foregrounded
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in the play in the same way as the meaning of chaos theory to ar-
tistic form and to epistemology are. I therefore refer to Arcadia
only briefly in this chapter, and take up the characters’ identities in
the context of the more prominent themes in sections 2.2 and 4.3.
In this chapter I first give a brief overview of how the theory
of emergent complexity has been adopted into discussions con-
cerning identity in literary studies. In the second part I concen-
trate on the works of John Barth and argue that he is a prime ex-
ample of an author who relies on the humanist view of chaos and
identity. I do so not only in order to present an example of a co-
herent authorial identity but also in order to show that Barth’s fic-
tion does what Hayles calls for in her redefinition of the posthu-
man: provides the representation of emergent human conscious-
ness with a body and with individual embodied experiences.
3.1  The Emergent Self
The exemplary irrational and ‘transcendental’ num-
ber, pi, represents the ratio between a circle’s cir-
cumference and its diameter. Mathematicians have
calculated its value to some millions of digits and
have determined that no repeating pattern exists. So
while the circle seems succinctly definable for us,
the order of pi remains unintelligible. [...] Is pi an
excess produced by the tyrannical rigor of the circle,
condemned to meander forever, the irrational crea-
ture of a primal repression that founds Euclidean
consciousness? [...] Or is the circle just an overrated
bubble in the froth of a chaotic universe?
Ira Livingston, Arrow of Chaos
In his discussion on narrative and identity Bo Pettersson (2008:
23) describes the etymology of ‘identity’ as arising from the sense
of the Latin idem as sameness: ‘“I have an identity” means in effect
something  like  “I  am  the  same  (as  me)”’,  and  is  thus  a  rather
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vacuous notion that has been given various meanings. The tradi-
tional humanist conception of identity takes it to mean that one’s
view of oneself is actually identical to the reality of what the self
is. However, a poststructuralist reading of the notion presents it as
an empty tautology and as a symbol of the doubt as to how far
our view of anything actually matches, or can be proven to match
any originary reality. This has complicated the issue of identity to
the extent that rather than being conceived of as definable, endur-
ing  or  unitary,  identity  in  postmodern  culture  is  often  viewed in
terms similar to those used by Ira Livingston in his analogy of ?
and the circle: the coherent shape of the circle, or identity, is pre-
sented either as ‘tyrannical rigor’ that represses the true multiplic-
ity of subject positions, or as an ‘overrated’ secondary product of
the flux of chaotic consciousness. The humanist approach to
identity, however, has turned to chaos theory in order to find
ways of presenting identity as neither tyranny nor an overrated by-
product, but as an enduring natural entity – a standing wave in the
flow of consciousness. In the following I will indicate the ways in
which such a view can be used to review some of the central
problems of both the poststructuralist and the materialist views of
consciousness.
Fractal Reflections and Ambiguous Codes
As with the concept of literary form, chaos theory offers some
support for the postmodern interpretation of identity. They share
an emphasis on reflectivity and a view of life as information or
code, which in the case of poststructuralist theory tends to be
seen in terms of maximum ambiguity producing maximum value.
In Arrow of Chaos (1997) Livingston forms a view of identity that is
clearly influenced by poststructuralist theory. He combines Fou-
cault’s panopticon, Lacan’s mirror stage and the emergent pat-
terns found in the schooling behaviour of fish to form a view of
identity as ‘a school of mirrors’ (1997: 27). Here identity is formed
by the unceasing mirroring of consciousnesses in a relationship
that is reflective, ruled by flocking behaviour and strange attrac-
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tors, and lacks a central core. Our way of forming our identities,
Livingston (1997: 20) argues, is dependent on abandoning the
humanist conceptualisation, and that ‘[r]econfiguring humanity as
posthumanity means recognizing the priority of betweenness,  of  a
continuous fractal relation with otherness’. By combining the dy-
namics of schooling behaviour and the Lacanian approach to
identity, Livingston presents chaos theory as a tool with which the
reflectedness of identity is fragmented and multiplied and finally
dissolved as an entity. In its place Livingston (1997: 11) sets the
view of posthuman subjectivity as a dynamic process and presents
change rather than identity as the relevant ontological category.
If  the  universe  is  thus  seen  as  ruled  by  a  chaotic  flux  of  in-
formation, our inability to define the initial conditions of any dy-
namical process can be understood to mean that the information
processing that takes place in consciousness must also be funda-
mentally fragmented. In his analysis of Carol Shields’s The Stone
Diaries Gordon E. Slethaug (2000: 167-185) suggests that the
novel presents both narrative and human identity as such entan-
gled dichotomies. Shields’s multiple narrators, Slethaug (2000:
168) argues, ‘undermine the value of simple messages and the
“wholeness” of societal, auto/biographical, and novelistic conven-
tions, asserting that the subjectification of identity and text is
complicated, fragmentary, and implicated’. In terms of Living-
ston’s circle metaphor, Slethaug views Shields’s novel as prioritis-
ing the excess of fragmentary identity over the circle of the hu-
manist subject. That is, he argues that the novel presents a view of
identity and meaning where ‘the notion of a transparent, essential-
ized, centered self or text surrenders to an indeterminate, nonlin-
ear one of opacity, dispersion, gaps, and boundaries’ (Slethaug
2000: 170). Once again, the interesting issue is not how far chaos
theory  actually  justifies  such  a  view  of  either  identity  or  of  the
novel. Rather, it is much more fruitful to ask why Slethaug would
find the use of chaos thematics relevant in his view of identity in
Shields’s novel. In this particular case, Slethaug considers recent
conceptualisations of identity too simplistic, and chaos theory of-
fers him a way of complexifying them.
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Most of the theorists and critics engaging with the issue of
chaos theory and identity present arguments similar to Slethaug,
particularly in emphasising the need for more nuanced ways of
conceptualising the interaction between the self and its context.
They persist in allowing ambiguity to prevail over whether the self
is  an  entity  or  a  process,  whether  it  has  agency  or  not,  and
whether  the  unitary  experience  of  a  self  is  an  illusion  or  a  pro-
found truth about the dynamics of the entire universe. Mostly
they cultivate this ambiguity quite deliberately, as an expression of
a conceptual position too complex to be simply expressed with
the vocabulary available to them. This poststructuralist tendency
to concentrate on extending ambiguity and multiplicity can be
seen in Slethaug’s text. By using the duality of chaos theory to de-
scribe the main character Daisy’s identity in The Stone Diaries as
‘random and patterned, indeterminate and determinate, surprising
and conventional’, Slethaug (2000: 185, emphases original), opens
up a space between the traditional conceptualisations and through
the repetitions extends the time that the new kind of identity can
be conceptualised in the minds of his readers. Slethaug (2000:
167-168, 177) repeatedly uses the same rhetorical technique of
balancing opposites, while his analysis of the novel concentrates
on the fragmentariness of Shields’s narrative.60 Slethaug reconcep-
tualises the self as an ambiguous entity which relies on the decon-
struction of all the previous attempts to define it, and despite his
rhetoric seeming to balance the opposites of shape and fragmen-
tation, Slethaug finally presents the inconsistency as the originary
state which is masked by the patterns presented in the novel. Both
the stones and Daisy’s diaries, he argues, ‘reveal inconsistency, un-
predictability, and indeterminacy amidst suggestions of pattern and
symmetry’ (Slethaug 2000: 178, emphases added). As I suggest in
the following, the humanist position, in contrast, presents the pat-
tern and symmetry as real rather than illusionistic, despite the fact
that they arise from unpredictable processes.
60 On how reflective science writing uses such joint opposites for similar
conceptual purposes see p. 59-60 and further Aarnio (2008).
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In addition to introducing the idea of an emergent con-
sciousness, Gibson and Sterling’s The Difference Engine also pre-
sents a deeply ambiguous view of that emergent self, and this am-
biguity has had interesting effects on the novel’s critical reception.
While emergence is presented in the narrative as the prerequisite
for the creation of a new and more complex autonomous entity,
the totalitarian society out of which the new consciousness arises
does not resonate with humanist values such as individuality,
freedom or creativity. Thus the critical reception of the novel has
been divided depending on whether its presentation of society
and the materialistic world-view is seen as positive, negative or
deftly ambiguous. Herbert Sussman (1994) argues that the novel
brings out the joy and excitement in the mechanical developments
of the Victorian era. Jay Clayton (2000), on the other hand, explic-
itly disagrees with Sussman and emphasises how in The Difference
Engine technology is used to enforce the power of society over the
individual in a manner that should be read as critical. Nicholas
Spencer (1999), for his part, comes to the conclusion that the
novel is deeply ambiguous about this relationship between tech-
nology, society and individuality. The ‘critical negation’ of tech-
nology is, Spencer (1999: 426) argues, presented as ‘always al-
ready’ present, but without the possibility of becoming the ruling
ideology. By setting the human characters’ identities side by side
with the development of the emergent artificial intelligence, Spen-
cer (1999: 422-426) suggests, Gibson and Sterling emphasise the
idea of a ‘technosubject’, which simultaneously undermines the
traditional humanist self and critiques the inhuman iteratedness of
the Modus Eye consciousness. What these diverse opinions reveal
is that the evident ambiguity of the novel allows for different
readings that emphasise either the positive possibilities inherent in
the  idea  of  self  as  an  emergent  identity,  or  the  fears  that  such  a
view would be scientistic and connected to a society that erases
the individuality of its participants. The reason I touch on this de-
bate is that it effectively outlines the contested area of emergent
consciousness between humanist, poststructuralist and materialist
views of the self. Next I continue to draw that outline by concen-
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trating on the major contest between the materialist and the hu-
manist views, that is, the question of determinism and free will.
Determined and/or Self-Determined?
One way of delineating an individual identity is to identify as ‘me’
those aspects of the world which are in one’s control, as opposed
to those which constitute the unruly otherness of ‘not-me’. For
example, in Greg Jenkins’s short story ‘Strange Attractors’ (1999),
the protagonist – author of a popular book entitled Chaos and You
– colludes in his  own murder after  his  trophy wife commits  sui-
cide. The story presents the chaotician as a character whose iden-
tity to the last is tied to the concept of being in control – includ-
ing the guilt he shoulders for his wife’s sudden action and to the
method he chooses for his self-punishment. However, the title of
the story refers to fate, which brings together the death-obsessed
protagonist and a hitchhiker who admires serial killers. Not want-
ing to believe in fate as a force external to his will,  however, the
protagonist sees himself in control of even this chance meeting,
telling himself that he had foreseen it (Jenkins 1999: 113). Jen-
kins’s  story  is  an  example  of  the  use  of  chaos  theory  as  a  meta-
phor for the conflict  between fate and free will,  particularly  of  a
situation where the idea of absolute control and therefore respon-
sibility is preferable to the acceptance of unpredictability in the
environment.61
The opposite reaction would be to fully embrace the unpre-
dictability of the environment, including – if identity is under-
stood as emerging out of the interactions between different physi-
cal and environmental networks – the unpredictability of the fu-
ture behaviour of the self. Understandably one of the most popu-
lar texts used when discussing literary representations of the dif-
fuse subject is Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy. The novel and its
presentation of identity have also been seen in terms of chaos
61 For Jean Baudrillard (1994: 110-114) too chaos theory represents the op-
posite of destiny.
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theory, mostly with the aim of arguing that Sterne prefigures the
fractured, postmodern identity. Sim (1996), for example, suggests
not only that Tristram Shandy presents the relationship between de-
terminacy and indeterminacy in terms that are similar to those
used by chaos theory, but also that they lead to a dissolution of
stable identity and of free will.62
However, the universe’s combination of determinacy and in-
determinacy has also been seen as the source of free will. In Stop-
pard’s Arcadia Thomasina envisions a formula according to which
the present position of every single atom in the universe would
reveal the future. Although the logic of a deterministic universe
would seem to agree with this Laplacian63 ideal, the discovery of
chaos showed that such knowledge is an impossibility. The uni-
verse is completely determined, but it is still impossible to formu-
late predictions about its future behaviour. Both Thomasina in the
play’s nineteenth-century scenes and Chloë in the twentieth-
century ones suggest that the reason for this lies in sex: disorder is
produced by ‘[t]he action of bodies in heat’ (A 83-84) or by ‘peo-
ple fancying people who aren’t supposed to be in that part of the
plan’ (A 74). Although the characters are subject to the common
behavioural patterns of the physical universe (as is shown by them
being in part  slaves to their  sexual  drives),  they at  the same time
manage to be creative, inventive and unique, because the uni-
verse’s combination of determinism and unpredictability allows
free will to operate. As a group, they form a network of individu-
als whose shared patterns link them intuitively with the thoughts
and emotions of other characters, both within their own period
and  across  the  centuries,  but  they  are  also  always  free  to  make
their own interpretations of the past (see 4.3). This account of
free will within a deterministic universe is made possible by chaos
62 Other chaos-influenced interpretations of Tristram Shandy can be found in
Freeman (2002), Lamb (1990), Parker (2000) and Werner (1999).
63 Pierre-Simon Laplace, French 18th-century mathematician, whose famous
formulation of causal determinism Stoppard borrows for Thomasina. For
Laplace, knowledge of the future is limited only by our own computational
capabilities.
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theory which, as the physicist Roger Highfield (as quoted in Bull
2001: 150) notes in his own review of Arcadia, ‘rescues free will
and chance, giving full rein to the uncertainties of love and sexual
attraction that unfold in the play’. Although I would not go as far
as saying that Stoppard gives ‘full rein’ to any uncertainties in his
highly crafted drama, Highfield touches upon an important issue
in suggesting that, in the play, chaos theory is used to support the
marriage of free will and a deterministic universe.
Philosophical arguments concerning free will have mainly
concentrated on the question of whether the universe is determi-
nistic  and  if  so,  whether  freedom  can  or  cannot  exist  in  such  a
universe. Where libertarian metaphysics denies determinism en-
tirely, those who accept it are further differentiated by whether
they find that the deterministic universe is compatible with free
will or not. In terms of the present discussion concerning chaos
and identity, the arguments around free will  may fruitfully be ex-
plored by focusing through these philosophical categories on one
particular conception of agency. According to Bruce N. Waller
(2004), free will is, in addition to whatever transcendent require-
ments are set, dependent on at least two psychological factors: an
‘internal locus of control’ and a sense of ‘self-efficacy’. The first of
these assumes that there is a coherent self that controls the course
of its own life, and the second involves the faith that the self has
the knowledge required to make rational choices concerning its
future. If the universe is posited as completely determined, the in-
dividual’s internal locus of control is diminished, whereas in a
randomly operating universe her sense of self-efficacy would be
reduced because there is no possibility of predicting the results of
her actions. The question of knowledge is properly the subject of
chapter 4, but it is clear that any humanist solution to the problem
of determinism and freedom will attempt to define that internal
locus of control. What chaos theory can do in this context is to
make the internal locus of control, self-determination, thinkable
within a determined universe.
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The Humanist Posthuman
If the poststructuralist view of identity results in the loss of what
humanists would call a self and the materialist, deterministic uni-
verse threatens free will, the theory of emergent complexity com-
bines  the  idea  of  networks  with  materialism  to  suggest  that  this
combination might, after all, support a humanist conceptualisa-
tion of the self. Robert Littell’s novel The Visiting Professor (1993)
portrays a situation where an isolated individual learns to immerse
himself in feedback without losing his own sense of self in the
process. The novel sets its protagonist, a Russian chaos mathema-
tician, in the middle of the hectic events of an American college
town  with  its  sex,  drugs  and  serial  murders.  The  novel’s  themes
focus on codes and subtexts,  on identity,  faith and free will,  and
on chaos as randomness that exhibits occasional order. The pro-
fessor’s research involves two tasks related to the order of ?:
firstly, he is attempting to use its endlessly meandering decimal
sequence to draft a secret code that would be completely un-
breakable. Secondly, in defining ever more decimals to the series
he hopes that the continued absence of order within it would
prove the existence of God. Real disorder, Littell’s professor ar-
gues, is not coherently random, but does, by laws of statistics,
have some order randomly scattered within it. If, however, the
universe could be shown to be truly random it would prove that
God exists, since randomness without random order can only be
consciously created. But the professor discovers that the world is,
indeed, chaotic rather than random, and that the chaos ‘conceals
in its heart of hearts [...] a simple, elegant, perfectly natural ab-
sence of order’, not the coherent randomness that would be a sign
from God (Littell 1993: 182).64
64 Aarnio (2008: 214), on the contrary, claims that for the professor, ‘find-
ing evidence of pure randomness would prove that the universe is in some
sense truly indeterministic, as its inhabitants would then be capable of mak-
ing choices according to their free will’. I would suggest that in Littell’s
novel the crucial point is that the protagonist learns to take responsibility
for his choices without having proof of indeterminism, that is, having faith
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Littell also presents the personal life of his professor as a
struggle for control which the protagonist predictably loses in the
course of the novel. In the end he takes the leap by accepting
both the uncertainty of religious faith and the unpredictability of
life and love by marrying a woman named by her hippie parents
Occasional Rain. ‘I can say you [sic] I have become a consenting
homo chaoticus’, the professor admits (Littell 1993: 253). Further,
through physical love and slowly developing emotional contact
Littell roots his professor not only to the people around him, but
also to a physical universe where randomness is not real disorder
but chaos, out of which emerge both the possibility (though not
the proof) of God and the consciousness of living human beings.
However positive Littell’s professor’s experience of being a
‘homo chaoticus’, the ways in which an individual human conscious-
ness arises from and is dependent on the physical universe can
lead to a situation where the individual becomes nothing but a
node of connections – a view common to poststructuralist con-
ceptualisations of the self. In emphasising the contextualisation of
human existence the chaos approaches to identity may thus open
themselves to the incursion of life conceptualised as information,
which carries some problems of its own. Unlike Slethaug and Lit-
tell, who view the combination of chaos and information theory
as a solution to either the simplicity of the traditional concept of
identity or to the isolation of self from others, Hayles (1999) pre-
sents information theory itself as part of the problem rather than
a solution.
In How We Became Posthuman, the book that followed the in-
fluential Chaos Bound, Hayles presents the technological develop-
ments and the new conceptualisations of information and cyber-
netics, as well as examining the ways in which they have affected
Western concepts of human identity. In particular, Hayles criti-
cises the way the embodied human being has been sidelined in
cybernetics, and how, consequently, individual human identity is
uncoupled from individual experience. The development of the
in his undying soul even when the universe appears to be built on determi-
nistic chaos.
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informational conceptualisation of the self, as Hayles presents it,
involves both deconstructing the liberal humanist subject and
manifesting that deconstruction in cybernetics, which explicitly
defines the self through information and computation. For exam-
ple in the works of William Gibson and Don DeLillo, Hayles
(1999: 113) argues, human beings are ‘constructed as information-
processing systems whose boundaries are determined by the flow
of information’, and not by the limits of their physical bodies.
Hayles criticises these developments because, while she argues
with the view that the liberal humanist subject should be decon-
structed, she does not wish to tie human subjectivity too closely
to the theories of information processing.
In  particular,  Hayles  (1999:  12)  traces  the  problem  to  two
conceptual strategies which she calls ‘the Platonic backhand and
forehand’, both of which present information as the ideal realm of
which our embodied existence is just a shadow. The first of these
strategies is reduction and general abstraction, traditionally a cen-
tral tool of Western science. The second involves the concept of
emergence and the development of complexity from simple algo-
rithms. The fact that Hayles considers both reduction and emer-
gence as dependent upon Platonic ideals means that she does not
regard the dichotomy between the liberal humanist subject and
the posthuman subject as matching the dichotomy between the
circle and the ? (that is, definable versus fragmentary), but in
terms of disembodied versus embodied:
Indeed, one could argue that the erasure of embodiment is a fea-
ture common to both the liberal humanist subject and the cyber-
netic posthuman. Identified with the rational mind, the liberal
subject possessed a body but was not usually represented as being a
body. Only because the body is not identified with the self is it
possible to claim for the liberal subject its notorious universality,
a claim that depends on erasing markers of bodily difference, in-
cluding sex, race, and ethnicity. [...] To the extent that [the cyber-
netic presentation of] the posthuman constructs embodiment as
the instantiation of thought/information, it continues the liberal
tradition rather than disrupts it. (Hayles 1999: 4-5)
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Thus the emergent self, Hayles argues, tends to be presented in
cybernetics as a universal human self superimposed unchanged
onto various material forms of existence. The final and necessary
step, she argues, is taken only when human identity is conceptual-
ised as dependent on its body, a step that none of the cybernetic vi-
sions has truly taken. Thus what Ira Livingston (1997: 20) calls the
posthuman in the context of his Lacanian views, and what Hayles
means by the term are two very different things. As the concept
of the posthuman is not yet ossified, Hayles hopes to influence its
development by deconstructing the liberal humanist self but,
rather than conceiving of human existence as a stream of infor-
mation that can exist in any format, she insists on the importance
of embodiment in human experience.
A similarly negative portrayal of the influence of information
theory on identity is presented by Patricia Waugh (2005), who not
only identifies the ‘scriptoral metaphor’ which rules both post-
modern textuality and contemporary neo-Darwinism (see pp. 65-
66), but who also points out how that grand narrative relies on the
idea of the flow of information as disembodied and lacking indi-
vidual experiences. In both postmodern cultural theory and cur-
rent genetics, Waugh (2005: 262) argues, the body is
written or inscribed by texts and codes, traces, endlessly replicat-
ing, deferred, reiterated and re-inscribed. The text becomes the
real. Science and postmodernism seem to share a flight from ex-
perience, from the lived body, into an intertextual dematerializa-
tion of the real.
Waugh (2005: 227) also convincingly shows how the evolutionary
epic blurs the boundary between the physical and the intentional,
allowing the natural sciences to formulate a ‘theoretically and lin-
guistically heteronomous naturalism’ and to take over the spaces
previously left for ‘the humanistic practices of speculative dis-
course and art’.
However, it is possible, despite these criticisms, to see emer-
gent complexity as a possible solution to the problem of retaining
a space for a humanist identity as well as intentional, embodied
experiences (and for literature, which cannot be separated from
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either). Complexity theory insists that different levels of reality re-
quire different ways of description. Thus the realm of thought and
art can be understood as embodied and real without subjecting it
to the reductively materialist world-view or the scriptoral meta-
phor. What I would suggest, therefore, is that by combining
Hayles’s and Waugh’s arguments it is possible to envision a view
of a non-reductivist, materially based but emergent human self – a
humanist view of the posthuman. Although Hayles sees the con-
cept of emergence as mainly connected to the view of identity as
information, there are authors who discuss the combination of
emergent identity and embodied experience in much the same
way that she calls for in How We Became Posthuman. The theories of
emergence have been used to rescue some aspects of the self by
showing that, as is the case with literary form, it can be a relatively
unitary phenomenon despite being entirely dependent on the in-
teraction of multiple processes. Furthermore, by emphasising the
need for different levels of description for different levels of real-
ity the humanist presentation of emergent identity includes a more
balanced view of the natural sciences than the approaches criti-
cised by Waugh. The self and its experiences are phenomena that
are best approached through the methods of the humanities, even
though a scientific theory of emergent complexity is used to con-
nect them to the physical phenomena from which they arise.65
Argyros (1991: 291-292), for instance, envisions the ‘chaotic
self’ as ‘[s]imultaneously Cartesian and Heraclitean’, and while his
view is ‘consonant with the intuition of much contemporary the-
ory, that the self is not a fortress carried through time, but a dy-
namic, changing, multiple, and, at times, contradictory network’,
Argyros refuses to abandon ‘the equally compelling idea that the
self does indeed have coherence and integrity’. Building on Doug-
las Hofstadter’s (1979/1994) conception of a chaotic system that
‘locks in’ on its most stable state, Argyros (1991: 289-290) sug-
gests that the self is a stable, emergent property of the dynamics
of the brain. As such, the self not only emerges from the brain,
65 Paulson (1991: 49-51) makes a similar point in the context of cognition
and different disciplines.
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but is also itself a ‘dynamical system open to the world and espe-
cially to other selves’ (Argyros 1991: 291), that is, it is a stable,
though evolving phenomenon in communication with its envi-
ronment.66
Peter Francis Mackey’s reading of James Joyce’s Ulysses in
Chaos Theory and James Joyce’s Everyman (1999) uses a similar con-
ceptualisation to discuss the identity of a literary character.
Mackey (1999: 128) argues that Bloom’s thoughts ‘repeatedly em-
erge as if they were forms or attractors within the protean flow of
his consciousness. [...] They abide the traits that define his iden-
tity, as an eddy abides its shape’. Emphasising the way chaos the-
ory has been used to describe enduring shapes in turbulent water,
Mackey (1999: 118-119) suggests that in Ulysses Joyce uses water
symbolism to point to the same phenomena and link them to
Bloom’s consciousness:
Like the complex systems chaos theory studies, Bloom’s stream
of consciousness changes and moves, yet it also exhibits an un-
derlying form in the consistent qualities of Bloom’s personality.
He does not merely think about his life and world, he thinks
about them in certain ways, revealing the traits that give his iden-
tity coherence. [...] His thoughts, in fact, move like a complex sys-
tem, spinning, turning, folding, almost but never quite repeating a
restricted, creative path of personality, akin to how elements in a
complex system follow parameters of behavior governed by other
pattern-making attractors.67
Thus Mackey uses the idea of attractors and stability within turbu-
lence to explain how readers can draw connections and bridge
gaps in Joyce’s presentation of Bloom’s fluctuating thoughts.
Thanks to readers learning to recognise the shape of Bloom’s
consciousness, he remains the touchstone even through the
novel’s later, more radically disjointed styles. Such recognisability
66 For a related view of the emergent self in philosophy and cultural studies
see Wheeler (2006). Wheeler’s biosemiotics does not, however, refer to the
criticism presented by Hayles (1999) and Waugh (2005).
67 McCarthy (2006: 61-68), like Mackey, conceptualises identity in terms of
a standing wave, although he talks of quantum wave functions and not
streams of consciousness.
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makes Bloom the identifiable Everyman in Joyce’s mythical uni-
verse: ‘This stream of consciousness testifies to the drama that
persists even in the commonplace thought, even in the common-
place  life.  It  is  the  drama  that  is  the  evolution  of  our  selves’
(Mackey 1999: 144). The stability and the endurance of a recog-
nisable  identity  make  the  ‘drama’  of  Joyce’s  stylistic  play  and
stream-of-consciousness writing possible, Mackey argues, and
without it human existence would not be possible.
The central issue in any attempt to rescue aspects of the hu-
manist subject is to resolve the conflict between the interactive
view emphasised by postmodern cybernetics and a humanist one
that emphasises intention and embodiment. ‘If “human essence is
freedom from the wills of others”’, Hayles (1999: 4), declares, ‘the
posthuman is “post” not because it is necessarily unfree but be-
cause  there  is  no  a  priori  way  to  identify  a  self-will  that  can  be
clearly distinguished from an other-will’. Emergent complexity,
however, is one way of conceptualising a difference between the
self-will and those others, because it emphasises the individuality
of every end product of a single, dynamic process. In this way the
humanist conceptualisation of identity strongly resembles the
modified organic metaphor, discussed in the previous chapter,
which presents a literary work as simultaneously an object and a
process. Similarly, Mackey (1999: 125) argues that the fact that
Bloom can be defined as a self distinct from, yet connected to so-
ciety makes it possible for him to act and to make his identity
have an effect on reality: ‘Asserting himself, he can insert himself
too and act upon his overlapping relation to the world’. Thus
Mackey presents Joyce’s novel as a representation of the chaotic
feedback between self and world which allows individuals to be
connected to the world beyond themselves.
What is most intriguing about the views presented by Argy-
ros,  Mackey  and  others  is  the  thought  that  in  their  search  for  a
non-reductive view of what it is to be human they are turning to
the natural sciences. This appeal to science for a ground on which
to  build  a  view  of  human  identity  is  part  of  a  long  tradition  in-
volving scientific concepts from the heliocentric universe to the
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theory of evolution, but I would also suggest that in the context
of  contemporary  literary  studies  it  also  stems  from  the  authors’
dissatisfaction with the reductive aspects of poststructuralist the-
ory (see further pp. 195-197).
Furthermore, emergence makes it possible to argue that liter-
ary tools are naturally suited to deal with (although they do not
fully explain) the complexity of human experience and its emer-
gent meanings, and therefore science no longer appears to be as
overwhelming a paradigm as it previously did.68 While it is vital to
keep in mind Waugh’s warning that the natural sciences should
not be adopted as an explanatory model in arts, the humanist view
of  the  posthuman  identity  tries  to  extend  our  understanding  by
utilising those discoveries of the natural sciences which resonate
with its own vision. These authors have identified in chaos theory
metaphorical meanings that connect not with the dissolution of
the self, but with coherent, though dynamic, identity, and with
free will. In other words, agency emerges from the interaction of
an embodied individual and his or her environment.
The ways in which chaos theory has been used to deal with
the concept of identity have perhaps raised more questions than
they have answered. Does the mind create the chaotic dynamics
we observe because that is the only way our minds can process
things? Or do our minds work according to the laws of chaos
theory because that  is  the way all  of  the universe (our minds in-
cluded) functions? If the self is, indeed, a chaotic system, is this a
sign of a true correspondence between the self and physical reality
or just a reflection of a need to imagine the self as a reflection of
dynamics that exist outside it? Rather than attempt to answer such
philosophical puzzles directly I will confine myself in the follow-
ing to the ways in which similar questions arise in a purely literary
context, in particular with the issue of authorial identity.
68 Appreciation of the special skills of the humanities is evident in, for in-
stance, the recent development of the field of medical humanities, and the
increasing number of courses offered to medical students in the techniques
of story-telling and interpretation. See e.g. Coles (1989) and Charon and
Montello (2002).
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3.2 Authorial Identity: John Barth’s Iterated Opera
If  an idea  is  worth having once,  it  is  worth having
twice.
Tom Stoppard, Indian Ink
[N]o account of who one is can afford to ignore the
issue of one’s self-interpretation, since the former is
(at least partially) constituted by the latter.
Dan Zahavi, ‘Self and Other:
The Limits of Narrative Understanding’
[N]ot only is all fiction fiction about fiction, but all
fiction about fiction is in fact fiction about life.
Some of us understood that all along.
John Barth, ‘Tales Within Tales Within Tales’
In her discussion of The Education of Henry Adams in Chaos Bound
Hayles (1990: 61-90) approaches chaos and identity through the
relationship between author and narrator/character in autobio-
graphical fiction. The gap between Henry Adams the author and
the narrator of The Education of Henry Adams establishes both that
the author cannot be extrapolated from the narrator, and that
there is an autonomous authorial self which ‘lingers beyond the
reach of textuality’ (Hayles 1990: 64). This extra-textual self is
structurally equated with chaos in the dynamics of Adams’s text,
Hayles argues. Order is a realm which becomes present through
the act of imagining, whereas chaos rules the physical reality and
therefore ‘fades into absence’ in the text. Similarly, the character
of Henry Adams ‘materializes into a textual presence because he
has been imagined’, whereas the author ‘fades into absence be-
cause he exists in external reality’ (Hayles 1990: 77). Hayles’s dis-
cussion functions as a useful starting point to the analysis of John
Barth’s authorial identity because I will argue that chaos theory
can be used not only to conceptualise an author beyond textuality,
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but also to construct an authorial identity that is a tangible pres-
ence which nevertheless leaves room for the text itself.
John Barth’s narrative re-enactment, both of elements ap-
pearing in the work of other authors, and those appearing in his
own, is one example of such a construction. Much has already
been written (not least by the author himself) about Barth’s use of
literary predecessors and ancient literary tropes as springboards in
his own fiction, but less has been said about his controversial
habit, especially since the 1980s, of raiding his own previous
works for usable parts. Is a good idea worth having more than
once, and iteration a valid aesthetic? I suggest that the concept of
iteration provides Barth with a way to deal with his own authorial
identity that allows for both growth and continuity. In many of
his most recent books Barth explicitly examines the themes of
repetition, recycling and authorship. They appear particularly
clearly in the ‘memoir bottled in a novel’ called Once Upon a Time:
A Floating Opera (1994), on which I will focus in this section. As
Barth acknowledges his advancing age and prepares to hand in yet
another manuscript, he is occupied by certain recurring questions:
How to stop his body of works growing infirm along with his
own, aging, physical body? How to go on, when all he seems to
do  is  either  repeat  himself  or  quote  someone  else?  How  to
achieve closure and yet stave off endings? As the speaker of
Barth’s ‘The End: An Introduction’ notes:
For a writer, after all, the alternative ‘last-chapter’ scenarios are
almost equally distressing [...]: Either the end comes before one
has  had  one’s  entire  say  (we  recall  John  Keats’s  fears  that  he
might cease to be before his pen had gleaned his teeming brain) –
What an unspeakable pity, so to speak! – or else one goes on be-
ing and being after one’s pen has gleaned et cetera: not so much a
pity as simply pathetic. (OS 16)
I  will  argue  that  as  Barth’s  fictions  become  more  and  more  fo-
cused on the theme of authorship as a career, they also reveal a
mature author torn between the ‘anxiety of continuance’, the fear
of running out of things to say before the end of his life (Tobin
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1992), and what I call the ‘anxiety of completion’, the fear of run-
ning out of life before his artistic vision has reached its closure.
As a solution to these anxieties Barth has in the last few dec-
ades become increasingly occupied with constructing an authorial
identity through self-referential intertextuality. This identity is fo-
cused through a character who is the author’s personified narra-
tive imagination, and who provides him with both continued in-
spiration and a frame which explicitly draws his works into a co-
herent whole.69 As Dan Zahavi notes in the second epigraph
above, self-interpretation is crucial to any identity, and I believe it
is explicitly present in the way Barth’s constant re-interpretation
of his own works shape his authorship, just as observing ‘its own
shed images’ shapes the emergent consciousness in Gibson and
Sterling’s The Difference Engine. Furthermore, Barth is a writer
whose frame-tales have often ended up subsuming individual nar-
ratives, making novels out of his planned collections of short sto-
ries (Barth 1995: 103), and I believe that his self-interpretations
reveal a meta-frame in the making.
The final epigraph to this section comes from Barth himself
and acts as an introduction to the ways in which Barth’s authorial
identity connects to the concept of personal identity in general.
When one of the best-known authors of postmodern metafiction
in America states that ‘fiction about fiction is in fact fiction about
life’, anyone interested in the intersection of narrative and identity
should sit up and take note. Fictions produced by the human im-
agination, Barth is saying, are finally about how human beings ex-
perience their lives, and a central element of that experience is the
way we tell stories about ourselves. An additional level to Barth’s
comment comes from the way he incorporates theories of emer-
gent consciousness in his fictions in order to present writing as a
self-replicating or reproductive urge, as a way of living more lives
than biologically possible. For Barth story-telling, like life, in-
69 In terms created by Wayne C. Booth (1979: 268-275) this identity might
be called a ‘career author’, but one constructed by the author rather than
the critic.
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volves complex pleasures that draw their power from our experi-
ences as embodied human beings.
Intertextuality: Recycling Literary Predecessors
As I argued in section 2.3, Barth’s conception of the ‘literature of
exhaustion’ has more to do with being able to create novelty out
of worn-out conventions than with merely announcing that those
conventions are, indeed, worn out. The difference between
Barth’s view and the theory of the anxiety of influence (which it
was seen by some critics to represent) is that Barth as an author is
not at the mercy of the textual past and his predecessors, but is,
instead, an individual who is able to engage in dialogue with them.
Patricia Tobin, for example, (1992: 7-9) suggests that Barth’s way
of  dealing  with  the  anxiety  of  influence  is  to  interact  with  the
great-grandfathers such as Homer, Cervantes or the anonymous
author(s) of The Thousand Nights and a Night rather than his imme-
diate  and  thus  more  imposing  predecessors.  This  is  true  in  the
sense that the explicit intertextual references in Barth’s fictions are
made to such faraway ancestors. However, as he states in many
essays, his writing (particularly in its formal elements) is created in
dialogue with, for example, the works of Borges, Italo Calvino
and Gabriel Garcia Márquez. Thus, even though Barth may avoid
naming his immediate predecessors as conversational partners in
his fictions, he is perfectly willing to acknowledge their influence.
‘My ideal postmodernist author’, Barth (1980/1984: 203) writes,
‘neither merely repudiates nor merely imitates either his twentieth-
century parents or his nineteenth-century premodernist grandpar-
ents. He has the first half of our century under his belt, but not on
his back.’
Central to the ability not to be overwhelmed by the literary
past is Barth’s way of maintaining a balance between the aesthet-
ics of novelty and of repetition. In ‘Innovation and Repetition:
Between Modern and Post-Modern Aesthetics’, Umberto Eco
(1985) differentiates between various attitudes towards repetition
in classical, romantic, modern and postmodern aesthetics. If the
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classical era respected the creation of a perfect example of a type
and the romantics envisioned art as the creation of something out
of nothing, a major characteristic of a modern aesthetics is the
creation of novelty out of known elements. Such an aesthetic, Eco
(1985: 173-174) argues, depends on two characteristics: on the
one hand the work presents ‘a dialectic between order and nov-
elty’, and on the other the audience must be able to perceive that
dialectic. But where the modern conception seeks such a balance
between scheme and variation, the postmodern view focuses on
the fact of variability itself.
Variability to infinity has all the characteristics of repetition, and
very little of innovation. But it is the ‘infinity’ of the process that
gives  a  new sense  to  the  device  of  variation.  What  must  be  en-
joyed – suggests the post-modern aesthetics – is the fact that a se-
ries of possible variations is potentially infinite. (Eco 1985: 179)
The fractal narrative techniques discussed in section 2.3 re-
veal how important Eco’s postmodern principle of infinite varia-
tion  is  to  Barth’s  conception  of  literary  form.  At  the  same time,
Barth goes even further than Eco’s definition of postmodernism
in the sense of acknowledging, but not stopping at the fact of in-
finite variation. Writing about Borges’s short story ‘Pierre Menard,
Author of Don Quixote’ in ‘The Literature of Exhaustion’, Barth
(1967/1984: 69-70) is perfectly ready to recognise Borges’s origi-
nality, but rather than identifying genius as the ability to create
something enjoyable in spite of the fact that so much has already
been said, he portrays it as the ability to recognise an unsolvable
dead-end and create innovation out of that recognition. ‘Borges
doesn’t attribute the Quixote to himself’, Barth (1967/1984: 69)
points out, ‘much less recompose it like Pierre Menard; instead,
he writes a remarkable and original work of literature, the implicit
theme of which is the difficulty, perhaps the unnecessity, of writ-
ing original works of literature’. Barth is thus suggesting that Bor-
ges’s narrative, while it tells a story about the difficulty of original-
ity, manages to be strikingly original, and that although Pierre
Menard’s quintessentially postmodern gesture merely points at the
infinite variety of contexts, the method of recontextualising old
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stories and techniques can be of value when it is reflected back on
itself by Borges; an old story is recycled in an original story about
the recycling of stories.
Thus the solution Barth (1980/1984: 205) offers to the prob-
lem of literary ‘used-upness’ is one of impassioned recycling, or
repetition with imagination and intent. John Barth may be a
Johnnie-come-lately, writing in the shadow of thousands of years
of human literary creativity, but rather than seeing literary history
as an oppressive force, he uses it as a source of inspiration.
Barth’s favourite visual symbol for this process is the Fibonacci
spiral formed by the chambered nautilus, a structure which allows
both repetition and growth:
The spiral reenacts the circle, but opens out [...]. The nautilus’ lat-
est chamber echoes its predecessors, but does not merely repeat
them, and it is where the animal lives; he carries his history on his
back, but as a matter of natural-historical fact, that history is his
Personal Flotation Device, not a dead weight carrying him under.
(Barth 1984: 170)
In his essays Barth tends to present his own ideal of a postmod-
ern artist as the natural and fairly uncomplicated solution to the
problem of exhaustion. It is clear from his fictions, however, that
practicing what he preaches is not quite as straightforward.
Though the notion of an inexhaustible, re-inventing, passionate
postmodernist is argued clearly in his non-fiction, his fiction
seems less certain of how to reach that ideal.
One representation of the danger of uninspired imitation ap-
pears as early as Chimera (1972/1991). Of the three novellas in this
collection, all of which present different methods of using the
past for continued inspiration, ‘Bellerophoniad’ depicts the risk
involved in using imitation as a method of gaining a place in the
pantheon (or canon). It tells the story of Bellerophon, who imi-
tates the careers of mythic heroes in order to become one himself,
but only manages to become an imitation of a mythic hero. A
more optimistic view, this time of an author bootstrapping him-
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self to originality,70 appears in Tidewater Tales, where the exhausted
postmodern novel is replenished by the long tradition of oral
story-telling. The blocked author Peter Sagamore (the name re-
flects the storyline: though his voice seems to be petering out, he
ends up being the teller of a cornucopia of stories) is looking for a
release from his self-conscious and reductive style of writing,
where, ‘as more and more goes without saying, less and less gets
said’ (Barth 1987/1997: 405). His solution to the blockage is an
example of recycling the works of others: when sailing with his
pregnant wife Peter listens and makes notes on dozens of stories
told by the people they meet; stories which finally, along with the
frame story of their cruise, culminate in his unblocking and in the
birth of their twins.
As Fogel and Slethaug (1990: 202) have argued, The Tidewater
Tales is an explicit exploration of the idea that ‘stories are not di-
vinely intuited by one author, but are the carefully constructed
product of current and historical linguistic, literary, and cultural
experiences. Writing and narrating become collective concerns
that involve scores of people, both contemporary and ancient’. At
the same time, the novel is a celebration of the individual talent
story-tellers have in fashioning their narratives into original
wholes, despite the fact that they are working with elements that
have passed through many hands before them. Relating Barth’s
thinking to that of Roland Barthes, for example, shows that where
Barthes (1968/1988: 170) replaces the author with ‘the scriptor’,
who ‘no longer bears within him passions, humours, feelings, im-
pressions, but rather this immense dictionary from which he
draws a writing that can know no halt’, Barth’s (1990/1995: 88)
fictions are creations of a thinking and feeling intellect, and fu-
elled by a ‘profound though post-innocent passion’ for the power
of story-telling.
70 The author as a mythical hero is a common motif in Barth’s fiction both
before and after he familiarised himself with Joseph Campbell’s description
of the life cycle of the wandering hero (see OUT 114-121, 313-317).
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Autotextuality: Barth Recycling Barth
Chimera, while it tells a cautionary tale of Bellerophon, also in-
cludes the story ‘Perseid’, which suggests that the most fruitful so-
lution to blocked creativity might not be imitation of others, but
of yourself. It recounts the fate of Perseus, who, having lost his
way in middle age, successfully reorients himself by retracing and
re-telling the story of his own heroism. As I argued in section 2.3,
Barth presents re-enactment as a narrative device through which
the story loops back onto itself and thus manages to contain an
infinite number of stories within the finite space of a single book.
It should, however, also be noted that Barth’s entire body of work
is  built  on  an  evolving  autotextual  structure  of  repeated  and  re-
flective elements.71 Barth (1998: 664) has admitted to his (initially
unconscious) habit of writing books in pairs, but as his corpus has
grown it has also revealed more complex and wide-spread pat-
terns of repetition. For example, from the 1982 novel Sabbatical
onwards, nearly all of Barth’s books have featured the central mo-
tif of sailing, mostly around Chesapeake Bay on the east coast of
the United States. Showboats make frequent appearances, as do
first-person-plural narrators (usually man and wife), Scheherazade
and (especially in the 1980s) the CIA. Equally pervasive is the use
of the phrases ‘once upon a time’, ‘it goes without saying’ and ‘on
with the story’. Tobin (1992: 9-10) makes the point that, viewed
through the ‘Bloomian schema of oedipal conflict’, Barth is con-
fronted with an ‘anxiety of continuance’ where the anxiety defined
by Bloom as an external influence on authors is an internal anxi-
ety for Barth. His struggles with his own previous writerly selves
are realised in his works as the reiteration and continuing devel-
opment of tropes, themes and narrative structures from previous
publications. Barth solves these struggles, Tobin (1992: 10) sug-
71 ‘Autotextuality’ in the sense of intertextual relationships between differ-
ent works by a single author is usually attributed to Lucien Dällenbach (see
e.g. Andrews 1999). Chollier (2001: 4), on the other hand, takes it to refer
to ‘vocal exchange within a given novel’.
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gests, by reinventing himself in each new work, by setting himself
‘as new ephebe to his own precursor, in order that the career
might go on’. Thus the iterations function as generators of new
material, enabling Barth to take elements from an already pub-
lished book and to extend their meanings by rewriting them in a
different context. Self-repetition, as well as the repetition of illus-
trious predecessors, thus becomes a solution to postmodern ex-
haustion. Whereas Barth’s use of repetition in narrative structure
is governed mostly by the idea of fractal infinity and feedback
loops, the reiteration of narrative elements from work to work has
more to do with the concept of emergent complexity. The repeti-
tions create links between the works and make the oeuvre into an
organic whole in which the interaction of the repeated elements
generate meanings that go beyond those contained within the in-
dividual works.
Therefore the reiterations not only enable Barth to extend the
life of his body of works, but they also unify that corpus into
something like a single entity. By creating a network of resem-
blances and repetitions between his fictions, Barth emphasises the
single creative effort behind them: the narrative imagination that
has spawned each work. This coherent narrative imagination has
also appeared as a reflective autobiographical character in Barth’s
books.72 Already in the epistolary novel Letters (1979/1980), the
correspondence is conducted between ‘Mr John Barth, Esq., Au-
thor’ and various fictional characters who have appeared in his
previous novels and stories. In his later works Barth has made fic-
tionalised autobiography an increasingly central element, turning
the whole concept of authorship into a literary theme which fo-
cuses on the relationship between life and story. In this section I
focus on Barth’s fictional memoir Once Upon a Time: A Floating Op-
era (1994), which not only explicitly thematises his authorial iden-
72 For a discussion of authors appearing as fictional characters see Franssen
and Hoenselaars (1999). Many of the elements they identify in the genre of
‘author as character’ also apply to Barth’s fictional selves, e.g. questions of
intertextuality, creativity and reference. Their collection does not, however,
discuss the question of authorial identity at any length.
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tity, but also presents that identity in terms Barth found in chaos
theory.73 If Barth’s idea of the ‘coaxial esemplasy’ is, first of all, the
principle through which a work of art forms a reflective whole
(see 2.3), in this book Barth uses the same concept to describe the
creative process in addition to the structure of the product.
The building of the authorial persona out of the complex
combination of experience and narration is presented in this
memoir through one of Barth’s repeated images: that of ‘finding
oneself at sea’.74 In Once  Upon a  Time the narrator, a middle-aged
author of postmodern American novels, sets out on a late-autumn
sailing cruise with his wife in the hope of rekindling his inspira-
tion. They are caught in a storm and thrown off course, finding
themselves in a labyrinth of marshy tidewater coastland. The nar-
rator sets off in a dinghy to seek a safe route out, and the opera
relates the process of him finding his way back aboard his craft –
both in the sense of his sailboat and his writing skill. The frame of
the memoir is explicitly fictional, but during his wandering in the
marshes the narrator reviews his life, which, while not quite the
autobiography of John Barth, is ‘a kind of ship’s log of the Inside
Passage, framed by this fictitious literal voyage’ (OUT 384).
While the resemblances between his life and his stories are
fairly self-evident in all of his works, in Once  Upon  a  Time Barth
explicitly sets out to write a memoir which mixes fiction and non-
fiction. In the ‘Programme Note’ which opens Once  Upon  a  Time
Barth (OUT n.p.) writes:
Once Upon a Time – a memoir bottled in a novel and here floated
off to whom it may concern – is not the story of my life, but it is
most certainly a story thereof. Its theme is Vocation. The better
to sing it,  I  have passed over or scarcely sounded other themes,
73 For a discussion of autobiography as a theme in Barth’s earlier works, see
Martin (2003).
74 Barth has made most mileage out of the paradox in this phrase in The
Last Voyage of Somebody the Sailor (1991/1992), where the protagonist, lost in
the world of Sinbad the Sailor, finds his way by redefining his identity
through narration. The novel’s themes are very similar to Once Upon a Time,
but it appeared before Barth became consciously aware of chaos theory as a
possible metaphor for the reflective loop of self-definition.
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and have reorchestrated freely to my purpose. Of my children,
for  example,  as  of  real  friends  and  colleagues  past  and  current,
there is scarcely a mention. My twin sister makes a fictionalized
cameo appearance. My ship- and lifemate, this opera’s dedicatee,
takes a larger role, likewise fictionalized, in its opening and clos-
ing scenes. My thanks to both for their permission to be thus im-
agined. I have been careful of all hands’ privacy except my own,
and even that has scarcely been trespassed on. Every life has a
Scheherazadesworth of stories.
Such conscious declarations do not alter the fact that Barth’s fic-
tions in general and this memoir in particular present their readers
with a narrator and/or focalising character who obviously shares
many of the author’s life experiences, and therefore cannot be de-
fined as purely fictional, at least not in the conventional sense.75
Borrowing terms from Gérard Genette (1997), we could perhaps
say that Barth is treating his own life as a hypotext, and his writ-
ings relate his life through the various kinds of transpositions
Genette describes as taking place in intertextual relations. But
whereas in literary hypertextuality the reader can make direct
comparisons with the text and the hypotext, Barth’s works simul-
taneously tempt and forbid readers to extrapolate the author’s life
from the fictionalised versions of it. His novels make it clear that
fiction and narration are not necessarily the same thing, even
though both are forms of story-telling, and in some sense this re-
sembles Roland Barthes’s (1979: 77) description of a text’s rela-
tionship with its intertexts: the reading of a text cannot be a proc-
ess of ‘filiation’ or connection to ‘sources’ and ‘influences’. How-
ever, if Barthes, perhaps provocatively, goes as far as seeing the
author’s life as being ‘no longer the origin of his fables’, Barth re-
tains the connection between life and story, even though a multi-
tude of stories can be told about a single life. A story of his life is
not his life, but it is still ‘a story thereof’.
In order to keep the reader at an arm’s length and discourage
simplistic biographical readings, Barth has created for his memoir
75 For a discussion of similar elements in the autobiographical fiction of
Richard Brautigan and of the relationship of postmodern American fiction
to referentiality see Pettersson (2004).
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a temporal structure that is deliberately confusing and forces the
reader to be constantly aware of the fictionality of its frame tale,
however factual the details of the life story narrated within it. The
narrator of the frame tale is telling his story in 1990 about events
which supposedly happened in 1992, and his tale is peppered with
footnotes by ‘the Author’, who is writing the book in 1991-1992.
Such a temporal structure resembles the narrative loops Barth
constructs in On With the Story, published just two years after Once
Upon  a  Time.  In  the  latter,  the  story  of  the  narrator’s  life  is  told
within the frame of the sailing trip,  but  eventually  it  reaches and
passes the time when the frame tale itself was told. The narrator
explains that his decision to ‘set the action of this narrative not in
“real” time but in an imagined near future that the present will
presently overtake’ was motivated by the desire to set this story
apart  from  reality,  as  ‘a  voyage  out  of  the  time  of  its  imagining
and writing into the time imagined and written’ (OUT 127).
Further fantastic elements in the frame tale include a Virgil-
character the narrator meets in the marshes. Variously called Jerry
Schreiber or Jay Scribner (Barth’s tongue-in-cheek reference to
John the Scribe), this guide is the authorial persona’s fictional
friend and alter ego. Jay/Jerry gives the narrator a Parker fountain
pen which functions as a time machine, first taking the narrator’s
imagination back to his childhood and then producing a story of
his life: ‘Time’s arrow on the butted cap points pointward, to
where the ongoing present’s nib resistlessly pasts the future, eluci-
dating  all  three’  (OUT 364).  Barth’s  memoir  could  thus  also  be
seen as a self-conscious play on autobiographical reference, such
as Paul John Eakin’s (1989: xiii) notion that ‘the true reference of
story in autobiography is not to some comparatively remote period
in the subject’s past but rather to the unfolding in language of the
autobiographical act itself’. This self-referential spiral is symbol-
ised in Barth’s memoir by the Parker pen which makes it possible
for  the  story  of  his  life  to  emerge  in  the  act  of  its  imagining.
Hence, the reference of Barth’s narrative is not to the life the au-
thor has lived, but to the writing of that life.
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By creating a feedback loop in which he imaginatively relates
the story of his life, Barth shows how the narration of the (or a)
story of the author’s own life can reanimate his literary imagina-
tion. The reflectivity of this fictional frame story within which the
memoir appears enables the narrator to create a story out of his
inability to create stories; to take his career forward by pronounc-
ing it stuck and reviewing how it got to where it presently is:
[L]ike prudent navigators we may reckon our course by deducing
where  we  are  from  our  running  plot  of  where  we’ve  been.  [...]
‘[C]oaxial esemplasy’: the ongoing, reciprocal shaping of our story
(in  this  case,  a  story  of  our  life)  by  our  imagination,  and of  our
imagination by our story thus far. (OUT 20)
Clara Bartocci (1995) has quite rightly noted that Once Upon a Time
should not be regarded as an autobiography of Barth, but rather
as the autobiography of his novels – or even, as I would suggest,
the autobiography of his narrative imagination personified as
‘John Barth, Esq., Author’. In this way Barth manages to combine
the notion of chaos as emergence with an authorial presence
which does not refer to an absent outsider, nor blocks out the life
of the text.
As to whether narrative orders life experiences or actually
creates those experiences in the form we have them, the answer
is, typically for Barth, not either/or, but a paradoxical both-and.
The authorial persona is constructed by the stories he tells, but
because of the explicit connection between the persona and the
actual author, the implication remains that there are life experi-
ences that precede that narrative and on which it is constructed.
The Ageing Body of Work
Whether defining Barth’s writings as fictional autobiography,
autofiction or autobiographies of his fictions, and their self-
referentiality as sheer repetition, metafiction, intertextuality or
pastiche, we should note that the presence of his self-referential
authorial persona has become more and more pronounced in
each of his recent books. The emergent, holistic shape of Barth’s
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corpus is the result of the reflectivity between the authorial per-
sona and the structures of story-telling which create that persona
and at the same time themselves arise from his presence in the
books. One of the effects created by this persona is that the
reader’s attention is focused on the author’s name and on an au-
thorial identity behind the novels. ‘I’m going to maintain’, Barth
(1992/1995: 188) writes,
that the first and the final question that a storywriter puts to his
or her memory, regardless of the subject and kind of story in
progress,  is  not,  as  we  usually  take  it  to  be,  the  question  ‘What
happened’ but rather the essential question of identity – the per-
sonal, professional, cultural, even species-specific ‘Who am I?’
[...].
Once  Upon  a  Time, Barth’s most explicit answer to that question,
suggests not only that individual human identity emerges out of
the self-reflective sensory data of our experiences, but also that
for an author the answer lies in the history of his writings, the
words and sentences ‘which hang together like the acts and stages
of a meaningful life and are in fact mine’s meaning, anyhow its
most tangible expression’ (OUT 323). Thus Barth conducts his re-
iterations not only in order to continue his career, but also in or-
der to ensure that his writings form a single body of works in
which the proliferation of meaning is constrained by his author-
ship.76 To Tobin’s (1992) presentation of Barth’s struggle to con-
tinue the life-span of his narrative imagination, I would therefore
add his continuing achievements at closure, both within individual
works and across his career as a whole. Furthermore, I suggest
that his works, as the ‘tangible expression’ of his narrative imagi-
nation, are embodied, humanist posthuman stories about stories.
76 Alan Lindsay (1995: 44) has argued that Barth creates a variety of author-
ial personae who all, in turn, attempt to ‘dominate’ the entire collection of
text. Lindsay focuses on the essay collection The Friday Book, but implies
that the struggle between different personae extends to Barth’s fictions as
well. I would argue, however, that the slight differences between one work
and the next actually makes the single authorial persona deeper and more
life-like as it varies its tone according to different genres and situations.
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One reason for the creation of Barth’s unusually strong au-
thorial persona may lie in his vision of what the purpose of fiction
may  be  in  the  lives  of  human  beings.  On  the  one  hand,  for  a
writer fiction is a form of procreation, and writing alternate identi-
ties can entail living more lives than usual. The single biological
life available to an author can be infinitely multiplied and ex-
tended through the creation of fictional lives, the ‘Sche-
herazadesworth of stories’ that all our lives have the potential for.
‘There is no other life’, no afterlife or rebirth of a transmigratory
soul, quips another one of Barth’s author-characters: ‘That’s why
some of us make up stories’  (OS 92). In Once  Upon a  Time Barth
has multiplied himself firstly, by constructing the double temporal
structure and the two autobiographical narrative voices (the narra-
tor and ‘the Author’),  and secondly, by creating in Jay Scribner a
character who functions as a foil and trickster figure (Bowen
1999: 195), but is also yet another alter ego to those authorial
voices. Through all these different personae Barth alleviates his
anxiety of continuance and postpones his own writerly end by
creating infinitely regressing, personified copies of his literary im-
agination.
On the other hand, Barth is much persuaded by the theories
that human consciousness is to a large extent dependent on narra-
tive, and that the creation of fictional narratives helps us recognise
and  modify  the  structure  of  our  own  life  stories  (Barth
1992/1995: 192-196). In the early nineties Barth found the perfect
symbol for his conception of the relationship between fictional
story-telling and our life stories in Daniel C. Dennett’s description
of the editorial process through which the brain creates the feeling
of coherent sense experience. The unified self, Dennett
(1991/1992) argues, is produced by a process of selection and
self-organisation from the fragmented activity of different regions
of the brain, a process which perhaps solves, with the help of em-
ergent complexity, the paradox I described at the beginning of
chapter 3. Barth sees in this a perfect analogy to the way his im-
agination and the story being told by that imagination interact and
shape each other. Citing Dennett and the German philosopher
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Hans Vaihinger, Barth writes about the self as a ‘Center of Narra-
tive Gravity’ which is created in the act of creating a narrative
about itself. Once more turning to Scheherazade as a symbol of
narrative creativity, Barth (1995: 195-196) equates her with the
‘(fictionalistical, as-ifish) scenario-spinner that is the continuously
auto-creating self of every one of us’. Or as another neurophi-
losopher Antonio Damasio (1999: 191) puts it:
The story contained in the images of core consciousness is not
told by some clever homunculus. Nor is the story really told by
you as a self because the core you is only born as the story is told,
within the story itself. You exist as a mental being when primordial
stories are being told, and only then. [...] You are the music while
the music lasts.
Thus ‘John Barth, Esq., Author’ is an identity which emerges out
of the reiterated relationships between the life of the actual author
and the various stories told of it. He is the one telling the story
that tells us about who he is.
I would also argue that the emphasis on a balance between
motion and rest, between continuance and closure which was
shown to be present in On With the Story (see 2.3), can also be seen
in Barth’s entire body of works. Slethaug notes in Beautiful Chaos
(2000:  6)  how a  unifying  frame extends  over  Barth’s  oeuvre  and
that at least since writing Letters Barth has consciously perceived
his  own works  ‘not  just  as  a  corpus  and  canon,  but  as  a  system
with negative feedback, cyclical growth, and certain kinds of ero-
sion’. Although Slethaugh’s vision of Barth’s corpus as governed
by ‘cyclical growth’ is certainly correct, he also suggests that the
point of the repetitions is to bring forward ‘the problems with
unpredictability in systems and their nearly inexplicable failure’
(Slethaug 2000: 7). I would argue, however, that Barth is more in-
terested in the emergent complexity of form and meaning than in
unpredictability or the failure of systems. Narrative fiction in gen-
eral is for Barth a self-perpetuating loop of ever-repeating (though
not exactly repeating) patterns, which in themselves consist of in-
finitely divisible moments of narrative time, yet inexorably move
towards their own extinction. By adopting the vocabulary and im-
Emergent Identities
179
agery of chaos theory Barth is able to give symbolic form to his
thoughts on the paradoxical nature of stories.
It is also interesting to note, in connection with the discus-
sion in section 2.3 of literary works as both objects and processes,
that the feedback within Barth’s body of works appears not only
in the temporal, narrative structures but also in the choice of fig-
ural effects through which his authorship appears to readers. Al-
though the concentration on the structures of story-telling in
Barth’s works shows a clear focus on narrative as a means of tell-
ing ourselves who we are, the temporal sequence is often sub-
sumed within what could be called a three-dimensional structure,
and any understanding of how the events of the story actually re-
late to each other can only be gained from attempting to visualise
it. The Fibonacci spiral is one such structure, another is the
Möbius strip. Similarly, the repetition of individual phrases, im-
ages and metaphors creates coherence to Barth’s authorial per-
sona through linkages between images rather than through a con-
ventional narrative. The authorial identity is thus not only told by
his narratives, but it is also shown through the flashes of recogni-
tion gained from yet another image of Scheherazade on her
couch, of the sailboat as a dramatic vehicle, of a pen that, Escher-
like, writes the author into existence.
In section 2.3 I also described the chaos-inspired narrative
frames Barth uses in On With the Story and argued that rather than
implying the fragmentation of narrative cohesion, the bending and
buckling of those frames suggests, instead, their robustness. Fur-
thermore, because of Barth’s commitment to the reflective frame,
achieving not only continuance but also closure in his career as-
sumes perhaps more importance for him than for most authors.
His fictions since Once Upon a Time have all been in some form or
another representations of ending – complementing each of his
previous books and completing the frame of his career with each
publication, just in case it turns out to be the last. Thus Barth has
turned the main argument of ‘The Literature of Exhaustion’ into a
personal career project, seeking to show the validity of repetition
as an aesthetic while at the same time framing and reframing his
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own literary career. Once  Upon  a  Time is  his  first  last  novel  and
wraps up the story of his vocation, whereas Coming Soon!!! (2001),
a reiteration of his first novel The Floating Opera (1956/1980), be-
comes a last first novel. The short-story series On With the Story,
The  Book  of  Ten  Nights  and  a  Night (2004) and Where Three Roads
Meet (2005) all deal with the approaching end of life and of story-
telling.77 By repeatedly constructing such frames to his career
Barth manages to have his closure without the ending and to keep
on writing new fictions by John Barth, even while exhausting (in
the sense of completing) his own body of works with each new
book.
Finally, Barth’s corpus makes yet another pun involving
story-telling and the authorial identity: that of an embodied hu-
man author producing a body of works through which his narra-
tive imagination also gains an embodied existence of sorts. In
many ways, I suggest, his writings exemplify the call made by
Hayles (1999) for an embodied posthuman. A recent example of
the principle of embodiment in Barth’s works can be found in The
Book  of  Ten  Nights  and  a  Night, another series of previously pub-
lished short stories with a new frame. The book feeds on Barth’s
work as a teacher of creative writing at Johns Hopkins University.
Not only is it yet another fiction about fiction (and therefore
about life), but it is also a how-to book: many of the stories have
an exemplary flavour, as if thought up to illustrate a particular is-
sue in the craft of story-telling, making the book into a fictional-
ised version of an introductory course: Fiction Writing 101. In
this series Barth (2004: 4) uses computer terminology to define
the difference between the narrative imagination and the author as
the separation between the ‘capital-A Author’ who is ‘the mere
narrative hardware’, and ‘Graybard’, the software of story-telling.
While Graybard lacks the ‘hardware’ body of the author him-
self, it is clear by his explicitly sexual contact with the ‘brackish
tidewater marsh-nymph’ who is his Muse (Barth 2004: 1) that the
narrative imagination is by no means disembodied. As I briefly
mentioned in section 2.3, sex and story-telling have always been
77 Another series, The Development, appeared in October 2008.
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intertwined in Barth’s fictions, and erotic encounters between au-
thor-characters and their spouses, or the narrative imagination
and his muse, appear in various guises in almost all of his works.78
The central point to make of the connection between sex and
story-telling in Barth is that even if his writings are intensely meta-
fictional and engage in various kinds of reflective play with lan-
guage and with fictionality, they never leave behind the embodied
experience of individual human beings. His fictions, Barth
(1993/1995: 112) writes,
certainly are to some extent about themselves and about the phe-
nomenon of storytelling, but various of them have also managed
to be ‘about’ such matters as the problematics of history, of love,
and of personal identity; about the myth of the wandering hero as
it applies to our lowercase lives; also the locale of tidewater Mary-
land, the several differences between art and life, and (on the
other hand) the equatability of narration – of the transmission
and reception of stories – with being humanly alive.
The fact has to be admitted that reading Barth’s fiction has
become an exercise in déjà vu, and especially in the last ten years
some might feel that if you have read one book by Barth, you
have read them all. It could therefore be argued that if literary
value is considered to be originality understood in the stereotypi-
cally romantic sense of unique genius residing in a single work,
Barth might seem to have failed as an artist. Taken together, how-
ever, his books form a single work of literature in which the inter-
secting themes, images and narrative techniques make the whole
into more than the sum of its parts, and the narrative of the writ-
ing of these works is interwoven with the individual stories they
tell. Barth’s aim has always been to build on the postmodern aes-
78 Surprisingly little has been written about love and narration in Barth. On
the early fiction, see Farwell (1974/1980) and for a brief nod towards the
presence of this theme in the later fiction, see Harris (1995), who is not,
however, explicit about the connection between sex and stories. Barth’s
autobiographical narrator in Once Upon a Time, however, notes that the bed-
time stories of Scheherazade made the coupling of sex and stories so famil-
iar to him that when he finally found out about pen and penis sharing an
etymological connection, his reaction was only ‘a mild Voilà’ (OUT 267).
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thetic which is based on the innovative rearrangement of elements
within an emergent structure. In his closing statement at the
Stuttgart seminar Barth (1995: 343) ponders on the meaning of
the word ‘originality’:
‘Originality’ is a matter of opinion, I suppose, more than of em-
pirical verification, but to the extent that ‘original’ means ‘novel’
or ‘innovative’ rather than ‘aboriginal’, that which is ‘most origi-
nal’ cannot very well also be ‘oldest’, since it has to be an innova-
tion from something older than itself, some preexisting state of
affairs.
In his works Barth constructs his own kind of originality, in which
‘aboriginal’ elements are set to interact in novel ways, and new
meaning emerges from that interaction. More than once he has
referred to himself not as a composer but an arranger: one ‘whose
chiefest literary pleasure is to take a received melody [...] and, im-
provising like a jazzman within its constraints, reorchestrate it to
present purpose’ (Barth 1984: 7). Out of such reorchestrations
also arises Barth’s authorial identity, which is centred on the con-
cepts of exhaustion and replenishment, on the emergent self-
organisation of, if not an ‘original’, then at least a ‘singular’ per-
sona from the elements provided both by the author’s embodied,
individual experiences and by the millennia of human literary past.
The real skill for an author (and for all of us) lies in not only recy-
cling old elements but doing it imaginatively within the emergent
frame provided by our culture and our life experiences. Thus John
Barth’s corpus, by concentrating on themes such as authorship,
originality, repetition and fictionality, and by harnessing the con-
cepts offered by chaos theory, manages to become a set of inter-
locking variations on a theme, iterations of a melody which form
the opera by John Barth.
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Conclusion: Live Stories
Lewis Shiner’s novel Deserted Cities of the Heart (1988/1989) pre-
sents chaos and emergence as symbols for both the unpredictable
complexity of human society and for the shape that guides an in-
dividual identity. The novel’s characters, embroiled in the upheav-
als of South American politics and Mayan mysticism, learn to see
the strange attractor as a vital aid in comprehending the purpose
and the pattern in their own lives, and therefore gain the position
of freely making informed choices. For Shiner, the attractor is
thus not a fate that controls the individual, but a way of concep-
tualising identity in a way that helps human beings comprehend
the shape of their lives and, if need be, act in a way that will push
their personal trajectory onto a new attractor.
This chapter has examined the ways in which emergent com-
plexity has been used to answer the question of what kinds of
things human identities are and how they can be represented in
literature. As with the concept of literary form, which was seen in
terms of both object and process, I have tried to approach iden-
tity as a notion that entails, in terms of Ira Livingston’s analogy,
both the chaos of ? and the comprehensibility and coherence of
the circle. While the multiplicity of the networks which influence
the self have been emphasised by many interpreters in the past,
this chapter has focused on the ways in which a coherent identity
can be perceived as an emergent shape in the dynamics between
an individual consciousness and its material and cultural basis. Al-
though ambiguity and multiplicity is present in these interpreta-
tions, the authors concentrate more on trying to describe the kind
of coherence that the self might have, and how that coherence
could be discussed. In particular, the scientists’ ability to draw up
the strange attractors in the behaviour of seemingly random sys-
tems has been taken as a sign of optimism by those who would
like to argue for consistency and continuity in the human experi-
ence of selfhood.
Another issue which connects this section to chapter 2 is the
role of information theory in the understanding of both literature
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and the mind. If I earlier focused on how literary works have been
conceptualised, this chapter brought out the view of life in all its
forms as an evolving system of information processing. Not sur-
prisingly, there exists a wide variety of opinion as to the implica-
tions of such a view. To use a few more examples, Carter Kaplan
(2000: 161) in Critical Synoptics presents complexity theory as an
example of intellectual mythology that presents itself as ‘dogma, a
set of magical or scientific commandments’, and he proceeds to
dismantle that dogma through the means of Menippean satire. In
complete contrast, Eric Jantsch (1980) sees the combination of
computation and evolution as the best way of explaining the na-
ture of the universe and human existence. He combines the de-
terminism of evolution with the freedom brought by the process
of self-organization, and through this new paradigm, he claims, a
‘humanistic’ vision ‘is finding its scientific foundations’ (Jantsch
1980: xiii).
The first part of this chapter focused on bringing out this
contrast in what emergent complexity might mean for the hu-
manities. While many scholars have seen information theory as a
way of describing how a coherent consciousness and identity
could arise in a feedback system of data processing, Hayles (1999)
and Waugh (2005) have pointed out potential problems in such a
conceptualisation. Both take information theory to undermine
embodiment, and Waugh, in particular, connects such a loss of
the individual body to the poststructuralist drive towards seeing
everything in terms of texts and codes. What their critique shows
is that rather than solving the problems of identity and selfhood,
cybernetics, emergence and the computational model of con-
sciousness can only present new data for the humanities to dwell
on, and that psychology, philosophy, literary theory and other dis-
ciplines must continue to try and approach the issues in their own
terms. If literary theory is able to take the scientific discoveries
and present two seemingly diametrically opposite interpretations
of what they mean, it is clear that the answers to the complex
questions of identity cannot be found by the natural sciences
alone. The humanities in general and literary studies in particular
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still have to work out for themselves the most fruitful ways of ap-
proaching such problematic concepts – even while they keep an
eye on the discoveries being made in the natural sciences.
Literary representations of identity have, indeed, been exam-
ined within the humanities without involving chaos theory and
emergent complexity. One such field is the study of narrative
identity, which aims to shed light both on the way human identity
is, at its roots, narratively formed, and on how authors use narra-
tive techniques to bring out literary characters as coherent identi-
ties.79 A valuable element in such studies, and one which resonates
with the humanist chaos interpretations, is the notion that identity
is no longer a useful concept if it  is seen as a monolith. It is im-
portant to accept that identity, while by definition it needs to be
somehow separated as an entity, is both changeable through time
and open to the influence of others.
John Barth’s authorial persona is a good example of just such
a narrated identity. ‘John Barth, esq., Author’ is not only open to
the  influence  of  centuries  of  literary  tradition,  but  also  grows  as
time and his literary career go on. By reiterating and re-
interpreting the corpus that makes him up and is made up by him,
Barth and his narrative imagination draw inspiration and coher-
ence from the past,  the maze of time which is  not his  adversary
but ‘a resplendent arabesque, a chaos most artfully structured’
(OUT 324). Further, the authorial persona stops its reflective
identity from becoming mere textual play by connecting story-
telling with sexual pleasure, and by consciously attaching itself to
the details of the actual author’s body of individual experience. In
all of this, chaos theory provides Barth with a view of identity as
‘coaxial esemplasy’, as a reflective and dynamic, self-organising
whole. His are live stories, narratives which claim the semi-
organic, yet crafted status suggested by the romantic metaphor.
79 A useful summary of research into narrative conceptualisations of iden-
tity can be found in Pettersson (2008). The most comprehensive analysis of
narrative techniques used in the presentation of fictional characters’ minds
is Cohn (1978).
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Chaos theory has thus influenced the humanist perspectives
on both literary structure and the ways in which identities are
formed and represented. There is one further major issue that has
engaged the literary interpretations, that is, the question of knowl-
edge. A coherent self which is able to perceive structures in the
dynamics of the universe is also able to gain knowledge of that
universe. That knowledge may not always be gained through ra-
tional enquiry but through an intuitive connection between the
mind and world. The self, as Philip Kuberski (2000: 20) suggests,
can in terms of chaos theory be viewed as part of those dynamic
processes whereby the physical world becomes conscious: ‘It may
be a principle of reflexivity, the widely distributed event of differ-
ence that relates the world to itself’. This paradoxical relation
through difference has been viewed as significant not only to con-
ceptualisations of identity, but also to epistemology. Thus in the
final chapter of this study I turn to look at the ways in which in-
terpretations of chaos theory connect both the human mind and
its literary creations to reality.
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4.  The Self-Similarity of Mind and World:
Imagination and Realism
All the seminars [...] had a fatal family likeness.
They were repetitive in the extreme. We found the
same clefts and crevices, transgressions and disinte-
grations, lures and deceptions beneath, no matter
what surface we were scrying. I thought, next we
will go on to the phantasmagoria of Bosch, and, in
his incantatory way, Butcher obliged. I went on
looking at the filthy window above his head, and I
thought, I must have things. I know a dirty window
is an ancient, well-worn trope for intellectual dissat-
isfaction and scholarly blindness. The thing is, that
the thing was also there. A real, very dirty window,
shutting out the sun. A thing.
A.S. Byatt, The Biographer’s Tale
In Rebecca Goldstein’s short story ‘Strange Attractors’ (1993),
Phoebe Saunders, a young Princeton professor and a specialist in
the geometry of soap bubbles, journeys to the Bures institute in
France. The people she meets there, though at first intimidating to
her and from very different backgrounds than Phoebe herself,
have many simple human experiences in common, such as eating,
drinking and love. However, there are also other experiences they
share that go beyond the basic biological universals. The scientists
and the artists share not only food and drink but also intellectual
experiences that are equally human: the pleasure and excitement
that arises from abstract thought, and the wonder they feel at the
details of the physical world, whether soap bubbles or a rare dou-
ble rainbow. In the title of the story Goldstein plays with both the
general and the technical meaning of ‘strange attraction’: the char-
acters are unexpectedly and unpredictably drawn to one another,
but their interactions are also part of a larger dynamic relationship
between the human mind and reality.
This chapter presents a view of literature as inextricably
linked to reality and to the various ways in which human beings
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gain knowledge of that reality. As with Goldstein’s characters, the
connection with reality can be based on biological universals or
on abstractions, or, most fruitfully, on both. The role of chaos
theory in such thinking is to provide a way of conceptualising a
connection between mind and reality that is neither mystical nor
reductive,  but  based on the idea of  the self-similarity  of  the uni-
verse, on the notion that the same dynamics repeat themselves in
various materials and in different kinds of interactive systems. Cu-
riosity about mathematical abstractions leads these authors first to
a new understanding of how the physical universe actually func-
tions, and then to the realisation that the dynamics of the seem-
ingly unreachable and inhuman physical reality is in fact mirrored
in ourselves, which, in the final analysis, turns the study, represen-
tation and understanding of that reality into a humanist project.
Even though some popular accounts have suggested that
chaos theory caused an epistemological revolution in science (e.g.
Gleick 1987/1998), and some literary appropriations of it have
implied that it has similarly revolutionary implications in literary
studies (e.g. Demastes 1998: 10), chaos theory has not created a
significant change in the way science views its objects. This does
not mean, however, that the question is resolved as to what are
the implications of chaos theory to the epistemology of literature
and literary  studies.  In Chaos Bound Hayles (1990: 16) notes how
there has been a radical change in the ‘epistemic ground’ on which
the order/disorder dichotomy rests.80 The new scientific theories
of the twentieth century opened new questions for scientific ex-
planations: general relativity, quantum theory and chaos theory
describe behaviour and phenomena that could not be explained
by using old-fashioned notions about what is possible (including
assumptions about the universe functioning rationally and pre-
dictably). On the basis of these scientific developments some crit-
ics have drawn the conclusion that since the universe turns out to
80 See also Kellert (1996: 231): ‘To the extent that our widely accepted
frameworks – even frameworks for thinking about human society or art or
religion – have been influenced by the physics of regular linear behavior,
those frameworks are indeed challenged by chaos theory.’
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be inherently irrational and unpredictable, the rational methods of
science can no longer be seen as the best way to describe it (see
e.g. Porush 1991: 77, 80).
In the context of such developments, it is natural that many
of the literary discussions on chaos theory focus on the relation of
the individual  mind to reality,  as  well  as  to other texts  and other
beings. In the following sections I will examine aspects in the
works of Jorie Graham and Tom Stoppard that show how they,
like Byatt’s biographer in the epigraph, yearn for ‘things’ and in-
corporate the notion of the mind’s connection to a chaotic reality
into their writing. Where poststructuralist theory questions lin-
guistic reference and the accessibility of reality, Stoppard and
Graham focus on finding ways of recontextualising literature in
reality, without, however, losing sight of the ways in which literary
works differ from other forms of thinking and knowing. In Stop-
pard’s Arcadia the connection between the characters and the
world exists partly in the form of their mutual physical attraction
that follows the rules of gravitation, and partly in the intuitions –
the gut feelings – the characters have about what has happened in
the past. Jorie Graham also uses chaos theory to explore the intui-
tive connections between people and things, and her poems dis-
play a strong sense of the materiality of the world as well as a de-
sire to convey that materiality in words. Both authors insist upon
the connection because they want to emphasise embodiment, but
their writings also thematise two further human universals: imagi-
nation and curiosity.
As  with  the  concepts  of  literary  form  and  human  identity,
there are many aspects in the humanist perspective that draw on
romantic notions of art and humanity. Stoppard and Graham em-
phasise the view of human beings as organisms amongst other or-
ganisms, yet at the same time present imagination as a transcen-
dental characteristic which sets human beings into a category of
their own. They also focus on imagination and intuition as forms
of knowing on a level with the rational methods of the Enlight-
enment. While such reawakening of romantic epistemologies
might seem a step backwards after the poststructuralist critique of
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humanist universals, it is intriguing that some theorists (e.g.
Waugh 1999, Paulson 2001a, Toulmin 2001) have argued that in
re-engaging physical reality and the human biological universals
literary and cultural theory is actually stepping into difficult areas
of study which the poststructuralist theories bracketed off as un-
solvable. ‘[P]ostmodern Uncertainty is a paradoxically comfortable
and reassuring condition’, suggests Waugh (1999: 45).
[It is] a kind of comfortable acquiescence, an assumption of re-
conciliation which reduces the strangeness of natural and aes-
thetic worlds to our familiar models and simply dissolves the
problem of consciousness and intentionality by writing it out of
consideration. The problem for literary criticism, as for literature
itself, is how to bring that scientific impulse back from nowhere
and into a relation with our human situation, to the kind of in-
dwelling of embodied consciousness, where we begin from, as
individuals and inhabitants of a culture. (Waugh 1999: 59)
The ‘reassuring’ postmodern uncertainty is achieved by making
the uncertainty absolute, by making sure that we always know we
do not know, rather than living with the real possibility that some-
times we know and sometimes we do not. This chapter briefly de-
scribes the part chaos theory has played in the re-engagement of
literary studies with realist epistemology and then moves on to
discuss the ways in which some authors have responded to
Waugh’s call for combining embodied experience and the scien-
tific impulse.
If chaos theory provides Stoppard and Graham with a reason
for epistemological optimism, it also helps them to combine the
metafictional techniques of postmodern literature with realist
epistemology to form a new kind of literary realism. Thus I  sug-
gest that Stoppard’s and Graham’s departure from the conven-
tions of realism does not necessarily imply a loss of interest in re-
ality,  and that  metafiction and realism should not always be seen
as opposites. Like John Barth, whose autotextuality both creates
an authorial presence and comments on its creation, these authors
write  about  reality  and  about  their  writing  about  reality  in  equal
measure. Graham’s poetry pushes at the complex boundary be-
tween the sayable and the unsayable and in doing so, thematises
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that struggle in bodily terms. Stoppard’s Arcadia uses chaos theory
to link up the behaviour of numbers, ideas, and bodies in space,
and through such links the play explores the connections human
beings have with their physical existence, with the past and with
each other. The emphasis on the connections between physical
systems, such as heat exchange, and the emotional lives of the
characters also reflects on the epistemological questions in the
play, and forms a counterbalance to the disrupting force of en-
tropy.
4.1  Realism and the Rules of Dynamics
She wondered
if every molecule on the surface of her skin
was wet and what wet meant to such very
tiny matter. [...]
She loved the water trails over her body curves,
the classical lines between wet and dry
making graph patterns which she thought might follow
the activity in her brain – all she wanted
was to be a good atlas, a bright school map
to shine up the world for everyone to see.
Jo Shapcott, ‘In the Bath’
As discussed in chapter 2, many literary scholars who engage
chaos theory in their writings hold the view that the literary work
is an object that is describable and comprehensible, even while it
exists in a dynamic relationship with its readers. In the following I
will discuss two further aspects of the epistemological optimism
displayed by humanist literary scholars: the ways in which they use
chaos theory to discuss the larger philosophical question of real-
ism, and the way they build a theory of representation on that phi-
losophical realism. Can a literary work represent reality? On what
basis is its resemblance to reality judged?
The link between literature and the real world in these writ-
ings is primarily based on the conjecture that the human mind and
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its products (including literature) function according to the same
principles as waterfalls or weather. This notion is illustrated by the
poem by Jo Shapcott above. Shapcott’s speaker is fascinated by
the thought that her mind and body might be replicating the dy-
namics that rule all matter in the universe. The poem creates the
same analogy which Argyros presents in A Blessed Rage for Order
(see the epigraph to chapter 3) and the speaker wonders how,
even though the molecular description of water is different from
the description of her wet skin, certain patterns might recur in the
‘classical lines between wet and dry’ and in ‘the activity in her
brain’.  What the system is made of and what its mechanisms are
do not matter  to the rules  of  dynamics – all  that  matters  are the
dynamics themselves, which, even at the edge of chaos, contain
universal characteristics. ‘The whole tradition of physics is that
you isolate the mechanisms and then all the rest flows,’ says the
mathematical physicist Mitchell Feigenbaum (as quoted in Gleick
1987/1998: 174-175). But in chaotic systems ‘you know the right
equations but they’re just not helpful. You add up all the micro-
scopic pieces and you find that you cannot extend them to the
long term. They’re not what’s important in the problem’. What is
important are patterns of behaviour, which chaos theory has
shown to entail universal characteristics. One of these is a con-
stant discovered by Feigenbaum himself, which expresses the ra-
tio of bifurcations in the behaviour of a system proceeding to-
wards chaos (approximately 4.669:1). Even though the number as
such may not say much, its existence as a universal characteristic
shows that there are recognisable rhythms in the behaviour of sys-
tems as different as developing animal populations and swirling
smoke.
By suggesting that the same dynamics extend all the way to
the function of consciousness, such universal characteristics con-
nect  the  human  mind  to  the  rest  of  reality.  As  humans,  we  are
embodied minds, so the argument goes, and the combination of
mind and body is just one expression of the same underlying laws
of dynamics that govern complex phenomena in the rest of the
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universe.81 Thus there may be an inherent, though still hypotheti-
cal, connection between our minds and the physical universe –
one which may be difficult or even impossible to formulate clearly
within our rational minds, but which still exists in the imagination.
Mostly such efforts are connected to the traditions of literary
and philosophical realism. One of the very few scholars engaging
chaos theory and drama is William W. Demastes, whose Theatre of
Chaos (1998) explicitly aims to formulate a new kind of dramatic
realism,  a  ‘chaotics  realism’  (1998:  33),  which  would  ‘provide  a
“scientific” description of reality as it is experienced by human be-
ings’ (1998: 128), a description which would be based on the new
physics and expressed through new dramatic techniques. De-
mastes’ strategy is to look for a third way between the two major
dramatic traditions influencing European theatre in the twentieth
century: naturalism and absurdism. Chaos theory, he suggests, of-
fers  such  a  way,  since  it  provides  a  middle  ground  between  the
hubristic control of naturalism and the absurdist despair of ran-
domness. All three approaches, however, share the assumption
that theatre has to do with how the universe is – the only question
being whether it actually is determined or random, and to what
extent can it be controlled by human actions. Indeed, although he
does not explicitly put forward any kind of scientistic argument of
science over art, Demastes (1998: 149) suggests that ‘an under-
standing of nature seems a critical priority, the antecedent to any
valid approach to or philosophy of human existence’.
However, as I suggested in chapter 1, chaos theory has more
commonly been taken as supporting poststructuralist epistemo-
logical uncertainties. Such interpretations have their roots in the
undeniable unpredictability and nonlinearity of the universe.
While for centuries mathematics concentrated on linear, easily
solvable systems and even ventured to suggest that nonlinear sys-
tems are exceptions in a mainly linear universe,  thinking of linear
systems as the norm is now seen as rather absurd:
81  One of the more eloquent accounts of the interconnection of everything
through the laws of dynamics is John Gribbin’s Deep Simplicity: Chaos, Com-
plexity and the Emergence of Life (2004/2005).
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To call a general differential equation ‘nonlinear’ is rather like
calling zoology ‘nonpachydermology’. But you see, we live in a
world which for centuries acted as if the only animal in existence
was the elephant, which assumed that holes in the skirting-board
must be made by tiny elephants, which saw the soaring eagle as a
wing-eared Dumbo, the tiger as an elephant with a rather short
trunk and stripes, and whose taxonomists resorted to corrective
surgery so that the museum’s zoological collection consisted en-
tirely of lumbering grey pachyderms. (Stewart 1989/1997: 74)82
During the 1960s and 1970s the science of ‘non-elephant animals’
developed, until books like Gleick’s and Stewart’s appeared,
spreading the word among non-specialists, and, together with
concepts such as Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and the bi-
zarre paradoxes of the quantum world, the unpredictability of
chaotic systems was taken to hit the final nail into the coffin of
such Enlightenment ideals as knowledge, reference and control
(Cordle 1999: 75-105).
However, those whom I would describe as humanist feel an
affinity with the enthusiasm displayed by the chaos theorists
themselves about the way their discoveries have actually extended
the field of our understanding to cover phenomena previously
considered incomprehensible. If we cannot exactly predict the
weather, at least we now know why we cannot do so, and can use
that new understanding to make the predictions better than they
were before, even though they will necessarily remain fallible. In
direct opposition to the assumptions of poststructuralist literary
theory, chaos theorists themselves continue to argue that their
discoveries do not imply an absolute limit to what can be known
or understood, only to what can be predicted. Rather than explod-
ing inquiry into innumerable individual points of view, they em-
phasise the shared characteristics in systems as different as turbu-
lent liquids and double pendulums.83 As Harriett Hawkins (1995:
36) has noted,
82 Gleick (1987/1998: 68) attributes a similar analogy to the mathematician
Stanislaw Ulam.
83 The study of chaos mathematics has resulted in some practitioners refer-
ring to the field of ‘experimental mathematics’ that reflects the way the cal-
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chaos theory may prove as challenging to certain axioms of liter-
ary theory as it did to cherished scientific assumptions. For in
marked contrast to many influential literary theorists, the most in-
fluential chaos theorists and practitioners repeatedly insist that
whether we like it or not, there is ‘something’ of universal (not
exclusively culture-based) relevance that lies outside their texts,
and for which their texts themselves are but approximations,
symbolic images, metaphors.84
The perspective identified by Hawkins in chaos theorists is actu-
ally also present in the work of a number of literary scholars, who
rather than assuming an overwhelming primacy for language and
texts, are keen to redefine the relationship between literary works,
their study and the world in a way that retains the specific charac-
ter of literary art without severing it from the physical world.
From the Scriptoral Metaphor to Philosophical Realism
One reason why a single scientific theory can give rise to two in-
terpretations as different as the poststructuralist and the humanist
views of chaos lies in the metaphorical structures that govern our
ideas of what knowledge is. The scriptoral metaphor, which ac-
cording to Waugh (2005) rules most of the current writings on
science and literature (see pp. 65-66) guides us into thinking of ex-
istence as (chaotic) information flow to which there is no outside
with which to interact. To such a view knowledge, too, appears as
constructed internally within the information flow, with nothing
to separate the information from the world it describes. Such an
internally constructed system of knowledge represents a com-
pletely self-consistent structure. However, in a system where
knowledge is created with external reference it is easier to allow
for representations to be incomplete and subject to change. By
building on a definition of knowledge that allows such incom-
pleteness and which relies on external reference, the humanist
culations cannot be ascertained from known axioms but are set to run in a
computer and the results observed afterwards. (see Harris 1997: 136)
84 See also Paulson (2001b: 79).
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view of chaos also accepts a degree of realism not allowed by the
poststructuralist interpretations. The mutability of chaotic systems
supports the idea of knowledge as changeable, but the stable pat-
terns that exist within the seeming disorder also create a heuristic
base on which to build representations. We may never be abso-
lutely sure about anything, but that does not mean that some
statements would not be truer than others. In Chaos Bound Hayles
(1990: 209-235) presents the dialectic between accepting a degree
of uncertainty and demanding absolute rationality as that between
‘local knowledge’ and ‘global theory’. Their interaction, Hayles
(1990: 232-233) suggests, will always mean that while they ‘may
each attempt to deny the other by extending its boundaries, when
one is pushed to the limit, the other returns’. What I see happen-
ing in humanist approaches to literary epistemology is a move-
ment away from global theory and back towards local knowledge,
but with the added emphasis on a shared physical reality as the
context of that knowledge.
As discussed in section 1.3, William Paulson (1991) regards
different scientific disciplines as different forms of information
processing where new information can be created by combining
one level of description with another, or with an object not usu-
ally viewed in terms of that particular level. Paulson (1991: 45)
further points out that accepting that some systems are more than
the  sum  of  their  parts  already  commits  researchers  to  a  more
pragmatic epistemology, and that ‘[t]hose who describe phenom-
ena as complex or emergent thus renounce the Cartesian dream
of maximal certainty by reduction to the simple, and assume the
risk of choosing a pertinent level of description’. The difference
between levels is not in the number of details which could be re-
duced to a lower-level explanation, but in the dynamic interaction
of those details, which makes every instance unique and every de-
scription partial.
Such an epistemology is not exclusive to literary interpreta-
tions of chaos theory. In Return to Reason (2001) Stephen Toulmin
continues the argument he first made in Cosmopolis (1990/1992),
according to which the rise of rationality at the expense of rea-
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sonableness in the seventeenth century was, among other things,
due to the desire for absolute certainty on which to base theologi-
cal and scientific arguments in order to prevent further religious
wars like those of the early 1600s. The combination of scientism
and scepticism in poststructuralist literary and cultural theory re-
sults from that same desire, for once it became clear that the first
axioms cannot be found, the whole system of rationality suppos-
edly collapsed. Toulmin (2001: 204-214) advocates a return to a
Renaissance balance between the theoretical and the practical arts,
where instead of truth being built on absolute axioms, personal
experience forms the roots of a system of theorising and most
questions have more than one reasonable answer. The major dif-
ference between Toulmin’s position and that of poststructuralist
theory is that the different answers are not themselves absolute
and therefore incommensurable but situated and practical, and
can therefore be discussed. Thus Toulmin advocates reasonable-
ness based on contextual evaluation over strict rationality.
This conception of reasonableness based on external refer-
ence can further be found in literary epistemology, especially in
Paisley Livingston’s (1988) views of specifically literary knowl-
edge. If the natural sciences are taken as valid but not algorithmic
ways of looking for the truth about the world, Livingston argues,
literary studies themselves would be freed from the impasse cre-
ated by the requirement for axiomatic and absolute knowledge. In
order to define those aspects of natural scientific theory that
should be adopted into the humanities, Livingston calls upon a
realist epistemology which would accept that science, on the one
hand, cannot form a perfect algorithm for life, but, on the other
hand, is not completely isolated from other human concerns. The
benefit in accepting the fallibility of knowledge is, according to
Paulson, Toulmin and Livingston, that it makes possible a non-
absolute, non-reductive model for how the mind can gain infor-
mation from reality.
Such scholars base their thinking on the existence of an ex-
ternal, physical reality which does impinge on human minds and
which can be described in language, even if not with absolute pre-
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cision. Such philosophical realism is the first step in the formation
of a humanist approach towards chaos and literary epistemology.
The second is to connect philosophical realism to the realist tradi-
tion of literary representation.
Mimesis through Universal Dynamics
In her incisive study of nineteenth-century realism Lilian R. Furst
(1995) argues that even the traditional realist novelists had neither
a naive nor a monolithic view of what representation of reality in
literature might mean. Even though her stated aim (Furst 1995:
16-17) is to ‘extricate realism from the quagmire of mimesis’ and
to argue that realism should not be equated with a referential pur-
pose  but  rather  with  a  desire  to  create  a  credible  illusion,  Furst
(1995: 12) also allows for the credibility of the illusion to be
judged in relation to a shared reality: ‘It is the sustained dialogue
between reference to actuality and the textual creation of a fabri-
cated realm that is the distinctive hallmark of the realist novel’,
she argues. For expressing this dual nature of the realist novel
Furst (1995: 36-38) adopts Benjamin Harshav’s (formerly Hru-
sovski) view of an equally dual system of reference: that of ‘exter-
nal’ and of ‘internal’ reference. ‘The realists are, indeed, conspicu-
ous for holding their texts open to outside data, appropriating
them in order to make close connections between the real and the
fictional domains,’ she suggests.
The external field of reference [...] merges seamlessly with the in-
ternal one. The conversion that is abrupt in the deviance of the
poem is so gradual and gentle in realist fiction as to be virtually
imperceptible. [...] It makes constant use of a dual system of ref-
erence, to the point where its slippery pretenses even blur the dis-
tinctions between apparently ordinary sentences and possibly de-
viant ones. [...] The coexistence of the dual system of reference is
at once a consequence, and expression, and a reinforcement of
the porosity between the real and the fictional worlds. (Furst
1995: 45)
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Following Furst’s application of this dual system of reference, a
literary work, when it is understood in terms of its process-like
characteristics, could also be seen as a combination of kinds of
reference and with various epistemological purposes.
Furthermore, the conceptual separation between external and
internal reference creates an important parallel with certain
strands in recent discussions on mimesis. Rather than being seen
simply as a form of copying reality, scholars such as Paul Ricoeur
(1983/1984) and Stephen Halliwell (2002) have understood mi-
mesis in the Aristotelian sense as both invention and discovery, as
imitation that is a re-enactment rather than a copy.85 Halliwell
(2002: 22-24) convincingly argues that the mimetic tradition is
much more varied than the common translation of the term as
‘imitation’ allows, and that the debates over the different versions
(and, indeed, over whether the concept should be applied to art at
all) have taken place between two different attitudes to represen-
tation: an ‘outward-looking’ or ‘world-reflecting’ view on the one
hand, and a more inward-looking or ‘world-creating’ view on the
other.
On the first of these interpretations, mimesis incorporates a re-
sponse to a reality (whether particular or general) that is believed
to exist outside and independently of art. It engages with this re-
ality, or at the very least with other experiences and perceptions
of it, and has the capacity to promote and enlighten the under-
standing of it. On the second interpretation, mimesis is the pro-
duction of a ‘heterocosm’ [...], an imaginary world-in-itself, which
may resemble or remind us of the real world in certain respects
(and may thus in some cases be partly a matter of ‘worldlike’ con-
sistency or plausibility), but is not to be judged primarily or di-
rectly by comparison to it. (Halliwell 2002: 23)
Based on Halliwell’s definition, the outward-looking interpretation
of mimesis views the world as a necessary element in art and sug-
gests that in discarding its worldliness art would lose one of the
85 Even Furst (1995: 60-61) rehabilitates this sense of mimesis at the very
end of her study, where she argues that although mimesis as mirroring is a
useless concept, it becomes vital when understood as skillful enactment.
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aspects that make it most valuable to human beings: its cognitive
function as a producer of new content for human thought. This
does not mean, however, becoming blind to the creative and im-
aginative nature of art, but rather it is an understanding that both
are needed, even if different works of art emphasise the two as-
pects in different ways.
In fact, mimesis is not an issue generally discussed in con-
junction with chaos theory. Hayles (1990), for example, while ad-
mirably covering the reciprocities between chaos theory on the
one hand and identity, the experience of time and literary form on
the other, does not directly comment on representation or mime-
sis. She views chaos primarily as the noise in the message, and due
to her focus on poststructuralist theory, she is not interested in
discussing the interfaces between chaotic dynamics and reference.
Argyros, on the other hand, spends half of his book A Blessed
Rage for Order (1991) on establishing a connection between the dy-
namics of literature and those of reality, a connection which de-
rives from seeing the universe as a series of evolving hierarchies.
He further suggests that the reproduction of dynamic forms from
level  to level  is  a  form of mimesis.  As I  indicated in section 3.1,
one of Argyros’s suggestions is that literature is nonlinear because
reality is. Strange attractors restrict the behaviour of a chaotic sys-
tem to a particular area of phase space while still allowing it an in-
finite number of paths to take within that restricted area. Similarly
narrative, Argyros (1991: 319) suggests, ‘exists in the economy be-
tween Platonic fixity and Foucauldian relativity – describing a
form which is at once cross-culturally universal and locally duc-
tile’. Furthermore, because of this similarity in dynamic form be-
tween  narrative  and  nature,  he  argues,  ‘[n]arrative  is  indeed  mi-
metic. It imitates nature’ (Argyros 1991: 321).
Argyros focuses on the universality of chaos dynamics, and
combines them with evolutionary theory and Jakob von Uexküll’s
semiotic umwelts to form a cosmology in which human cultural
production is part of an evolving, hierarchical system that encom-
passes everything from subatomic particles to poetry. In such a
universe the human mind would not be an outside observer able
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to rationally access knowledge, but part and parcel of it: ‘The
mind simply does the work of nature at a higher pitch, that is, it is
more active, spontaneous, generative, hierarchical, and creative
than the lower evolutionary levels of which it is composed’ (Argy-
ros 1991: 187). The connections within such a system bring the
physical universe within the scope of human thought, making
both scientific knowledge and literary representation possible. A
human knows what it is like to be a rock, Argyros (1991: 182-184)
suggests, because she is subject to the same physical laws of iner-
tia, gravity etc. that rule the umwelt of the rock. While the connec-
tion is real, accessing it with the conscious mind is more difficult.
The only ways of expressing such knowledge in language are ab-
stractions: ‘level-specific knowledge of the world of a rat or a rock
is, for the most part, so primitive that it is, in principle, unavail-
able to conscious reflection except as a top down theory or fic-
tion’ (Argyros 1991: 183).
If chaos theory helps Argyros to connect mind to reality, the
same is true of narrative:
A narrative is a hypothesis about the nature of an existing slice of
reality or about the potential consequences of certain variations
on a model of the world. Inasmuch as narratives tend to be
shared, they perform on an intersubjective, cultural level what our
central nervous system does at the level of the individual. (Argy-
ros 1991: 316)
Thus both fictional and factual narratives are another reflection of
the universal complex dynamics that are expressed in all the dif-
ferent umwelts. Since chaos theory reveals how a system following
simple laws can develop fantastically complex behaviour, Argyros
(1991: 316-321) also argues that it helps us to accept the fact that
human beings will map their world through causal narratives. In
Argyros’s thinking chaos theory shows that deterministic phe-
nomena can still be amazingly complex, and therefore there is no
reason to fear, as Lyotard (1984) does, that our preference of
grand narratives would automatically make our conceptual uni-
verse more simplistic:
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A common presupposition of contemporary thought is that
complexity and teleology are engaged in a zero-sum game – a re-
lation in which an increase in teleological dynamics must be paid
for by a decrease in complexity. Implied in such a view is a con-
ception of teleology as a deterministic frame inimical to the inde-
terministic richness of complexity. I believe that chaos offers a
model of complexity which can correct this widespread notion by
allowing for a relation between complexity and teleology that is
best understood as a mutually enhancing feedback loop. (Argyros
1991: 317)
This view, Argyros argues, could end the solipsism in which liter-
ary studies found itself in the late 1980s. ‘[T]he only nonmeta-
physical way around the impasse generated by the apotheosis of
textuality’, Argyros (1991: 6) writes, ‘is through a kind of founda-
tionalism  based  on  a  view  of  the  universe  as  a  communicative,
dynamical, and evolving system’, whose dynamics depend on a
complex network of interacting, self-similar hierarchies. Accessing
knowledge between different levels can be done through either
the supposedly top-down methods of science or through embod-
ied knowledge and imagination, both of which have their limita-
tions.
Argyros’s argument about the chaotic connection between
mind and world explores the same ground as the discussions on
mimesis. The embodied knowledge of the umwelt of  the  rock
which he envisions is unavailable to rational thought or straight-
forward representation, and it can be accessed only by the experi-
ence of certain laws of physics, and only represented by a ‘fiction’.
Similarly, the concept of mimesis as artistic representation de-
pends on the separation of certain elements of human experience
as accessible only to intuition and imagination. However, as dis-
cussed in chapter 2, humanist interpretations do not lead to a
view of art just for art’s sake, but contextualise the work of art in
an external reality. Literature, rather than being entirely autono-
mous imaginative activity,  is  viewed as one way in which human
imagination replicates the chaotic dynamics of the physical world
and produces works that are artificially autonomous in Paulson’s
(1988: 135) sense. A similar argument will be made further in this
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chapter about Graham’s and Stoppard’s writing, which suggests
that both are realist authors of sorts. However, in order to navi-
gate between the variety of ways in which ‘realism’ has been un-
derstood in literary scholarship, it is necessary to specify that these
recent writers are externalist realists. I derive the term ‘externalism’
from epistemology and use it here in the sense suggested by Mark
Rowlands (1999: ix): ‘the idea that the contents of the mind are, in
some sense at least, worldly: they are environmentally constituted’.
Although I do not follow any specific or philosophically defined
sense of externalism, my use of the term roughly follows the epis-
temological division between externalism and internalism; that is,
justifying knowledge through a fallible embodied and external ref-
erence rather than through self-consistent internal reflection
alone.86
Externalist  realism is  thus a  view of the nature and purpose
of fiction and it acts as an identifying label for those works of lit-
erature and literary criticism that take the existence and the rele-
vance of a shared, physical reality to be one of the major elements
in literary communication. Naturally, this does not mean that they
would present literature as just another form of non-fictional dis-
course. The assumption made by externalist realism is that literary
works are representations that function on the basis of their refer-
ence  to  reality,  but  are  not  limited  to  it.  To  this  assumption  is
added an interest in the discoveries made by science, which to-
gether result in works that focus on the ways in which our knowl-
edge of physical reality, whether human bodies, other organisms
or elementary particles, can be expressed through artistic means.
As my two exemplary authors are a poet and a dramatist, it is
clear that externalist realism is not limited to narrative fiction, but
includes works of prose, drama and poetry as well as literary criti-
cism and theory. Although my definition arises from the limited
86 For more on exernalism in epistemology see Luntley 1999. I have previ-
ously used ‘externalism’ as such as a term to describe this literary phe-
nomenon (Polvinen 2003: 50), but found it necessary to adopt the more
specific term of ‘externalist realism’ in order to contextualise it better within
the field of literary studies.
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number of authors and scholars whose works both refer to chaos
theory and display an externalist realist attitude, I also believe the
term can be useful in defining a much larger phenomenon in con-
temporary literature.87 In the final analysis, externalist realism is
like literary realism in general in that its aim is to present reality
largely as it is, but rather than concentrate exclusively on the reali-
ties of human experience and social interaction, externalist realism
also  attempts  to  present  to  readers  forms  of  physical  reality  that
may be, and often are, as far away from normal human experience
as can be imagined. Stoppard and Graham, for example, write
about cosmology, quantum mechanics and chaos with the aim of
making these phenomena present in readers’ minds, and not only
87 Some further theoretical fields are useful to mention in order to triangu-
late the position of externalist realism: biopoetics, ecocriticism and phe-
nomenology. Biopoetics is a theoretical outlook which sees literature in
terms of evolution, particularly evolutionary psychology (see e.g. Carroll
1999). Although externalist realists share with biopoetics their appreciation
of what science has been able to discover about the physical context of
human existence, the focus of biopoetics is almost exclusively on explaining
the behaviour of literary characters in terms of evolutionary principles.
Similarly, ecocriticism begins with a principle shared by externalist realists:
that there is a relationship between the human mind and its environment
and that it is interesting and valid to examine how that relationship is ex-
pressed in literature (Glotfelty 1996: xix). However, the actual practice of
ecocriticism tends to concentrate only on the biosphere: on human interac-
tion with the natural environment. The externalist realists have a wider and
perhaps more philosophical interest in the relationship between humanity
and the surrounding universe. They do not limit themselves to the plane-
tary environment or to the level of the human senses, but attempt to ap-
proach even more fundamental issues in physics, such as the universal
mathematical rules of dynamics. Further, there are certain affinities between
externalist realism and phenomenology in the sense that both emphasise
bodily experience of the otherness of reality, although they differ in that
phenomenologists have traditionally only accepted the experiences available
through the senses of an individual (Desroches 2003), whereas externalist
realists also embrace the intersubjective knowledge that is derived from the
scientific enterprise. Where phenomenology takes the view that the natural
sciences represent a world-view which must be supplanted by an individual
encounter with an object in all its otherness, for the externalist realists the
universe presented by science is a source of inspiration.
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because they happen to be a poignant symbol for some aspect of
human life. Authors can and should try to talk about physical
phenomena; to produce drama, poetry and fiction that shares with
science the very human excitement over things that are not hu-
man.
It is also important to emphasise that the externalist realism I
am describing does not assume either positivism or mechanism.
The relationship between mind and reality advocated is still a hu-
manist approach, and not described in absolute terms, nor is it
explainable through the description of brain states alone. As I ar-
gued in chapter 3, this view of chaos theory, particularly the no-
tion of emergent complexity, provides a way of conceiving of the
mind as an emergent property which is determined by physical
laws but whose behaviour is, nevertheless, unpredictable in terms
of those laws.  Thus bringing scientific  ideas to bear on literature
does not in this case imply belief in a totally value-free science, in
the supremacy of science and technology, or a physicalist or natu-
ralist reduction of the human sciences to materialist principles. In-
stead, externalist realists are driven by what Martin Eger (1993:
201) calls the ‘cosmological interest’: a cognitive drive to compre-
hend human experience in conjunction with its physical context.
Externalist Realism and Metafiction
When dealing with a theory of physics in relation to literature it is
very easy to adopt the assumption that conceptual models repro-
duce the objects they are modelling. Such a view not only distorts
the ontology of art, but also misrepresents the scientific world-
view. Trying to match language to reality in a way that would re-
produce all the aspects of that reality is of course pointless: the
ever-pithy Raymond Tallis (1988/2000: 127), for instance, notes
that ‘no amount of fiddling with words and meanings could make
the word “itchy” itself itchy’. The discussion of how ‘itchy’ can
represent itchiness without itself being itchy is also self-
consciously  thematised in externalist  realist  texts  and is  taken up
in discussions over the status of metafiction. While Tallis’s point
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holds in terms of the details of the linguistic system, there are crit-
ics and authors who have suggested that there is something in lin-
guistic representation that replicates not the objects, but the dy-
namics of reality.
One of the ways in which such a replication has been envi-
sioned is through a particularly postmodern version of mimesis, in
which the real is conceived as an unstable field, and literature al-
legedly reflects that instability. A fractured text is mimetic be-
cause, as chaos theory has revealed, reality itself is fractured.88
One of the less helpful, yet widely spread views of how such
structural mimesis appears in literature is comparing the butterfly
effect to novel plots where small events have disproportionately
large effects on the lives of fictional characters. For example Gil-
lespie’s (2003: 70) note that the society of Beowulf is sensitive to
initial conditions because ‘[a] warrior’s choice of the garments that
he will wear to a particular feast can alter the likelihood of peace
or war between two peoples’ is unlikely to deepen our under-
standing of the poem. Most authors (e.g. Hawkins 1995: 16) point
out that such situations are typical of literary plots, but do not go
on to show how viewing the behaviour of plots as chaotic would
help us understand them any better than narratology does.
As I noted in the Introduction, Stoicheff’s article ‘The Chaos
of Metafiction’  makes the bold claim that  ‘a  metafiction text is a
complex system’ (1991: 85). Equating Barthes’s jouissance with the
generation of patterns by complex dynamics Stoicheff (1991: 87-
88) argues that reflectivity makes a metafictional text a chaotic
system in which ‘the text’s limitless potential for interpretation
and the author’s relinquished power’ act like a creative dynamo.
However, Stoicheff does not accept the idea that the replication
of the functioning of dynamical systems would make metafiction
mimetic. ‘Metafiction’, Stoicheff (1991: 87) claims, ‘is a synchronic
response to the chaotic nature of its medium, and the structures
88 See also McHale (1987: 38), who notes how mimetic effects in postmod-
ern literature ‘are accomplished not so much at the level of its content,
which is often manifestly un- or anti-realistic, as at the level of form’ (also
quoted in Slethaug 2000: 7).
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inherent in it are a consequence of the dynamics of language, not
a reflection of the chaotic phenomenal or ontological realities that
all art, in some way, engages’. As Hayles (1991b: 22) notes in her
introduction to the collection in which Stoicheff’s article appears,
Stoicheff ‘attributes the convergence between postmodern litera-
ture and science to a “narrative of chaos” that is characteristic of
the present moment’, meaning that metafiction and chaos theory
would in Stoicheff’s opinion be similar because both are ruled by
a master narrative.
Thus Stoicheff suggests that metafiction shares the dynamics
of chaos not because it is representative of the chaotic dynamics
which occur in the real world, but because such dynamics rule the
function of language, and the functions of language are what
metafiction represents. Nevertheless, Stoicheff keeps referring to
the relationship between the text and the world, and bases his ar-
gument of the inherent unnaturalness of non-metafictional fiction
on the discrepancy between the simple and ordered fiction and
the chaos of the phenomenal world (1991: 85, 91).89 At the end of
his article this tendency becomes a conscious statement of the
‘nice irony’ inherent in the idea that metafiction unintentionally
replicates the dynamics of reality:
If we were now to take into consideration the possibility that the
phenomenal world itself is chaotic, infinitely self-replicating and
fractally ordered, the antimimetic properties in metafiction be-
speak a nice irony. Metafiction begins with a distaste for purport-
edly referential or realistic literature and yet, in its reaction against
such, nevertheless manifests the structures of the chaotic phe-
nomenal world. The difference is that metafiction generates those
structures in itself, and so, although not mimetic of a chaotic world,
nevertheless shares its aspects. Just as ‘the approximation of a
coastline to a fractal is better than its approximation to a smooth
89 Similar comparison between chaos theory and the way art simultaneously
represents the complexity of life and makes it manageable can be found in
Slethaug (2000: xv): ‘Since art is a means of imposing order upon experi-
ence, it puts under erasure, as Derrida would say, all the flux and nonlinear-
ity that constitutes life, but then reinscribes it through narration’.
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curve’, so are reality’s contours closer to metafiction’s than to
mimetic fiction’s. (Stoicheff 1991: 94, quoting Paul Davies)
I would say that Stoicheff has the relationship between literature
and the world backwards: rather than taking literature to be a
function of the way we relate to the physical and social realities of
our embodied existence, Stoicheff (1991: 95) takes the position
that ‘our interpretation of our world is a function of our reading
of texts’. Further, because his starting point is in the assumption
that language rules itself, Stoicheff makes no separation between
texts that deliberately invite open readings and texts that do not –
that is, he does not allow for either authorial intention or even for
textual structures that do not support metafictional readings.
John Barth’s metafictional play is an example of a very differ-
ent view of the relationship between metafiction and mimesis. As
discussed in chapter 3, Barth creates an authorial persona which
underlines its own constructedness but still comes across as an
individual voice. Furthermore, his account in the essay ‘Very Like
an Elephant: Reality versus Realism’ (1995: 136-143) of the rela-
tionship between metafiction and mimesis explicitly begins with
the idea of ‘Reality’ with a decidedly capital R. ‘It was not invented
by “realistic” novelists and painters, although our perception of it
can doubtless be influenced by art as surely as changes in a cul-
ture’s perceptions influence what passes for artistic realism’, Barth
(1995: 139) declares. What his metafictions depose is not reality
but the conventions of realism: the ‘“Windex” approach’ which
aims to give readers an illusion of reality by the means of invisible
language (Barth 1995: 141).
In general terms, in the Stuttgart lectures Barth (1995: 347-
348) views chaos theory as an interesting new way of ‘making
sense of the world’.  At the very end of his  last  lecture,  however,
he also makes the connection between chaos theory and the use
of metafictional technique in what I would call an externalist real-
ist literature. Being aware of both the dynamics described in chaos
theory and of the development of similar dynamics in the history
of literature, Barth (1995: 348) notes, makes him as a novelist able
to do deliberately what others may do unconsciously. The deliber-
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ate use of chaos theory as the self-similar dynamics that connect
into a single continuum elementary particles, human lovers and
the  movement  of  both  galaxies  and  narratives  is  evident  in On
With the Story (see 2.3). Rather than go into details of the stories
that  have already been discussed above,  I  would like to draw at-
tention to one that has the joy in both reality and language as its
core. ‘Good-bye to the Fruits’ has the simple premise of narrating
the  experiences  of  a  man  who  has  ‘agreed  to  die’,  but  with  the
stipulation that he first be allowed to say goodbye to ‘those of
Earth’s fruits that he had particularly enjoyed in his fortunate
though not-extraordinary lifetime’ (OS 192).  He  begins  with  ‘ap-
ples and oranges’, but quickly the story expands to talk in sensu-
ous language about more exotic fruits from the lime to the guava,
and further, to other foods, to the taste of kisses and to ‘those
flora and fauna that one eats only with one’s eyes’, that is, natural
landscapes (OS 192-196). Finally, after including both humans and
their  artefacts  in his  list,  he turns,  in a  way familiar  from Barth’s
earlier use of conceptual loops, to the words that describe all the
things he has seen and heard and tasted, ‘that most supple, versa-
tile, and ubiquitous of humanisms, language’ (OS 201). The words
form a continuity with things, are about the fruits and about
themselves, and both have a value worth celebrating.
The two different attitudes visible in Barth on the one hand
and Stoicheff in the other fall into the two different categories of
metafiction identified by Patricia Waugh (1984/1985: 53): one
which ‘finally accepts a substantial real world whose significance is
not entirely composed of relationships within language’ and the
other which ‘suggests there can never be an escape from the
prisonhouse of language and either delights or despairs in this’.
The first of these approaches would quite happily accommodate
the  idea  that  the  real  world  is  representable,  it  is  only  that  the
methods of traditional realism are inadequate for such a represen-
tation. From this perspective it is also perfectly possible for an ex-
ternalist realist text to accommodate the techniques of metafic-
tion, and the externalist realist attitude and an interest in literary
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form are by no means exclusive of each other. As Paulson (2001b:
6-7) puts it:
Literature is both referential and rhetorical: it helps its readers to
interact with both the variety of the world over time and space
and the variety of possibilities for knowing and imagining the
world through language. Both modes of reading – directed to-
wards the world and directed towards discourse – are parts of the
requisite diversity needed for steering an adaptable course and
constructing a viable pluralistic future.
Representing the dynamics of the natural world could thus be, at
the  same  time,  a  representation  of  the  dynamics  of  art.  Such  a
suggestion is made, for instance, by Sheila Emerson (1991: 162) in
her essay on the similarities between Ruskin’s view of natural or-
der and chaos theory. Emerson analyses a passage in which
Ruskin describes sketching an aspen and finding that the act of
drawing seems to function according to laws that go beyond his
hand. Ruskin’s sketch, Emerson argues, thus becomes ‘a picture
of the laws of composition, a picture of relations between mind
and its objects. The picture is a statement about, not a mere imita-
tion of, two things at once: about how a tree is composed, and
about how an artist composes’.
The idea that the conventions of realism alone are not en-
ough to represent a world ruled by chaotic dynamics is also pre-
sent in Leslie Forbes’s novel Bombay Ice (1998). In this multi-
layered rewriting of Shakespeare’s The Tempest and As You Like It,
Rosalind, a half-Indian, half-Scottish journalist returns from Brit-
ain to Bombay to see her sister Miranda, only to be almost annihi-
lated by the chaotic forces of monsoon weather and the rampant
crime and corruption within the Bollywood movie-making indus-
try. Armed with the knowledge of chaotic weather patterns gained
from her meteorologist father, Rosalind sets out to map the pat-
terns of events around her sister’s marriage and a series of deaths
connected to her new family. She is pulled into the violent world
of Miranda’s husband, director Prosper Sharma, who is filming
The Tempest. Sharma’s version of the play begins as a realistic film
and then, towards the end turns more and more to the lushly the-
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atrical style familiar from the fantasy sequences of Bollywood
films (Forbes 1998: 382). Jamie James (1998: n.p.) in his New York
Times review of the novel draws attention to its intertexts: these
include not only Shakespeare, but Raymond Chandler, Hollywood
noir and other ‘baroque encrustations’ of literary and cinematic
allusions. The mixing of such different worlds into a single narra-
tive creates a ‘pervasive tone of literary fantasia’, which James
judges to be occasionally mannered, but also one that ‘makes the
reader more willing to suspend disbelief’. The contrast between
the fairy-tale perfection of the worlds created in Bollywood films
and the phantasmagoric mood of the corrupt and violent movie-
making industry which creates those images, underlines the differ-
ence between imitation as representation and as mirroring.
Forbes’s choice of literary technique is voiced by the central Cali-
ban-character, another Bollywood film-director, as a non-realistic
way of constructing a true-to-life picture: ‘the map of Bombay is
reflected in its movies, and just as the best map is not the one that
perfectly represents reality, so the best expression of this city can-
not be achieved by celluloid realism’ (Forbes 1998: 4). Thus the
novel strongly emphasises the possibility that non-realist literary
forms can, by using the dynamics of chaos, create realistic repre-
sentations.
Chaos theory has so far been a source of inspiration to sev-
eral different conceptions of the relationship between mind, litera-
ture and reality: it has been seen as proof of the dissemination of
meaning in a textual universe and as a way of revitalising realism
due to the connection implied by the shared dynamics between
mind,  language  and  reality.  In  the  following  I  shall  take  a  closer
look at the works of a poet who does not only attempt to repre-
sent reality in words, but also bring that reality into presence
within the bodies of her readers.
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4.2 Jorie Graham and the Bodily Connection
He  has  a  feeling  that  he  can’t  find  words  for,  al-
though it is to do with his poetry. [...] It is a brief
knowledge of his own temporary body, all the soft
slippery dark organs, all the minute interlocking
bones, all the snaking, fizzing, prickling veins and
nerves. It is the knowledge that he is inside this skin,
and it is intensely pleasurable because it always goes
with  a  sense  of  the  huge  sweep  and  intricacy  and
age of what is outside hair, skin, eyeballs, nostrils, lips
and the helix of the ear. It is the irrational pleasure
of a creature in the fact that its surroundings were
there long before its own appearance, and will be
there long after.
A.S. Byatt, Babel Tower
Jorie Graham is a poet who keeps trying to push the limits of the
unsayable. Her writing, Graham herself has claimed, is ‘an attempt
to say “are you there?” to a nonidealist, a pragmatist, a reader who
doesn’t necessarily even believe in literature; most importantly,
though, a reader who doesn’t believe that words are telling the
truth’ (Graham 1987/1999: 232). As the title of her selected po-
ems The Dream of a Unifield Field (1995/1996) suggests, Graham’s
writing is much influenced by scientific ideas, and she is a prime
example of an author who, without a formal education in the sci-
ences,  is  able  to  absorb  current  scientific  ideas  and  use  them as
raw material for poetry. But the title not only refers to one of the
unsolved puzzles of theoretical physics, but is also a metaphor for
the desire in Graham’s poetry to connect reality, experience and
language into an interactive whole.
In this dream, chaos theory and complexity appear as ways of
conceptualising the dynamics of those interactions, as ways of
finding words for the feelings that A.S. Byatt’s poet experiences in
the epigraph. Adelaide Morris (2006) has drawn attention to the
resemblance between chaos theory and the ‘linked interactions’
that occur in Graham’s poem ‘Event Horizon’ (Graham 1993: 50-
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54), where organisation and collapse occur in various systems
from the Trojan civilisation to soap bubbles (whose complex ge-
ometry Rebecca Goldstein’s short story also evoked). In the fol-
lowing I will present more instances where Graham’s poetry
draws on chaos theory, and argue that at the root of her work is
the movement between the pleasure of being inside and the con-
sciousness of all that is outside, as well as the notion that the
mind’s abstractions could actually be self-similar with the physical
universe.
The Physics of the Imagination
Central to Graham’s poetry is the dual attempt of establishing the
world as the other and yet gaining knowledge from it. An explicit
example of the first theme can be found in the opening poem of
Overlord (2005), which describes a childhood realisation that hu-
man consciousness can be absent from its physical moment, that
it can move in time and space. In ‘Other’ (O 1-3) the speaker re-
members a school day spent at home sick and the moment when
the child imagined her name being called out in the classroom: ‘I
heard it said the second time into the grayish morninglight | over
the rows and rows of chairs, the gleaming fullness of them,
empty, as children stood. | There was nothing I could do. I saw it
as I heard it – “absent” – | said out into the room’.
Next the realisation hits her that the tree outside her window
could not do what she just did: ‘It could not be | absent. [...] [W]hat
of it could ever retreat, | leaving only part of itself present?’ That
which has not the human capacity to imagine itself somewhere
else, the tree and the physical objects in her bedroom, are sud-
denly the truly other.
Graham is not, however, satisfied with just establishing the
otherness of the physical world, but is equally insistent in gaining
knowledge of it. The conduit for the knowledge that passes from
the world to the mind is the human body. As Joanna Klink has
noted (2002: 189), Graham’s project
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involves two motions of spirit: on the one hand, coaxing ideas –
in their pre-entanglement with things – out of the visible world,
that they might be apprehended and recognized; on the other
hand, translating ideas into physical realities, bringing them down
into the body so that they are particular, concrete, visceral,
known.
Ideas and abstractions like imagination and otherness are in these
poems embroiled in embodiment and, indeed, rather than taking
the abstracting mind and the concrete body as opposing or sepa-
rate entities, Graham sees the ‘[a]bstraction in which the body
thinks in its unbodily reaches’ as ‘the crucial metaphysical exten-
sion of bodily knowledge’ (Graham 1996, n.p.). Like Barth, she
builds the bodily conduit between mind and reality by bringing
the history of humanity into herself, by processing the myths and
turning-points within her writing, thus making the act of literary
representation into a ‘fractal enactment’. ‘This might seem exces-
sive to some’, she tells Thomas Gardner in an interview,
but I feel that poems are enactments, ritualistic enactments, frac-
tal enactments – in language, of historical motions. And in the
process of them, you experience your accountability. You feel, in
yourself, those crucial motions the culture has effected because
you feel yourself actually doing them, undertaking them – help-
lessly, really – in the poem’ (Graham 1987/1999: 221).
The embodied experience of things that have not actually hap-
pened to that individual body are possible, Graham thus suggests,
because of the fractal self-similarity of the chaotic dynamics of the
universe.
One example of her explorations of the shared dynamics of
mind,  body  and world  is  ‘Vertigo’  from The End of Beauty (1987,
republished in Graham 1995/1996: 64-65). In this poem Graham
makes the force of narrative (in particular the narrative of ‘falling’
in love) physically felt by describing it as the vertiginous feeling of
gravitational pull while standing on a cliff.
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She leaned out. What is it pulls at one, she wondered,
what? That it has no shape but point of view?
That it cannot move to hold us?
Oh it has vibrancy, she thought, this emptiness, this intake just
prior to
the start of a story, the mind trying to fasten
and fasten, the mind feeling it like a sickness this wanting
to snag, catch hold, begin, the mind crawling out to the edge of the cliff
and feeling the body as if for the first time [...].
The third-person narration Graham uses instead of her more
usual lyrical first person emphasises the idea of narrative, whereas
the stretched fourth line and the outride90 ‘prior to’ strengthen the
feeling of a body at the edge of a precipice, which the following
line plunges into the dizzying fall of story. As Helen Vendler
(1995: 77-79) has argued, Graham’s long lines and enjambments
have a narrative function, extending the narrative space of the
poem both horizontally and, through the long sentences, verti-
cally. Vendler also makes the suggestion that the development of
Graham’s poetry from early short-lined poems to the ‘sprawling’
lines and outrides of the later ones has to do with her emphasising
unpredictability over ‘shapely organic form’. To be more exact, I
would argue that what has taken place is a change in Graham’s
conception of what organic form is, a change facilitated by the
discoveries of chaos theory and the complexity of biological
forms. In ‘Vertigo’, the connection formed between the physical
force of gravity and the mental narrative pull is a typical example
of Graham’s efforts to bring the physical and the mental together
without, however, subsuming one to the other.
The feedback between the otherness of the material world
and the embodied human mind is in these poems driven by un-
quenchable curiosity. Without it, the world recedes into flat ordi-
nariness and the process through which ideas are generated is lost.
It is obvious that the natural sciences provide Graham with much
of the fuel for her curiosity, and her poems include references to
90 This term is adapted from Gerard Manley Hopkins by Helen Vendler
(1995: 79) to refer to Graham’s ‘small piece-lines dropping down at the
right margin of their precursor line’.
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everything from plant taxonomy to quantum mechanics. What
she gains from the natural sciences, in addition to the satisfaction
of curiosity,  is  a  new way of looking at  things.  This  new kind of
looking is then utilised in her poetry as the ground which, as in
‘Vertigo’, simultaneously pulls at the lyrical voice and forms an
opposite for her. As Gardner (1999: 202, quoting Graham 1997:
44) has noted, the incomprehensibility always present in Graham’s
poetry ‘opens the possibility for renewal – for an encounter with
“the world made strange again” in our experience of its impene-
trability’.
This meeting with something that resists, something that
stays opaque, becomes an ethical issue in ‘Upon Emergence’, in
Overlord (20-22). The title reflects the emergent complexity of life:
the ‘mottled interminable | forms’ of plants and insects in the
speaker’s garden. Secondly, the poem presents multiple subjects
for the verb ‘emerge’: the mind waking to reality, the details of life
entering the speaker’s body, but also visible surfaces or (mere) ap-
pearances. While Graham continues to look for the bodily con-
nection between mind and reality, she at the same time expresses
anguish at the thought that such a connection would do violence
to the other. William Olsen (1991: 87) has noted that Graham re-
jects the romantic conception of nature being at its most perfect
in observation, that ‘the physical world is impoverished unless we
grant it the benediction of our attention’. Instead, for her the
mind, lording it over nature, may instead be a wrathful and violent
God.  ‘Before  I  think  it,  |  what  is  its  state?’  she  asks.  ‘And  if  I
summon it | to mind, if I begin to summon it? Unbearable | tyr-
anny’. This tyranny towards matter puts the human mind in a po-
sition similar to that of God. The speaker of the poem sits, like a
deity, ‘at the very edge | of the garden, paying out my attention’.
She sees the garden, accepts its reality, but when attempting to
reach for the existence of the geraniums, the rocks and the birds,
finds that she is, in fact, pulling them into her own mind. How-
ever, the final poem of Overlord, ‘Posterity’ (O 86-88) returns read-
ers to the gaze on the garden and to the entreaty for the existence
of the material other in a more optimistic mood: ‘To praise to re-
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call to memorialize to summon to mind | the thing itself – forgive
me – the given thing – that you might have persuaded yourself is |
invisible, | unknowable, creature of context – it is there, it is
there, it needs to be there’. The ‘thingness’ of physical reality is
what Graham needs and reaches for in poetry, whether it is waves
on the beach or grubs in the garden.
The collection Region of Unlikeness (1991) also focuses on such
impenetrability. Graham takes her title from St Augustine’s Confes-
sions to signify the areas where the otherness of things, physical
reality in particular, makes thinking possible. Throughout the col-
lection there is an emphasis on edges and skins, self-definitions
and imposed definitions. In ‘Chaos (Eve)’ (RU 46-53), in particu-
lar, Graham blends the seemingly paradoxical nature of chaotic
systems as unpredictable yet describable phenomena with a de-
scription of the creation of the skin of humanity – the border
which shuts us away from the world, yet makes existence possible
through the distinction between self and other. The poem opens
with the creation of Adam out of skins patched together and filled
with life, and with Eve still inside, ‘awake, wearing him tight all
round her’. In the second section the speaker describes an aged
and senile grandmother whose exterior also closes in an infinity of
unseen life. The grandmother is seen either as an unmoving body
or a mind that cannot be reached, except by a trace on a carpet,
left by her shuffling orbits in the family’s living room. The trace is
both the horizontal figure eight, the symbol of infinity, and Lo-
renz’s butterfly attractor with its pair of different-sized loops (see
fig. 2 in the Introduction):
a figure eight –
 one wing more pronounced where it wrapped all night
round the recliner he’d
 fall asleep in.
[...]
 The other wing
wove round the low table with all the wrapped candy –
 Here have some, have some, gesturing towards our bodies –
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Like a dynamical system which reveals its orderliness once its be-
haviour is plotted onto a graph, the life of the grandmother, en-
cased within that of her husband and (grand)children, but also in-
accessible to them, only reveals its shape after the fact. In the final
section of the poem the grandmother’s life is finally liberated, like
Eve  out  of  Adam’s  body,  and  the  speaker  for  the  first  time  ex-
periences the older woman as a person separate from herself: ‘The
shape took hold. | Stepped free’.
Skin is a central image in ‘Chaos (Eve)’, functioning both as
the container which makes it possible to exist in a single shape
and to perceive the shape of others, and as the border which both
separates and connects humans to reality. The skin joins the mind
to the otherness of the world which, like the behaviour of a cha-
otic system, can be perceived and even comprehended, but not
controlled.
Lyricism and Comprehensibility
A similar link between separation and connection, or fragmenta-
tion and shape, can be seen in the structure of ‘Chaos (Eve)’. Wil-
liam Gillespie (2006), one of the few critics to have commented
on Graham’s use of chaos theory, notes that the line and sentence
breaks in this poem form a system where foregrounded breaks
are, nevertheless, joined into a flow by the enjambments at stanza
breaks and the conjunctions that begin sentences and sentence
fragments. The result is a dynamic that on the one hand empha-
sises its fragmentariness, but on the other uses self-similar con-
necting strategies on different levels of the poem’s structure to
cohere the fragmented sections in a rhythm.
In other words, the impact of chaos theory on Graham’s po-
etry can also be seen in the balance she builds between disruption
and comprehensibility. Graham does not confine herself to chaos
in its scientific sense, but combines it with the ancient concept of
primordial randomness out of which form is taken. Most of her
poems are written in free verse, which Graham defines not as the
absence of form but as the dynamic region closest to randomness
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(Graham 1987/1999: 227), a definition that matches the chaos
theorists’ definition of the edge of chaos as the most creative dy-
namics  in  nature  (e.g.  Lewin  1993).  The  term  chaos  also  desig-
nates for Graham the direct opposite of organised pattern, in
which case creativity exists in the area between the order and dis-
order. ‘Form, when it has power’ she says, ‘is form wrenched
from its opposite. I happen to favor work in which the potential
(or posited) power of chaos is great. Because I believe it is so in
the world. It feels right  to  me.  So  form  wrought  from  a  merely
suggested, hardly virile, chaos might seem more artificial to me,
less trustworthy’ (1987/1999: 228).
Once wrested from chaos, form functions as a source of
pleasure, and, as was shown to be the case with Stoppard and
Barth in chapter 2, it gives readers the beauty of a crafted object
as well as the unsettling effects of the possibility of infinite variety.
Thus the complexity on the surface of Graham’s poems is neces-
sary in order to awaken in readers a state of intuitive knowledge,
but at the same time they have certain attractiveness or lyricism.
In ‘Chaos (Eve)’ (RU 46-53), for example, the difficulty of the
poem lies in the fragmentary syntax and in the conceptual shifts
between the bizarre and mythical scenes of the creation of Adam
and the domestic ones of the senile grandmother and her past as a
wife and mother. However, the rhythm and alliterative structures
in the lines themselves pull readers on and help them settle into
the poem. The third section begins with a description of a birth –
a child out of a womb, Eve out of Adam’s body, or understanding
from the mass of incoherent thought – a description which con-
sists of a sentence that begins but never actually arrives at a con-
clusion, and contains many of the kinds of breaks described by
Gillespie.
      Because the hole that opens in him is the edge of matter,
the very edge,
the sensation of there not being enough
– that rip – and then the squinting to see
– what is it out there? –
out of which the taut beast begins to grow,
and rapidly, the sensation of lateness pulling up out of
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the sensation of there not being
enough
(as you up out of this now pull) –
rising up out of the gloam
like a name being called –
Readers may flounder through the complex shifts from phrase to
phrase without being able to settle on a clear meaning or even a
sentence structure, yet the onomatopoeic quality of the effort and
rushing in the lines (the monosyllables of ‘as you up out of this
now pull’, and the steadier rhythm of the last two lines provides a
calm ending to the rush before yet another shift of perspective.
Such lyricism, Graham (1987/1999: 233, 235) believes, maintains
a sense of meaning in readers. ‘Only music will allow us, as read-
ers to suspend ourselves out into “incomprehension” long en-
ough to awaken that intuitive aspect of our reading sensibility, and
permit us to sense it, feel that it can “know”’.  The knowledge of
the poem is an intuitive knowledge, the expectation and hope of
which fuels the ‘soul-forging pleasures of thinking’ (Graham 1990:
n.p.).
The effects of this attempt to balance intuitive knowing and
‘acquisition of information’ are evident in the poem ‘The Com-
plex Mechanism of the Break’ from Never (2002: 33-35), which
describes a mind observing a breaking wave, a classic example of
both fractal form and the dynamics of feedback. In Graham’s de-
scription the waves on a beach mirror the way the mind’s efforts
at description become a feedback process, and thought, while
aiming at the external, turns back on itself. The detailed descrip-
tion of the self-similar patterns is both a defamiliarisation of the
materiality of the waves and a description of the speaker’s
thought:
      Up close four different brown retreating furls just now (being forced
       to forward-break) re-
entering themselves. Each tripping over each as they are also forced
     into retreat.
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What is force? My love is forced from me as in retreat
from love. My gaze is forced back into me as it retreats
from thought.
The  rhythm  of  the  first  two  lines  recreates  the  rhythm  of  the
waves themselves, rushing towards the edge of the page before
breaking into the short outrides, with the continuation between
the lines created by the enjambed word ‘re-entering’. In the fol-
lowing two lines the repetition of ‘retreat’ at the end of the lines
echoes the final word of the second line outride and functions as
the representation of the self-similar action of wave after wave
and thought after thought.
At the end of the poem, however, the gaze lifts further out to
sea, where ‘it seems, | nothing but steady forward progress in its
perfect | time occurs: onward, onward: tiny patterns which | seen
from above must: it  is imagined: perfectly: shine’.  The balance in
the poem is formed between the desire to delve deeper into the
fractal details of physical existence and the distance required to
see any meaningful shape in the materiality. Both views are partial
and what must be accepted is not that they are therefore both un-
true, but that choosing the pertinent level of description is neces-
sary and that the most complete picture is gained by combining
many partial views from different scales.
In other words, there is a balance in Graham’s poetry be-
tween the ‘essentially futile’ act of trying to seize something in
words and ‘what leaks in between the attempts at seizure’ which
‘is the thing’ (Graham 1987/1999: 230). The final impossibility of
the task is what the poet has to accept in order to achieve a small
success. As Gardner (1999: 205) puts it: ‘Out of our exhaustion
and the collapse of explanation, perhaps we have become quiet
enough to notice the very first moments when the multiple begins
to form patterns, or the light takes on a shape, or a new diagram
begins’. Poetry, as one form of such patterning – as representa-
tions of the world which attempt to make the world graspable to a
human mind – may be the only real knowledge available of the
otherness of the physical world, however much the poet may de-
sire to communicate the presence of physical things. Such pattern-
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making cannot be ignored or simply declared defunct, but must
be developed in the continuous process of being human. For
Graham, the forming of abstract patterns of the world in order to
try and make the physicality of existence truly felt is a task that is
at once inescapable and never-ending.
In another sense Graham’s project is phenomenological: she
is trying to meet the otherness of physical reality through love
which  would  give  room  to  its  otherness  and  not  reduce  it  to
sameness,  as  is  witnessed by her garden poems.  This  love of ex-
ternal reality is also strongly present in Stoppard’s Arcadia, where
it  surfaces  in  the  form of  curiosity  about  the  physical  world  and
about imagined abstractions in equal measure, and in the form of
the metaphorical connection made between physical love and
gravitational attraction. Such works of literature skilfully balance
love as an expression of physical connection and the love of imag-
ined abstractions, and in the final analysis break down some of
the assumptions concerning the relationships between physicality,
abstraction, science and art.
4.3  Tom Stoppard’s Gut Instinct
Theoretical physicists, and many other kinds of sci-
entists, work in a world of the mind. It is a mathe-
matical world without bodies, without people,
without the vagaries of human emotion. [...] The
exquisite contradictions and uncertainties of the
human heart do indeed make life interesting; they
are why God held the apple in front of Eve and
then forbade her to eat it, they inspire artists and
art, they are why the poet Rainer Maria Rilke wrote
that we should try to love the questions themselves.
All that is necessary and good. But I miss the
answers.  I  miss  the  rooms  I  could  enter,  the  lan-
guage that sounded as clear as a struck bell.
Alan Lightman, A Sense of the Mysterious:
Science and the Human Spirit
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It is not self-evident that articulate wonder is ulti-
mately about articulation.
Raymond Tallis, The Knowing Animal:
A Philosophical Inquiry into Knowledge and Truth
As discussed in connection with the structure of Arcadia and
Stoppard’s presentation of the notion of coherent form, the dif-
ferences between the romantic and classical attitudes to art are
central to the play. In chapter 2 I concentrated on how the two
views conceptualise beauty as an aspect of either order or free-
dom.  In  this  chapter  the  focus  is  on  the  way  classical  art  at-
tempted to reproduce ‘nature as God intended’ (A 12), whereas in
romanticism art was expected to produce a representation of ei-
ther nature or the artist’s experience. Furthermore, these historical
attitudes are in the play connected to a postmodern debate over
what (if anything) counts as knowledge in the sciences and in the
arts.
In the above quotation Alan Lightman, who gave up a career
in physics to write novels, separates the two worlds of science and
literature by suggesting that science is to do with clear and simple
answers, whereas the world of human meanings will always be
fraught with ambiguity and uncertainty. Although Lightman
(2000/2005: 178) does find pleasure and import in the world of
bodies, emotion and human meanings, he remains attuned to the
abstractions provided by science and yearns for the ‘magnificent
serenity’ and ‘indisputable rightness’ of mathematical equations.
In Arcadia this continuing dialogue between science, the discourse
of abstraction, and literature, the discourse of human meanings, is
linked to the epistemological questions of representation, and
conducted in the language of chaos theory.
While the play never allows these issues to be simply solved, I
will argue in the following that epistemological optimism gains
much more ground than cynical doubt. There is a connection,
noted by Fuller and Waugh (1999: 4-5), between the literature-
and-science debate and the aesthetic developments in literary the-
ory since romanticism which is very close to what Stoppard pre-
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sents in Arcadia. Whereas the romantics contrasted ‘the embodied
experience of art to the abstract calculation of science’, Fuller and
Waugh (1999: 4-5) argue, the poststructuralist position current in
the 1990s is one where ‘both science and art as kinds of knowl-
edge are suborned by an ideological critique which denies the pos-
sibility of any genuinely transcendental experience or disinterested
epistemological criticism’. I suggest that Stoppard both decon-
structs the romantic opposition of embodied art versus abstract
science and, far from taking up the poststructuralist position, he
reaches for transcendental experiences through both science and
art.
  Despite the fact that Stoppard rejects purely rationalistic
methods of reaching truth, in his work knowledge still retains a
referential basis. However, due to the intertextual and meta-
dramatic techniques he uses, he has been pigeonholed as a theat-
rical dandy whose work owes more to stylistic play than to a rep-
resentational purpose (e.g. Tynan 1977, Whitaker 1983, Özdemir
2004). Christopher Innes (1989: 317) claims that Stoppard’s plays
‘should be approached as intellectual comedy, in which the con-
tent of any ideas, however serious in themselves, is far less signifi-
cant than their role in the theatrical game’. In light of his later
works, I would argue, it is clear that Stoppard’s plays are much
more committed to the representation of reality than they were
previously given credit for. To borrow Raymond Tallis’s expres-
sion, it should not have been self-evident that the articulate won-
der of Stoppard’s plays is ultimately about articulation. Conse-
quently, the ludic perspective in Stoppard’s work is contested by
critics who emphasise their mimetic drive. Demastes (1998: 85-
103), for example, maintains that Arcadia reflects both in its sub-
ject matter and in its structure new information about how the
universe actually functions. Stoppard’s play, he suggests, is part of
a the ‘chaotics paradigm’ which aims to balance the opposing
drives of dramatic naturalism on the one hand and absurdism on
the  other.  What  I  would  like  to  emphasise,  however,  is  the  fact
that the assumption behind all three dramatic styles is that drama
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should reflect the world as it is, whether ordered or disordered
(see p. 193).
In  addition  to  the  issues  of  beauty  and  form  discussed  in
chapter 2, Arcadia has a second major theme: the birth and rebirth
of ideas from the interaction of reality and the human imagina-
tion. The play does not allow a strict separation between science
and  literature,  nor  between  the  worlds  of  abstract  ideas  and  hu-
man meanings. Instead it suggests that human imagination can
lead to intuitive truths that are to individuals just as valuable as
facts arrived at through painstaking research. The difference be-
tween the two forms of knowledge does, however, exist and it lies
in the nature of proof. ‘You can’t open a door till there’s a house,’
Valentine points out (A 79), wanting to show that scientific dis-
covery develops through deterministic processes according to
which Thomasina could not have discovered fractal mathematics
in the nineteenth century. What the play shows is that Tho-
masina’s intuitions about fractals were correct, but they could not
be proven correct until after the invention of computers, and
therefore do not count as part of the continuum of scientific dis-
covery.91 But  human  collective  creativity  is  for  Stoppard  like  a
chaotic system in itself: both deterministic and unpredictable, and
involving patterns that, even though they may count as dead-ends
in terms of the continuum of discovery, can be perceived after the
fact. Thomasina not only acts as a reminder that imaginative leaps
91 Fermat’s Last Theorem, which plays a significant role in the play, was at
the time of writing a sought-after historical and mathematical mystery, and
one which had been seen as proof of how individual genius can discover
something that hundreds of mathematicians could not reconstruct. A 150-
page proof for the theorem was published a few months after the opening
night of Arcadia by Andrew Wiles, and an article describing the solution
was added to the programme (Nadel 2002: 448-449). The 1993 proof was
found to be flawed and was replaced by a corrected version by Andrew
Wiles and Richard Taylor in 1994. However, mathematicians are of the
opinion that even if Fermat did have a proof for his theorem, he could not
have known the proof Wiles presented, since much of the mathematics
used in it were not developed until much later. These real-world events re-
play nicely the difference between individual and intersubjective solutions,
between science as a creative activity and as accumulative knowledge.
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of genius are possible; she also alerts us to the fact that an indi-
vidual can and should accept intuitive certainty even if the proof
of it does not (yet) exist. Her presence is counter-balanced by
Bernard, who attempts to transform his individual intuition into
intersubjective knowledge without involving the kind of proof
that such intersubjectivity requires.
In contrast to the poststructuralist view of the relativity of
knowledge, Stoppard, like the other externalist realists discussed
in section 4.1, holds on to the idea of universal laws. In Arcadia
mathematical equations, human beings and the turbulence of time
all express the same universal patterns of behaviour. But the idea
of universals presented in this play is not a reductive threat to the
individuality and variety of human existence. Stoppard’s charac-
ters manage to move with infinite freedom in their finite spaces
and to create a dance of intricate thought and feeling from the ba-
sic steps provided by universal laws. Like the authors and critics
discussed in the previous two sections, Stoppard presents the
connection between human minds and physical reality as a func-
tion of the chaotic dynamics that rule both mind and reality. The
connection is an extension of the self-similar patterning of the
universe, and one solution to the age-old dilemma of what counts
as knowledge in the arts, in the sciences and in the everyday lives
of human beings.
The Attraction between Bodies on Heat
 ‘One of the paradoxes in Stoppard’s writing’, writes Alice Rayner
(1987: 135), ‘is that no matter how far the mind ranges with ideas
or potentials or possibilities, it finally returns to the inexplicable
concreteness of objective physical reality’. Although it is a play
fizzing with ideas, Arcadia too is a theatrical representation of
both physics and physicality. Not only is chaos theory explicitly
present in the play, but the characters, buffeted as they are by the
forces of mutual attraction and repulsion, embody the chaotic dy-
namics that affect all living systems. Their physicality is made even
more pronounced by the environment within which they exist: by
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the room on the stage where the presence of various physical ob-
jects is constantly emphasised, and by the garden surrounding the
country house, talked about but never seen, which is not actually a
natural environment but a succession of representations of nature.
In Stoppard’s play, reality is not something manufactured by the
mind or by language, but an intriguing and beautiful realm which
the mind, alternatively aided and hampered by the patterns of na-
ture and nurture, attempts to comprehend.
Thus the physical environment surrounding the characters in
Arcadia reflects the play’s theoretical themes, but at the same time
comes across as refreshingly real. The events of two separate eras
take place in a single room which remains unaltered on stage
through the scene changes. The tangibility of objects is empha-
sised by the way they mount the schoolroom table in the course
of the play, and the way historical documents, like Chater’s letters
and Thomasina’s diagrams, survive on the stage as physical ob-
jects from one era to the next, even though people’s perception of
their meaning may change.92 Their obstinacy is also emphasised by
the way the seemingly innocuous but intractable garden books
disprove Bernard’s theories.
Another physical system constantly present in the play
(though not on stage) is the garden of the Coverlys’ manor house.
As suggested in section 2.2, Stoppard employs the garden as the
playground of ideas concerning classical, romantic and chaotic
geometries,  but  it  also  plays  an  important  role  as  the  site  of  dis-
cussions concerning the relationship between nature and human-
ity. Some critics have taken the garden to stand for the natural
forces, suggesting, as Demastes (1998: 97-98) does, that the ro-
mantic version is an example of nature in its chaotic phase: a sys-
tem where the initial conditions are set and which is then allowed
92 The objects (as well as the garden designs) are also an allusion to one of
the play’s intertexts: Thomas Love Peacock’s Headlong Hall (1816), where
an assortment of objects, including a quadrant and drawing books, are used
to stimulate philosophical discussions among the people gathered at a
country house. For this and other intentionally used intertexts see Nadel
(2002: 426-430).
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to freely run its course. However, as Hannah so clearly points out,
all the different gardens are imitations of paintings imitating clas-
sical  authors (A 25), and therefore it would be more accurate to
say that they are all representations of various kinds of conceptu-
alisations, and are not natural at all. The Arcadia that Lady Croom
sees in her neo-classical garden design attempts to reproduce na-
ture ‘as God indented’, but in fact it is a representation of nature
as the controlled, classical steady state where even the sheep are
‘tastefully arranged’ (A 12). The ‘picturesque’ design by Noakes,
however much it aims to reproduce the ‘irregular forms’ of na-
ture, also remains a representation, although the process of its
creation does produce much disorder: unfinished, muddy lakes,
‘mean plantations’, and the disrupting noise of the steam pump.
Such representations of an ideal environment act as remind-
ers of two other representations, the classical Arcadia and the
Garden of Eden, where it was imagined that humans lived in per-
fect rapport with their environment. Whatever form the ideal en-
vironment takes, the presence of both death (in the form of the
references to Poussin’s famous painting and Thomasina’s death in
the fire) and knowledge (Thomasina’s realisation of the implica-
tions of entropy and chaos, and the modern characters’ self-
conscious sexuality) opens the closed system of the representation
and exiles its inhabitants into reality. Stoppard even toys with the
idea of the apple as a symbol associated both with carnal knowl-
edge and, through Newton’s famous gravitating fruit, with scien-
tific knowledge. In Arcadia an apple, first given as a love token by
Gus to Hannah, is left on the table and fed by Septimus to his tor-
toise before its leaves finally become the catalyst for Thomasina’s
equations, giving her a brief glimpse of the laws of life before her
own cruel expulsion from the garden of Sidley Park.93
As Alison Wheatley (2004: 178) suggests, from the very first
scene the garden, rather than representing the forces of nature in
the play, functions merely as the setting of the truly uncontrollable
93 Both the original (London and New York) productions of Arcadia under-
lined this theme by having Poussin’s Spring, which pictures Eve offering the
apple to Adam, painted on the stage curtain (Fleming 2001: 196).
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natural force: sexual desire. Septimus’s ‘carnal embrace’ in the ga-
zebo with Mrs.  Chater  is  the first  of  many references to the un-
predictable world of human sexual attraction, where chaotic dy-
namics rule the day. In both time periods the characters experi-
ence confused relationships with each other: in the nineteenth
century Thomasina is in love with Septimus, who pines for Lady
Croom who is in love with Byron, who has an affair with Mrs
Chater, who had a ‘perpendicular poke’ with Septimus, and all of
the male twentieth-century characters desire Hannah, a woman as
self-contained as the palindrome of her name. Throughout the
play, the element which breaks open the deterministic universe is
heat – both as a phenomenon of physics and as a metaphor for
human passion. ‘Heat cannot of itself pass from one body to a
hotter body’, says the Second Law of Thermodynamics, and
Stoppard makes delightful play both with the suggestive vocabu-
lary and the phenomenon of entropy implied by the law (see 112-
118). Thomasina takes explicit note of this connection, pointing
out  how  Mrs  Chater,  whose  affairs  have  already  resulted  in  two
challenges to duel, ‘would overthrow the Newtonian system in a
weekend’ (A 84).
In the twentieth-century plot the main force of sexual energy
is produced by Hannah and Bernard, with additional confusion
caused  by  both  Valentine’s  and  Gus’s  desire  for  Hannah,  and
Chloë’s for Bernard. Hannah and Bernard are a couple whose dif-
ferences, like those between Septimus and Thomasina, can be
seen in terms of classicism and romanticism. However, these
characters seem to have adopted one attitude as a camouflage for
another. Bernard wears his romantic flamboyancy, like his pea-
cock-coloured handkerchief (A 16), as a cover for his lack of true
feelings. He is interested in Byron as ‘an eighteenth-century Ra-
tionalist touched by genius’ (A 60), rather than as a romantic fig-
ure. Hannah, on the other hand, seems an ardent classicist, but as
Valentine points out, her ‘classical reserve is only a mannerism;
and neurotic’ (A 75),  and  Bernard  notes  that  she  can  get  ‘quite
sentimental over geometry’ (A 28). Her book on Caroline Lamb,
the woman who made such embarrassingly public love to Byron,
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connects Hannah with unfettered passion, even though the book
attempts to present Caroline as an intellectual figure (see A 60).
As Bernard says, it  ‘takes a romantic to make a heroine of Caro-
line Lamb’ (A 63). The modern characters perform a complicated
dance of sexual and intellectual repartee which finally does not
bring them any closer to each other. The exceptions are Hannah
and Gus, whose awkward waltz accompanies the fluid dance of
Septimus and Thomasina at the end of the play.
The reason for this unpredictable behaviour of people in a
supposedly deterministic universe lies in the complexity and chaos
inherent in human beings. Or perhaps, as Chloë thinks, the unex-
pected behaviour of people results in a non-deterministic uni-
verse:
CHLOË  The future is all programmed like a computer – that’s a
proper theory, isn’t it?
VALENTINE  The deterministic universe, yes.
CHLOË  Right. Because everything including us is just a lot of at-
oms bouncing off each other like billiard balls [...]. But it
doesn’t work, does it?
VALENTINE  No. It turns out the maths is different.
CHLOË  No, it’s all because of sex. [...] The universe is determi-
nistic all right, just like Newton said, I mean it’s trying to
be, but the only thing going wrong is people fancying
people who aren’t supposed to be in that part of the plan.
VALENTINE  Ah. The attraction that Newton left out. All the way
back to the apple in the garden. (A 73-74)
In this play, human relationships do not work like Newtonian
two-body problems but rather like unpredictable and chaotic
three-body problems, where the complexities of the mutual gravi-
tational attraction between three equally sized bodies makes it im-
possible to predict the system’s behaviour. In the words of John
Gribbin (2004/2005: 14-15), ‘[t]he equations describing such sys-
tems can be written down, but they cannot be solved – they are
not integrable and are said to have no analytical solutions’. Where
at the opening of the play Thomasina envisions a completely de-
terministic universe (see p. 153), the conversation between Chloë
and Valentine counters such an ideal with the fact that calculating
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even the mutual influences between just three objects turns out to
be impossible. Despite the determinism of the universe, its dy-
namics mean that the future can only be known by living it.
By coupling and contrasting physical attraction between hu-
mans and the gravitational attraction between physical bodies,
Stoppard both connects humans to the material universe and sug-
gests  that  their  individual  quirks  are  real  and  have  an  impact  on
the depersonalised forces of nature. For chaos theory does not
reduce its subject matter to a mere collection of random particles,
but underlines that any complex system is always more than the
sum of  its  parts.  Thus  the  play  suggests  that  humans  share  with
the universe not only all their molecules and the rules by which
they move, but also the particularity of the patterns formed. If
such mundane physical phenomena as dripping taps and cream
swirling in coffee form harmonious yet unpredictable patterns,
then human life, if shaped by the same laws, is also beyond reduc-
tive analysis. As Stoppard (as quoted in Fleming 2001: 191) has
stated in an interview, for him chaos is a ‘powerful metaphor for
human behavior’ and one which manages to balance the ‘deter-
mined life’ with unpredictability. From this point of view, the
mind could be regarded as limited in its building-blocks, but infi-
nite in its capacity for uniqueness. The sensitivity of chaotic dy-
namics to initial conditions makes such systems unpredictable
even though deterministic, as Valentine explains:
We’re better at predicting events at the edge of the galaxy or in-
side the nucleus of an atom than whether it’ll rain on auntie’s
garden party three Sundays from now. Because the problem turns
out  to  be  different.  We  can’t  even  predict  the  next  drip  from a
dripping tap when it gets irregular. Each drip sets up the condi-
tions for the next, the smallest variation blows prediction apart,
and the weather is unpredictable the same way, will always be un-
predictable. When you push the numbers through the computer
you can see it on the screen. (A 48)
The realisation that simple systems can behave in ways that con-
found the greatest physicists ends the physicalist dream that all
human behaviour is explainable by reductive theories based purely
on  matter.  It  also  takes  away  the  need  for  the  arts  to  entrench
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themselves and completely separate thought from physical exis-
tence. The fact that human beings are made of flesh and blood
and exist together with earth, rocks and trees, does not mean that
they cannot be creative, unique and unpredictable individuals.
This allows Stoppard to embrace the notion of our material exis-
tence without falling prey to reductive physicalism.
In addition to being a materialist of sorts, Stoppard, in writ-
ing this play, has also made full use of both the conventions of lit-
erary realism and realism as a philosophical position. Although it
may be strange to consider a playwright as metadramatic and play-
ful  as  Stoppard as  a  realist,  it  is  important  to note that  the argu-
ment presented in the previous chapter about realism and meta-
fiction also applies to drama. Ruby Cohn, in Retreats from Realism in
Recent English Drama (1991) includes Stoppard in her discussion of
playwrights who abandon realism, but she explicitly refers to
Stoppard’s breaking of theatrical conventions rather than to his
rejection of realist epistemology. Other critics have, however,
made the mistake of taking the use of non-realist technique as a
sign of anti-realist epistemology. Mary A. Doll (1993: 118), for ex-
ample, categorises Stoppard as a ‘post-Absurdist’ in the sense that
he goes ‘even further than Absurdists in dispensing with unities of
plot, character, and action, together with the illusion of certainty
such unities assume’. But although Stoppard’s plays have under-
mined certainties, they have never actually broken the connection
to reality. Rather, they have only momentarily shaken the audi-
ence’s trust in the rationality of the world before reinstating it.
Therefore, although Stoppard destabilises the ‘illusion of cer-
tainty’, he never abandons the representational quality of drama.
His characters are unitary: however confused about their names,
even Rosencrantz and Guildenstern remain distinguishable char-
acters  throughout  the  play  that  bears  their  names.  Similarly,  as  I
pointed out in my discussion of Arcadia’s structure, the fluctuating
time-frames never actually break the realist frame (in the philoso-
phical sense), they merely exist in superposition for a dramatic ef-
fect.
Self-Similarity of Mind and World
233
In Stoppard’s play everything is interlinked: the two time lev-
els, the emotions of the characters and their research projects,
their lives and the shape of gardens. In his presentation of the af-
finities between physics and human behaviour, Stoppard also for-
ges a connection between people and the physical world they live
in, and rejects the idea that human existence is bounded by lan-
guage and therefore has no real contact to other human beings or
to material objects. At the same time, the link between the mental
and the physical provides the justification for the various kinds of
truths that the characters pursue, be they mathematical, emotional
or historical.
 ‘It’s Wanting to Know That Makes Us Matter’
Far from being uncaring intertextual play, Stoppard’s drama has
always been, as Clive James saw as far back as 1975, informed by
‘Einfühlung – the intellectual love for the objects of experience’
(James 1975: 76). What James refers to is the empathetic connec-
tion between mind and object, that is, the way in which Stoppard
feels his way into his subject matter. In Arcadia Stoppard not only
emphasises the existence of a physical reality, but also offers
chaos theory as a way of connecting thought with that reality
through the self-similar connections between different organisa-
tional levels of the universe. Like the other externalist realist crit-
ics and authors, Stoppard exemplifies in his writing a cosmologi-
cal interest, and like Jorie Graham, he conceptualises the mind’s
contact with reality as an embodied experience.
Through his use of chaos theory, Stoppard underlines the
fact that the complexity of physical reality is such that we have to
accept that we know much less about the way it all works than we
think we do. In the play Valentine describes the state of physics
before the arrival of chaos theory:
People were talking about the end of physics. Relativity and quan-
tum looked as if they were going to clean out the whole problem
between them. A theory of everything. But they only explained
the very big and the very small. The universe, the elementary par-
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ticles. The ordinary-sized stuff which is our lives, the things peo-
ple write poetry about – clouds – daffodils – waterfalls – and
what happens in a cup of coffee when the cream goes in – these
things are full of mystery, as mysterious to us as the heavens were
to the Greeks. (A 48)
Valentine’s own project involves searching for the algorithm that
rules the history of the grouse population of his ancestral lands.
But discovering the true algorithm in the middle of the noisy data
is too complex a task, since it is impossible for Valentine to track
down all the variables involved. ‘Real data is messy’, he laments.
It’s all very, very noisy out there. Very hard to spot the tune. Like
a piano in the next room, it’s playing our song, but unfortunately
it’s out of whack, some of the strings are missing, and the pianist
is tone deaf and drunk – I mean, the noise! (A 46)
There are similar difficulties in the various efforts by the charac-
ters to gain information and communicate it to each other: letters
get lost, statements are misinterpreted and the noise of the steam
engine in the nineteenth-century garden drives the lady of the
house to distraction. If predicting the future is impossible because
of the complexities displayed in the dynamics of systems with
multiple variables, interpreting the past is hampered by the pres-
ence of noise in the data.
Although a few critics have been distracted by the presence
of these epistemological difficulties (e.g. Boireau 1997, Doll 1993
and  Peter  1993),  it  is  clear  that  however  difficult  the  search  for
knowledge, according to Stoppard it is still a valuable endeavour.
For instance, rather than seeing Stoppard’s extensive word-play as
a sign of ‘surface dazzle’, as others have (e.g. Jenkins 1993), Clive
James (1975) is adamant that even the punning is a sign of a desire
for a more useful, a more extensive clarity. In comparing Stop-
pard’s works to the general theory of relativity and to the way the
paths of vectors converge in space-time James (1975: 72) suggests
that Stoppard’s interest is not focused on the fact that words can
mean anything, but on the ambiguities formed when several texts
and contexts cross each others’ paths in one word: ‘It isn’t helpful
to call such effects dazzling, since they are not meant to dazzle
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nor be effects’ but ‘devices by which you see further’. In chaos
theory Stoppard has found a touchstone which takes the theories
of physical existence from the galactic or quantum levels – levels
of reality which most people understand only as distant abstrac-
tions at best – to the level of everyday natural phenomena on a
human scale. The results of his intense examination of the nature
of reality can be dizzying, and cause the simultaneous fear and
fascination with which his characters stare at infinity. But, espe-
cially in the later plays, the fascination does win out. Similarly, al-
most thirty years after James, Daniel Jernigan (2003) makes the
point that Stoppard is still much too interested in trying to know,
and too little interested in the ideological underpinnings of con-
structed knowledge to count as a true postmodernist. Even
though he is still ‘completely serious about frivolity and stylish-
ness  as  ways  to  make  ideas  fly’  (Jenkins  1987:  xi),  it  is  the  ideas
that finally count, not the style alone. Thus it is difficult to think
how a playwright whose work is so clearly based on extensive re-
search on issues ranging from physics to philosophy could be
viewed as anything other than intensely curious about the world
he delves into.
In Arcadia the necessity of curiosity is voiced by Valentine,
who waxes  lyrical  on  the  subject  of  what  science  has  yet  to  dis-
cover, now that chaos theory has proven some of the old assump-
tions wrong:
It makes me so happy. To be at the beginning again, knowing al-
most nothing. [...] A door like this has cracked open five or six
times since we got up on our hind legs. It’s the best possible time
to be alive, when almost everything you thought you knew is
wrong. (A 47-48)
Although Valentine is excited about chaos theory proving many
old scientific assumptions wrong, such enthusiasm for the un-
known stems not from enjoyment of uncertainty as such, but
from the fact that there is much more to know than one previ-
ously thought. This enthusiasm for curiosity is shared by Hannah,
the rational sceptic set against Bernard’s impetuous certainty.
Where Bernard is dead sure about Byron fighting a duel at Sidley
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Park, Hannah develops a gut instinct about the identity of the
nineteenth-century garden’s resident hermit. Her intuition ends up
being correct, mainly because she is more genuinely interested in
knowledge. Rather than sharing Bernard’s aspiration to the title of
‘Media Don’ (A 56), she is passionate about finding things out,
not about being famous for finding: ‘It’s wanting to know that
makes us matter. Otherwise we’re going out the way we came in’
(A 75). Ira Nadel (2002: 430) points out a ‘possible pun’ in Han-
nah’s line, suggesting that not only does ‘wanting to know’ make
human life meaningful but it is also the way in which we acknowl-
edge our connectedness to the rest of ‘matter’. We are physical
beings as well as mental ones, and wanting to understand the ma-
terial  universe  is  a  valuable  endeavour  that  can  be  achieved  in  a
myriad of ways.
Imagination and Chaos
The ways in which human beings try to understand the world in-
clude both investigation and representation. The cold facts of sci-
entific inquiry may show that universal laws apply in the lives of
individual human beings, but at the same time meaning may be
discovered in the unexpected beauty of the patterns of those lives.
On the other hand, the world becomes a cold and inhospitable
place if scientific knowledge alone is used to explain it. The an-
swers  we  gain  from  science  may  leave  us  ‘alone,  on  an  empty
shore’ (A 94), but even then we can dance.
Mary A. Doll (1993) is one of the critics who take the pres-
ence of epistemological problems in Arcadia to mean that the
main purpose of the play is to enhance a feeling of uncertainty in
the audience. According to Doll (1993: 117-118), Stoppard pre-
sents any certainty about reality ‘as an arrogant attitude inherited
from the postures of logical positivism and classical science’.
Rodney Simard (1984: 51), on the other hand, argues that Stop-
pard insists on logic and reason but only to show that the logical
rules of causality themselves produce the absurdity: ‘His comedy
arises largely from logically extending his action one step further
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than it exists in objective reality’. But it is important to note that
even though both Doll and Simard view absurdity and the critique
of strict logic as the complete picture, such aspects are counter-
balanced by Stoppard’s conviction that both the intersubjective
project of science and the imaginative leaps of individuals can get
to know the world.
One of the most important themes in Arcadia is the debate
over what counts as knowledge, and whether the inevitable lack of
absolute proof should be a source of hope or despair. Despite the
problems and confusions, there are a number of epistemologically
optimistic elements in Arcadia. At the very end Hannah receives
strong evidence of the identity of the hermit, Bernard’s theory of
Byron’s  duel  is  proven  wrong  by  a  small  detail  mentioned  in  a
garden book, and Thomasina’s seemingly pointless fractal equa-
tions are shown to be meaningful nearly two centuries later. Stop-
pard uses chaos theory not only to describe people as both de-
termined and free,  but  also  to  explore  ways  of  accepting  the  im-
possibility of undeniable proof without falling into epistemologi-
cal relativism.
For most of his career, Stoppard has been questioning the
logic that pronounces knowledge worthless for being fallible, thus
expressing the same dissatisfaction with complete reliance on
axiomatic logic that was expressed by Paulson, Toulmin and Pais-
ley Livingston in section 4.1. While actively criticising scientism
and epistemologies built on absolutes, he has still, in both Hapgood
and Arcadia, turned to physics for a heuristic on which to build
knowledge that would be trustworthy in practice, though not rest-
ing on absolute axioms. Quantum mechanics proved a difficult
subject for the audience to grasp and Hapgood suffers from being
overtly complex, but in Arcadia Stoppard finds a firmer ground in
chaos theory and creates a system of intuitive knowledge based
upon the self-similar connection between mind and nature. Even
while he reminds us that the world is too complex for simple
categorisation, Stoppard also shows that the universal chaotic dy-
namics provides an intriguing way of connecting the human mind
to reality, of forming a conduit by which we could have intuitive
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knowledge about our environment. Through his characters and
through the implications of chaos theory Stoppard explores the
differences in what it means to know, to have intuitive certainty,
and to leap to conclusions.
In Arcadia the argument between classical and romantic atti-
tudes extends to conceptualisations of science and art, and to the
wider questions of knowledge and creativity. Stoppard’s depiction
of the classical and romantic gardens brings out the differences
between thought structures based on order and those based on
disorder (see 2.2). However, the separation of the two conceptual
structures does not result in a simplistic division between classical
science and romantic literature, nor does it suggest that science
involves only facts and literature only creativity. What sets the two
otherwise intersecting forms of knowledge apart is the nature of
proof. Where the individual genius of both scientists and artists
may light upon the truth, in order to become knowledge, scientific
innovations must be intersubjectively proven, whereas artistically
mediated knowledge speaks from one individual to another in a
way that cannot be replicated.
Thus scientific inquiry is revealed in the play as a fractal algo-
rithm in which you feed the new information back into what you
already know and try to see where the new result fits on the map,
whether it changes the overall pattern or not. As Valentine points
out about computer-generated fractals, you ‘never know where to
expect the next dot’ (A 47), but eventually you (or generations of
researchers  after  you)  begin  to  see  a  pattern  in  the  data.  On the
other hand, as Antor (1998) has pointed out, both the implica-
tions of Thomasina’s discoveries and her joking note in the mar-
gin of her mathematics primer emphasise the fact that sometimes
knowledge is not intersubjective but consists of patterns we have
made for ourselves in order to make sense of the world. These
patterns, Antor (1998: 353) suggests, arise from our ‘anthropo-
logical set-up’ and do no harm as long as their status as heuristic
devices is kept in mind. It is clear, however, that the patterns dis-
covered by individual intuition in Arcadia are not meant to be seen
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as temporary ‘epistemological crutches’, but are, instead, the other
side of the coin of scientific, intersubjective knowledge.
The emphasis chaos theory lays on the recurring patterns
which arise from the infinite complexity of our universe gives
Stoppard a fitting metaphor for the intuitive connection between
the knowing mind and reality. Werner Kriegelstein (1993: 99) has
suggested that being part of a complex, yet harmonious and self-
organising universe ‘will allow us to draw conclusions from a to-
tality of simultaneous impressions rather than through step by
step “logical thinking”’. Similarly, in Arcadia chaos theory is used
to suggest that from the shared dynamics between mind and
world arises intuitive knowledge. As parts of a self-similar uni-
verse, the characters’ imaginations reflect the chaotic dynamics,
helping them to recognise aspects of the world in the same way
they recognise aspects of themselves. In this Bernard’s declaration
about the power of poetry and self-knowledge (A 61) turns out to
be true in a different way than he himself realises. What the self-
similarity of the universe suggests is that you cannot understand
the universe without understanding yourself, nor can you under-
stand yourself without understanding the universe.
It is clear to anyone familiar with the history of science that
intuitive leaps are not the exclusive property of poets. Scientific
genius also depends on the ability to see directly into the heart of
the matter, past the slow steps normally required for acquiring
knowledge. Even though the general rule of scientific develop-
ment is, as Valentine says, that you ‘cannot open a door till there
is a house’, Hannah points out that the ability to take shortcuts is
exactly  what  genius  is  (A 79).  Such  is  the  gift  of  Thomasina,
whose mathematical talent goes beyond the methods of calcula-
tion available to her. ‘She saw what things meant, way ahead, like
seeing a picture’, admits Valentine (A 93). Thus Stoppard disman-
tles the stereotypical idea of artists as intuitive and scientists as ra-
tional, and simultaneously collapses the distinction between their
purviews. Imaginative leaps are not a relativistic opposite to logic,
but a necessary part of our relation to the world, whether that re-
lation  is  expressed  in  terms  of  science  or  literature.  Thus  the
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world of imagination is not the exclusive playground of poets, nor
is reality reached solely by scientific means.
The most evident of the intuitive connections in the play is
the one the twentieth-century humanist scholars have with the
events of the past. Bernard claims to feel this particularly strongly:
Gut instinct. The part of you which doesn’t reason. The certainty
for which there is no back-reference. Because time is reversed.
Tock, tick goes the universe and then recovers itself, but it was
enough, you were in there and you bloody know. (A 50).
Somehow Bernard’s intuition is like the reversal of time, a mo-
ment when he slips from one century to another to be present at
the time of the events he is studying. History in Arcadia is, not
least because of the structure of the play, a series of self-similar
loops, where intuition can sometimes leap from one orbit to an-
other, defying the second law of thermodynamics and time’s ar-
row.
 But even if Bernard’s failure gives support to the notion that
the past is irrecoverable, Stoppard plays with the possibility of go-
ing back in time. The presence of successful temporal loops is
suggested, in particular, by the character of Gus, the shy, speech-
less twentieth-century teenager who has such a knack for discov-
ering just what the other characters spend ages trying to grasp. He
points garden historians to the exact spot of the foundations of an
old boathouse (A 48), and he passes on to Hannah the evidence
she needs to show that Septimus was (in all likelihood) the Sidley
hermit (A 96-97).  Played by the only actor to have roles  both in
the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, Gus doubles in the
past as Thomasina’s older brother, Lord Augustus. His presence
is almost like a physical conduit between one era and the next –
an effect strengthened by the moments of confusion in the audi-
ence over when he is Lord Augustus, and when Gus in Regency
dress. The impossibility of reversing time’s arrow is symbolically
overturned by the final scene of the play, where the dance of
Hannah and Gus reflects and recreates the first and last waltz of
Thomasina and Septimus.
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In terms of intuitive knoweledge there are no signs of Stop-
pard prioritising one or the other of the Two Cultures. Where
Richard Corballis (1984: 15) argues that ‘in all Stoppard’s work an
abstract, artificial view of the world (“A”) is pitted against the flux
of reality (“B”), and the audience is invited to eschew the “clock-
work”  of  the  former  in  favour  of  the  “mystery”  of  the  latter’,  I
would say that Stoppard takes the abstract as an essential part of
appreciating the flux. Corballis is on the right track in recognising
the critique of abstract logic in Stoppard’s work, but embraces too
readily the idea that Stoppard abandons the world of scientific
discourse in favour of the experience of the mysteries of reality.
The question of whether science and art both count as know-
ledge is another source of debate between Valentine and Bernard.
On the one hand, the most valuable aspect of science is its ability
to organise our perceptions of reality into a system which helps us
weed out untruth, however attractive. On the other, poetry em-
phasises our innate ability to make intuitive leaps which bypass
the slow, methodical rules of science. In following Thomasina’s
research even Valentine learns that sometimes it is possible to un-
derstand a larger pattern of interactions without having knowl-
edge of the system’s basic elements. But for the mathematician,
the reason for striving for knowledge is always the knowledge it-
self, which exists apart from the lives and personalities of the
people involved in its creation. ‘It’s like arguing who got there
first with the calculus’, he declares. ‘The English say Newton, the
Germans say Leibnitz [sic]. But it doesn’t matter. Personalities.
What matters is the calculus. Scientific progress. Knowledge’ (A
60-61). As the counterbalance to this cumulative view of the hu-
man endeavour Stoppard presents the anachronism of Thomas-
ina’s discoveries (Clayton 2000: 205). Although her thinking was
left in a cul-de-sac of scientific discovery, her ideas have a value that
depends on their connection to her singular personality. At the
end of the play the audience would be hard pressed to claim that
personalities did not matter, and that Thomasina’s death was of
no consequence since her inventions were rediscovered by later
generations.
Self-Similarity of Mind and World
242
The play consistently balances these two aspects of knowl-
edge with the help of deterministic chaos. For Bernard, the hu-
man dimension is the only one that counts: ‘I can expand my uni-
verse without you’, he snaps to Valentine and quotes Byron’s ‘She
Walks in Beauty’ (A 61). Valentine, for his part, has to admit the
inherent impossibility of his attempt to define the actual chain of
cause and effect in the fluctuations of grouse populations. On the
other hand, the surprising harmonies of the universe connect one
set of characters with another, making possible the transmission
of knowledge through the intervening decades. The two true gen-
iuses of the play are Thomasina and Gus, one able to see into the
future of mathematics and physics, the other able to see back into
the past lives of the Coverly manor. Mathematics is a field where
individual intuition is vital for the creation of new solutions, but
even though Thomasina may have known she was right, her dis-
coveries could not be integrated into the larger system of mathe-
matics until much later. In historiography too the gut feeling of
one person may be either a personal truth or an intersubjective
one, depending on the kind of evidence it is possible to gather.
According to Stoppard (as quoted in Fleming 2001: 207), Gus is
an embodiment of those elements in the universe which are not
mechanistic, those aspects which we know are there, even though
we have no rational, scientific way of explaining them. The boy is
an embodiment of intuitive genius, of the idea that chaos theory
might explain why the correct conclusion may be reached through
subjective certainty even when intersubjective proof is lacking.
Hersh Zeifman (1990: 179) has pointed out that though
Stoppard’s plays are indebted to Beckett, they are fundamentally
optimistic about ontology in that they evince a heartfelt belief that
things do exist even though their existence cannot be logically
proven. Between this optimistic subtext and the use of absurdist
techniques Stoppard has created a tension from which arises post-
absurdist, or according to Demastes (1998), ‘chaotics’ theatre. ‘On
the surface, the absurdist vision originally “inherited” from Beck-
ett is brilliantly sustained, but under the surface that vision is con-
tinually being eroded and sabotaged’, Zeifman (1990: 179) con-
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cludes. In my opinion, Clive James (1975: 75-76) epitomises this
duality best in suggesting that Stoppard relies on intuitive certain-
ties even while he deconstructs the logic behind them:
And if the whole vaultingly clever enterprise turned out to be
merely intuitive – well, what is so mere about that? It might be
only in Stoppard’s enchanted playground that the majestic inevi-
tabilities of General Relativity can be reconciled with the Uncer-
tainty Principle or quantum physics, but Einstein’s life-long
search for the Unified Field was the same game, and he believed
in intuition.
In Arcadia Stoppard pulls in all the different strands of these
issues, creating a play in which the idea of deterministic chaos is
used to enliven questions of knowledge. The characters are shown
as embodied beings in a world of deterministic chaos, attempting
to understand their environment and themselves by both imagina-
tive and rational means. The presence of mistakes and failures in
the characters’ various quests for knowledge serves as a reminder
that certainty arrived at through an imaginative leap is by no
means infallible.
The resounding failure of Bernard’s intuition to alight on the
truth about who exactly shot which hare and who challenged
whom to a duel may for some members of the audience over-
shadow the  quiet  successes  of  the  other  modern  characters.  But
they do make genuine discoveries: Hannah by uncovering the fate
of Septimus Hodge, and Valentine by unearthing the meaning of
Thomasina’s equations. These characters are also the ones who
passionately believe in the importance of finding out the true na-
ture  of  things.  This  is  particularly  true  of  Hannah,  the  self-
declared enemy of chaos in art and life, who in the course of the
play accepts both Gus’s apple and his invitation to dance, learning
to trust her feelings and let her imagination guide her. However
wrong Bernard turns out to be, his mistaken intuition is counter-
balanced by Hannah’s correct gut feeling about Septimus being
the hermit. ‘You don’t know that’, Valentine warns her, but Han-
nah is adamant: ‘Oh, but I do. I do. Somewhere there will be some-
thing ... if only I can find it’ (A 66). What is more, as the structure
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of the play intersperses action from one era between the events of
another, the audience is first put in the position of the arbitrator
of the different intuitive certainties, and is then led, along with
Hannah, to the intuitive conclusion that the hermit must be Sep-
timus (Martyniuk 2004).
The arguments between Bernard and Valentine over whether
cosmological models should be accepted because they are true or
because they suit a particular temperament, are an echo of the
epistemological discussions on the position of the natural sciences
after Kuhnian paradigm shifts and social constructivism posi-
tioned them as just one of many alternative ways of presenting re-
ality. Stoppard (1993/1994: 268) comments in an interview on the
reaction against scientism around the year 1800, when Blake,
Wordsworth and Coleridge were resisting the idea that science
might soon find out all the answers: ‘The sense, or illusion, that
science is doing exactly that seems to accompany every age, and
creates an opposing force’. The new angle that chaos theory has
given Stoppard is that science may reveal important truths about
the  world  and  about  our  relation  to  it,  and  yet  at  the  same time
bring out new mysteries that give our lives even greater individual
resonance than before.
In his article marking the opening night of Arcadia, Michael
Billington (1993: 2) identifies the search for a system of post-
Christian morality as the core of Stoppard’s writing career, and
describes Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead as ‘a play about the
danger of living in a society that dismisses God as a logical impos-
sibility and moral absolutes as unprovable’. A similar warning can
be seen in Arcadia: time and time again in the play rigidly logical
processes are shown to be erroneous because, as chaos theory
states, all the variables affecting the final outcome can never be
known. Many critics have also latched on to Stoppard’s
(1974/1994: 65) comment that his plays ‘are a lot to do with the
fact that I  just  don’t  know’,  and have interpreted this  as  an admis-
sion of his own uncertainty. But the evidence of his plays, as well
as many other comments made by him in interviews, suggest that
rather than being a resolute relativist he is merely accepting his
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own lack of proof and emphasising the difference between two
kinds of knowledge: the kind reached through logical proofs and
the kind grasped by intuition. In this way Stoppard’s own need to
avoid endorsing any specific point of view in his plays can be ex-
plained not as embracing relativism, but as a way of bypassing
such logical arguments which suggest that true knowledge about
mind-independent reality is an impossibility. The two aspects of
knowing, intersubjective science and individual imagination are
reiterated on different levels of Arcadia and  result  in  a  blend  in
which Lightman’s serene science and the ‘exquisite contradictions’
of literature are irrevocably stirred together.
Conclusion: Science and Story-Telling
Looking back at the twentieth century, historians
will speak of it as the Century of Representation: a
time when, in all fields of art, thought, literature,
and science, people considered, or reconsidered, the
place of language in human life, and the basis on
which our reliance on it rests.
Stephen Toulmin, Return to Reason
In Greg Egan’s short story ‘Luminous’ (1995/1998) two students
of mathematics discover a contradiction in the axioms of number
theory, a defect which turns out to be a fractal border between
traditional mathematics and a kind of parallel universe of incom-
patible mathematical theorems. In order to stop an unscrupulous
financial company from exploiting the discovery, they attempt to
erase the incompatible mathematics by calculating proofs for the
theorems occupying the fractal border so that the cascade of
theorems would finally collapse the defect. What they discover is
that the border is defended by some being whose reality depends
on the kind of mathematics that in the world of the story is purely
abstract. The students’ attempt boils down to trying to define
mathematics as a system completely free of self-contradiction, one
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that covers all of reality and is infallible in its ability to tell the dif-
ference between truth and falsehood. The story ends with the
fractal border reinstated and the world facing the learning process
of letting go of absolute definition and embracing the contradic-
tions ‘between the exotic and the mundane, the pragmatic and the
Platonic, the visible and the invisible’ (Egan 1995/1998: 88). In
this story chaos theory offers alternatives to the binary opposition
between knowing nothing and knowing everything, between
complete relativity and absolute definition.
In this chapter I have argued that the authors discussed aim
to combine imaginative abstractions with a strong sense of the
physical reality of things. They portray physical reality as the
other, as the opposite of the human faculty of imagination, but
also  suggest  that  mind and reality  obey  the  same basic  rules  and
therefore that the dynamics of nature are graspable to the human
mind and representable in language. These writings by both liter-
ary theorists and authors build a connection between literature
and reality, and chaos theory plays an important part both in the
formation and the expression of this connection.
At  the  end  of Chaos Bound Hayles (1990: 292-293) puts her
finger on the crucial difference between the scientists and the lit-
erary interpreters of chaos she examines. She notes how Gleick’s
book in particular brings across the ‘sense of wonder’ the scien-
tists feel towards the systems they study. ‘Although they do not
put it this way’, she writes,
they intimate that chaos has given them a sense of being in touch
with the Lacanian real. [...] They see it rescuing postmodernism
from the prefix that positions us in ‘always already’. They take
chaos as demonstrating that there is something more than nov-
elty, something other than the precession of simulacra.
Opposing this view is the postmodern dialectic, which Hayles
(1990: 293) thinks complicates the ‘innocence of chaos’ by show-
ing that chaos theory itself is created by structures of power:
‘When theory, self, and culture are caught in the postmodern
loop, the construction of chaos cannot be unambiguous, because
it derives from and feeds into the same forces that made us long
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for escape’. It is precisely this epistemological difference between
innocent, potentially repressive scientific chaos and its sceptical,
postmodern version that appears most strongly in most of the
previous examinations of chaos theory in literature. However, my
argument is that a sense of wonder about the real is far from ab-
sent in the literary interpretations of chaos, as the analyses of
works by Stoppard, Graham and others show. This group of au-
thors and theorists I have termed externalist realists in recognition
of their interest in the possibilities of representation of an external
reality. While they accept that individual perception, ideology and
a myriad of other cultural factors will always influence the way re-
ality is comprehended, externalist realists do not abandon the at-
tempt at reaching reality as objectively as possible, and they fur-
thermore suggest that such an attempt is a peculiarly human activ-
ity. The order seemingly imposed on chaotic flux may actually
match an order that already exists in reality, due to the self-
similarity of both the universe and the human mind.
As was the case with literary form and the concept of  iden-
tity, chaos theory approaches to these issues do not exist in a vac-
uum.  In  terms  of  the  self-similarity  of  various  structures,  for  in-
stance, there is a strong resemblance between externalist realism
and the theories of iconicity, which have received much attention
in literary studies in recent years, especially since the publication
of Max Nänny and Olga Fischer’s collection Form Miming Meaning:
Iconicity in Language and Literature (1999). In that volume, Simon J.
Alderson (1999: 110) refers to the definition of iconicity in Dic-
tionary of Stylistics: ‘literature “can be regarded as iconic in the
broad sense that its FORM may strive to IMITATE in various ways
the reality it presents”’. While scholars making use of chaos theory
do not refer to iconicity and employ different terms to describe
the structures they analyse, both approaches seem to be looking
for an answer to the problem of how to make the discussion of
literary form relevant to things other than just the individual work
or some generic conventions.94 However, where the contempo-
94 For a discussion of diagrammatic iconicity specifically in the context of
literature and science see Batt (2007).
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rary theories of iconic form in literature tend to concentrate on
drawing parallels between the structures of literary narratives and
the structures of human perceptions of the world (Alderson 1999:
119), many scholars drawing on chaos theory are suggesting a link
between literary and actual physical structures. Literature, they
suggest, is not chaotic because in it authors represent the chaos
they perceive, but because that’s the way the universe, literature
included, functions. This dynamic conceptualisation of the re-
semblance between literature and reality is itself akin to the argu-
ments presented in biosemiotics, for example in Wendy Wheeler’s
The Whole Creature (2006), where emergent complexity is at the
heart  of  both  natural  and  cultural  systems,  and  both  are  seen  in
terms of semiotic processes. While biosemiotics itself is still strug-
gling to understand the differences between mimesis and mimicry,
between intentional resemblance and unconscious likeness, it of-
fers an interesting parallel to externalist realism in literary studies.
A second major topic of this chapter has been representation,
in particular the ways in which the knowledge transferred by the
natural sciences differs from literary representation. Both Graham
and  Stoppard  evidently  think  that  literature  can  be  a  source  of
knowledge and, furthermore, they refuse the romantic division
between embodied art and abstract science. Adelaide Morris
(2006: 151) has called Jorie Graham’s use of the natural sciences
as ‘thinking not just about but through a scientific problem’. At the
same time Graham always thinks through the body, thus joining
in her poetry not only science with art but also embodied science
and abstract art. What she attempts to think about through chaos
theory is the difference between observation and appropriation,
between the object as it is and the object perceived, and she de-
picts an embodied knowledge which feels like a dynamic process
between mind and reality, even when it seems impossible to de-
fine a reality separate from the mind.
Stoppard too extends the field of phenomena covered by
chaos theory from the physical ones science is prepared to de-
scribe, from ‘the things people write poetry about’ (A 48) to po-
etry itself, and to issues of truth and knowledge. Small incidents in
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the past can have vital consequences in the future, and are often
misinterpreted by those trying to find out what really happened.
In Arcadia we find uncertainty over what Fermat really meant by
his note, Thomasina’s humorous doodle mistaken for the ‘only
known likeness of the Sidley hermit’ (A 25), and, of course, Ber-
nard’s failed theory about Byron’s duel, based on a chain of mis-
taken inferences based on incomplete evidence. But the play is
also a story of discoveries, mathematical, emotional and historical.
In its presentation of intuitive knowledge, Arcadia reminds us that
not everything that is true can be proven. ‘[T]he essential truths’,
Stoppard (as quoted in Delaney 1990: 1) says, ‘are much foggier
things which we recognise instinctively rather than analyse and es-
tablish by demonstrative proof’.
One suggestion concerning the directions of future research
is implied in the work of Patricia Waugh (2004), who critiques the
expansion of purely materialist explanatory models into the un-
derstanding of human existence, and advocates a revaluation of
the intuited, subjective perspective to a work of art. Waugh not
only criticises the ‘reassuring’ condition of postmodern uncer-
tainty and calls for a way to re-engage the ‘scientific impulse’ of
structuralism with the human condition, but she also emphasises
that the human condition must be understood not so much in
terms  of  material  universals  but  in  terms  of  the  individual’s  ex-
perience of those universals (Waugh 1999: 59). She goes on to
maintain that ‘if knowledge is conceived wholly within the para-
digm of scientific materialism, then knowledge becomes an en-
tirely  third person affair  and experience,  what  it  feels  like on the
inside, is invalidated as knowledge’ (Waugh 2004: 71). In Arcadia a
return to subjective experience is connected both to the embodied
feeling of physical reality and to the abstract knowledge produced
by the natural sciences about that reality. Such a resurfacing of the
subjective, phenomenological perspective seems intriguing and
enriching, especially if connected with the latest research on em-
bodied experience provided by the cognitive sciences.
Finally, if the twentieth century is, as Stephen Toulmin sug-
gests in the epigraph of this section, the ‘Century of Representa-
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tion’ because of the humanities’ increasing focus on language, the
early twenty-first century has taken that focus a step further by
emphasising the crucial differences between the concepts of rep-
resentation and reproduction. If literature merely imitates reality it
would cease to have any epistemological value in its own right,
and therefore the rehabilitation of mimesis in the sense of repre-
sentation in discussions concerning the epistemological value of
literature is of central importance.
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Conclusion
If knowledge isn’t self-knowledge it isn’t doing
much, mate.
Bernard in Tom Stoppard’s Arcadia
Something has been sold to get here, something of
mine, something perhaps |  very precious | to me,
an heirloom, an inheritance [...].
Jorie Graham, ‘Disenchantment’
But let’s never imagine that by explaining things we
explain them away.
John Barth, Once Upon a Time
The humanist perspective on chaos theory outlined here seeks to
understand and describe the ways in which scientific knowledge
of a non-human universe can be understood as part of human
self-knowledge. The path taken to such a position winds through
the belief that knowledge in the humanities has to be related to
human beings, but also through the notion that if the humanities
lose sight of the knowledge provided by the natural sciences they
lose something essential to their own project. My final epigraphs
indicate three important landmarks on that path. Where Stop-
pard’s literary historian rather aggressively defends the value of
human-centred research as opposed to the dehumanised sciences,
the few lines from Graham’s poem suggest that the humanities’
freedom from reductive materialist approaches may have been
bought for a  price that  she at  least  is  loath to pay.  In their  writ-
ings, the three authors who form the backbone to my presenta-
tion of the humanist perspective are renegotiating the deal be-
tween literature and science. Stoppard, Barth and Graham present
in their works a material universe of complex, yet perceivable
forms, and their writings reflect the pleasure generated by human
curiosity about the shape and behaviour of those forms, a curios-
ity that expresses itself in both science and art. However, such
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pleasure is not just cognitive but includes an aesthetic dimension
as well. As Barth points out in the third epigraph, even while sci-
ence, philosophy and literary theory may develop explanations for
the universe and for mankind’s place in it, such explanations will
never be final nor will they end the human need to create non-
scientific representations. Disenchantment in this context is de-
mystification, not devaluation. Thus, from the humanist perspec-
tive, the universe in all its chaos and the multitudes of ways in
which the texture of reality can be represented in literature will re-
tain their beauty and fascination, however detailed the explana-
tions given of their basic processes.
The focus in this study has been on the links between litera-
ture and science at the turn of the twenty-first century. The rela-
tion between chaos theory and literature has turned out to be a
complex combination of more or less direct influence (in both di-
rections), misunderstood technicalities (again, in both directions)
and illuminating reinterpretations of heuristic metaphors. As I
pointed out in the Introduction, my aim has been to observe this
particular niche of interdisciplinary research in order to discover
why chaos theory has appealed to so many authors and critics and
why it has been understood in such different ways. As such, this
study presents an encounter between rather than an interdiscipli-
nary merging of literature and chaos theory. What I have deline-
ated here is one approach a literary scholar can take towards sci-
entific knowledge which respects that knowledge as an ‘expert
witness’ and yet focuses on the special competence of the hu-
manities as commentators on meaning and value in culture.
‘The primary function of a literature-science critic’, writes
Daniel Cordle (1999: 176), ‘is to describe the intersection of litera-
ture and science in the culture’.  This I have attempted to do not
only by presenting readings of works of fiction, poetry and drama
where the concepts developed by chaos theory appear but also by
examining the use of those concepts in literary scholarship. I have
shown that chaos theory is deeply involved in redefining notions
central to literary studies, such as literary form, authorial identity
and the relation of literature to reality. Although the direct appli-
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cability of chaos theory to such issues is understandably limited, it
is clear that the concepts and metaphors adopted from the sci-
ences have played a role in furthering the discussion in the field of
literature.
Furthermore, theoretical disagreements within the humani-
ties, in particular literary studies, form another dimension to the
conceptual graph I have been tracing. The intersection I have de-
scribed is not only between the sciences and the humanities, but
also between the poststructuralist and the humanist perspectives
within the humanities. Like Cordle himself (1999: 75-105), most
literary theorists have discussed chaos theory in terms of both
postmodern cultural forms and poststructuralist literary theory.
While it is true that postmodernism has had a central role in the
ways in which chaos theory has been adopted into non-scientific
culture  in  general  and  literary  studies  in  particular,  I  have  at-
tempted to show that poststructuralism has not been the only
theoretical framework involved. Interpretations of chaos theory
have also been influenced by what I have termed humanist con-
ceptualisations, particularly in connection with the four major is-
sues discussed above: appreciating the role of scientific knowledge
in culture, conceptualising the literary work as a semi-autonomous
and meaningful entity, seeing human identity as coherence rather
than dissolution, and believing that physical reality and embodi-
ment can be represented by literature.
Now I would like to turn from the synchronic picture I have
drawn of the relations between literature, chaos theory and the
humanist perspective to make some brief diachronic connections
between humanism in the late twentieth and early twenty-first
century and romanticism in the early nineteenth century. As I
pointed out in chapter 2, the humanist conceptualisation of liter-
ary form as ‘artificially autonomous’ (Paulson 1988: 135) bears
many of the characteristics of the organic metaphors of romanti-
cism. The emphasis on life-like patterns instead of Euclidian ge-
ometry  –  on  the  form  of  the  rose  instead  of  just  pyramids  and
cones in Thomasina’s terms (A 37, 84) – was prominent in ro-
mantic natural philosophy, for example in the work of the chemist
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Sir Humphry Davy (Lawrence 1990: 213). Similarly, for romanti-
cism Man, not God is the prime mover in the universe (Cunning-
ham and Jardine 1990: 1), and the humanist perspective, by op-
posing the impersonal networks of ideology and language, also
focuses on the human agent in the study of culture. It is clear that
for instance the notion of coherent authorship on which Barth’s
authorial identity partly relies is itself a notion deriving from the
romantic era. Such similarities go to show how the humanist per-
spective draws on cultural tradition, in particular on the period be-
fore the disillusionment inherent in twentieth-century modernism.
However, there are also important differences between ro-
manticism and the kind of humanism discussed in this study. One
major point of disagreement is in the attitudes to materialism.
Where romantic thinkers – including many of the natural scien-
tists of the time – supported vitalism and tended to regard life and
consciousness as autonomous forces (Knight 1990: 19-21), the
humanist perspective relies on emergence as the principle explain-
ing how matter can produce both life and consciousness. This dif-
ference in attitudes towards materialism has important conse-
quences with respect to the ways in which romanticism and con-
temporary humanism view the role of science. Where Shelley, for
instance, took science to stand for reductionism and oppressive
determinism (Paulson 1988: 13), the humanist interpretations of
chaos theory embrace the natural sciences as a valuable source of
knowledge – to some extent even as a valid source of self-
knowledge.
In addition to taking a more appreciative view of the natural
sciences than romanticism did, contemporary humanism is natu-
rally  tied  to  a  very  different  historical  moment  and  carries  the
marks of the poststructuralist critique of realist representation.
The relations between thought, language and reality have revealed
levels of complexity that romantic theory of art did not yet con-
ceptualise, but which all contemporary approaches have to take
into account, at least to the extent that postmodern literary forms
are related to them. Even if the humanist perspective does not
take metafictional elements in literature as automatically disman-
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tling its representation of reality, authors such as Barth are never-
theless clearly indebted to postmodern literary techniques and
employ those techniques fully aware of the complexities involved.
Such similarities and differences can be further traced in the
arguments presented in the chapters above. First of all, chaos the-
ory adaptations illuminated the different ways in which literary
scholarship has conceptualised science, and, conversely, those
conceptualisations were shown to reflect the scholars’ understand-
ing of the nature of interdisciplinary research. I argued that while
many poststructuralist adaptations of chaos theory see science in
terms of either culturally determined activity or all-encompassing
textuality, the humanist approach tends either to limit itself to the
analysis of rhetoric or to take up the knowledge science has pro-
duced and use it as a metaphor in order to rethink issues within its
own purview. Especially when engaging the sciences as concep-
tual metaphors for cultural issues the humanist perspective shows
an openness to scientific ideas that separates it from both roman-
ticism and the more sceptical branches of postmodern theory.
On the other hand, the humanist perspective’s focus on co-
herent identities and acting agents presents a point of contact with
romanticism. By conceptualising identity through chaos theory it
is possible to view it simultaneously in terms of complexity and
coherence, and to re-engage literary theory with human agency.
John Barth’s authorial identity was shown to be constructed as an
entity that grows and changes from book to book but which, al-
though a textual construct, is a recognisable and undeniable, al-
most bodily presence.
While such notions cover different sides of the sub-
ject/object dichotomy, yet another way to focus on it is the con-
ceptual complex of perception and representation. I have sug-
gested that pattern for many scholars and authors is inherently
more interesting than the kind of pervasive disorder commonly
signified by the term chaos. Chaos theory has been an inspiration
to the humanist perspective of Barth, Stoppard and Graham, all
authors who are specifically interested in understanding the be-
haviour of patterns in literature. In this they differ from those as-
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pects of romanticism which emphasised the powers of disorder
over the pervasive and ordering patterns of classicism.
It is also important to add that there is nothing inhuman or
mechanistic about this love of abstract pattern. Abstraction need
not denote wilfully difficult or be opposed to lived reality, but it
can refer to shapes both invented and discovered by human im-
agination in its observation of reality. From this perspective art,
humanist research and the natural sciences are all involved in mi-
mesis, understood as the dual process of discovery and invention.
Thus attempting to comprehend or even just experience the ab-
stract, the non-human other, is in itself a very human thing to do.
Stoppard  and  Graham  present  nature  as  a  mixture  of  extreme
otherness and recognisable rhythms, as another aspect of the con-
tinuum  of  existence  of  which  human  beings  are  a  part.  Such  a
view can be seen as an up-to-date and scientific pan-romanticism.
Furthermore, this valuing of abstraction entails not just a rational
appreciation but a feeling of emotional engagement and (intellec-
tual) pleasure. Here romanticism and the humanist perspective
agree, since both criticise approaches to art and the world that are
coldly logical or demand absolute axioms.
It is clear that mapping the exact relations between romantic
philosophy of art and the contemporary humanist perspective is a
topic for further research. But for the sake of epitomising the atti-
tudes I  have tried to delineate in this  work,  it  could be said that
from the humanist perspective chaos theory is, on the one hand,
scientific rationalism shot with romanticism, and on the other
hand, romantic individualism shot with philosophical realism.
The appropriation of chaos theory in literary studies, claim
Matheson and Kirchoff (1997: 42-43), ‘results primarily in re-
peated observations of the simultaneous presence of “order” and
“disorder” in various literary works, making their authors’ opti-
mistic  claims  seem  as  mysterious  as  a  declaration  that  a  revolu-
tionary critical school was to be founded exclusively on the search
for opposing images of “light” and “darkness” in literature’. I do
not, however, want to dismiss all of the chaos-and-literature ap-
proaches quite so readily. While chaos theory should not be taken
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as the sole basis of anything as extensive as a new approach to lit-
erature and its study, examining its role in the recent discussion
has been valuable as an illustration of the handling of a number of
important theoretical issues. It is natural for human beings, in-
cluding literary scholars, to ponder on the existence of patterns,
where they come from, and what are the elements that do not fit a
particular pattern. It is equally clear that in all representation there
is an interaction between pattern and disorder, and chaos theory
appeared as the perfect model for reinventing those issues in the
context of literary analysis.
The reason why chaos theory has drawn so much attention
from  authors  and  literary  critics  is  because  it  suits  many  of  the
themes discussed in late-twentieth-century literature and literary
theory, both those based on poststructuralist theory and the hu-
manist ones considered here (see chapter 1). However, I would
also suggest that the reasons for the overly enthusiastic adoption
of physics within literary analysis in the last few decades were also
tied to a particular cultural context that may not exist anymore.
The difference between the 1990s and today is that we now know
that our discussion of order and disorder in literature is part of a
larger vision of how patterns are perceived and how dynamic sys-
tems (including ourselves) interact. Thus there is no longer a need
to forcefully argue for the existence of that larger vision by adopt-
ing natural scientific language into literary studies. Rather, literary
scholars might now go on to develop a way of talking about pat-
terns and their dynamic interaction in the vocabulary of literary
studies, as well as looking for interdisciplinary connections with
fields such as cognitive studies that are similarly involved with
human pattern-recognition. As to other areas of further research,
I have suggested a few avenues where the conceptualisations
formed with the help of chaos theory could be developed. Many
of them are already visible in the rhetorical approaches to narra-
tology, the theories of embodied posthumanity and in the growing
interest in the concept of mimesis.
As  a  conclusion  to  this  study  and  to  my  efforts  at  under-
standing chaos, order and meaning, I would like to quote Mo, the
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narrator of Jenny Diski’s novel Rainforest (1987/1988: 17-18). Af-
ter years of staring too closely at the seething biodiversity of the
jungle, Mo wants to turn her back on all that is uncontrollable:
I know chaos but the words I have for it won’t do, nor the
thoughts. I will not allow chaos into my mind any more, and if
someone has made it into an abstract symbol then I applaud
them for making it unnecessary to use words, or to tear one’s
mind to pieces in the effort to make sense of what is not sensible.
I sympathise with Mo’s sentiment of wanting to make sure her
brain will never again be forced to try to contain the paradoxes of
nonlinear dynamics. However, as to words no longer being neces-
sary for the understanding of chaos she is, fortunately, wrong. Al-
though the abstract symbol has its function in science’s efforts at
constructing models, chaos must also be approached with words,
and only through words and through the making of sense can it
be developed as a humanist concept.
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List of Abbreviations
By John Barth
OS On With the Story (1996)
OUT Once Upon a Time: A Floating Opera (1994)
By Jorie Graham
O Overlord (2005)
RU Region of Unlikeness (1997)
By Tom Stoppard
A Arcadia (1993)
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